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Political Identity Formation in Post War Lebanon: 
 
Group identity construction in the discourse of Lebanese Forces and  
Hizbullah before and after Doha agreement 
 
Mona Daoud  
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how the discourse of two political leaders in Lebanon, Sayyed Hasan 
Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, a Shiite based party and Samir Geagea, the leader 
of the Lebanese Forces, a Marnoite based party, contributed to the shaping of group sectarian 
identities before and after the Doha agreement of 2008.  Based on the Critical Discourse Analysis 
method and the group/social identity approach, this thesis shows that in-out group polarization is 
pervasive in the leaders’ speeches during both times of crisis and times of accommodation.  
Moreover, speeches in both times, with slight differences, are based on the following elements: 
categorizing the other as an enemy, appealing to emotions, and highlighting the fear and threat of 
the other. Mobilization of violence and religion exists as well in their speeches during both times, 
but more present during times of war.  Speech analysis shows that both Nasrallah and Geagea 
claim to represent and address the nation and to represent a national unity, especially after the 
Doha agreement.  However, their discourse is conflictive and works on categorizing the other as 
an enemy, and on distancing the “in-group” from the “out-group” even when claiming to address 
this nation. Finally, this thesis concludes that in the context of these manipulative and persuasive 
techniques which are practiced by the political leaders throughout their speeches, increasing 
national consciousness in Lebanon is not an easy or quick task. However, this study recommends 
one basic element of reform to be focused on: working towards increasing the level of critical 
thinking of citizens, especially of the children and youth.  
 
Keywords: Social/group identity, in-out group polarization, Hizbullah, the 
Lebanese Forces, enemy categorization, discourse analysis, speech analysis, 
critical thinking, sectarianism, political mobilization, language and identity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1–Situating the Thesis 
Prior to the 1975 Lebanese Civil War, Lebanon was known as the “Switzerland of the 
Middle East” (Hudson, 1976, p.110). However, Lebanon did not enjoy the independence 
it gained in 1943 due to a long history of continuous conflicts among its religious-ethnic 
communities (Kliot, 2008). Kliot (2008) argues that besides its internal sectarian 
conflicts, Lebanon has always been prone to the interests of external power in Lebanese 
affairs: historically, the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, USSR, and United States), 
Syria, and lately Israel. As a result, the country has been subject to periods of 
fluctuation, communal harmony, and conflict. In the early 20th century, Lebanon was 
regarded as the home of modernity, and its Christian nation-state was viewed as a model 
of modern state formation in the Levant for its inter-communal national coexistence and 
liberal affluence. However, by 1975 and the end of the 20th century, Lebanon was 
viewed as the opposite; as the habitat of civil strife and a predecessor of failed nations 
(Ziadeh, 2006).  
Lebanon consists of eighteen recognized sects; most are represented within a power 
sharing arrangement described as a consociational democracy, a type of democracy 
which usually exists in relatively small states characterized by extreme cleavages among 
communal groups based on linguistic, racial, religious, sectarian, or tribal reasons 
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(Lijphart, 1969 & Salamey, 2010). Salamey (2009) argues that the national identity in 
such countries is deeply challenged by a single centralized national identity. In this 
respect, it is important to differentiate between the concept of a nation and that of a state. 
A nation stands for a group of people who share a number of commonalities such as 
common history and heritage, a common language and customs, or similar attitudes of 
owing one’s allegiance to the nation and to its legal representation, the state. However, a 
state stands for four major factors that are more technical: a geographically defined 
territory, a stable population within this defined region, a government, and diplomatic 
recognition of this state by other states (Mingst, 2008). Mingst (2008) argues that the 
nation and the state do not coincide, but over time, a common identity and nationality is 
forged, even in the absence of religious, ethnic, or cultural similarity. 
By examining the nation-building in Lebanon, Ziadeh (2006) indicates that it has been 
clearly characterized by the mixed inheritance of communalism. Eriksson’s identity 
based approach claims that people’s perceptions of themselves in relation to others 
determine their viewpoint of the reality around them (Kreidie, 2010). In other words, the 
way people see themselves is constructed by the environment, culture or specific events 
and situations (Kreidie, 2010). Staurt Kaufman (2006) believes that conflict and wars in 
the world are mainly driven by identity. In their struggle for state power, sectarian 
political leaders may resort to promoting narrow political interests and unifying 
symbolic nationalism instead of endorsing national interests (Kaufman, 2006).  For that 
purpose, the use of religious symbols and rhetoric to mobilize followers have been 
proven most effective. Ralph Crow (1962) argues that while religious explanations are 
not enough to understand Lebanese politics, one cannot deny its importance due to the 
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influence of religious attitudes and organizations (Crow, 1962). In this sense, political 
sectarianism has come to encompass aspects of both modernism and that of nation-state 
building. Their interplay has characterized the dynamics of the Lebanese national 
identity formation (Makdisi, 1996).  Many authors and thinkers believe that the 
Lebanese are not joined based on a common national identity but rather on a set of 
cleavages between different religions and sects (Khasshan, 1992).  
 
1.2–Views on Sectarianism in Lebanon: Different Propositions 
 Sectarianism in Lebanon is examined by different scholars using different propositions, 
such as: the historical and cultural (Makdisi, Kamal Salibi, Phares, Richard Hrair, 
Dekmejian, and others), the political economic approach (Nelsen, Fawwaz Traboulsi, 
and others), and the institutional (Ziadeh, 2006, Salamey, Safa, and others), and identity 
politics, which this thesis endorses.  
Makdisi (2000) believes that sectarianism cannot operate outside history and that 
Lebanese modernity is defined by sectarianism in the modern Mount Lebanon. The latter 
is a discourse produced by a specific historic conjecture; the Ottoman reform during the 
European domination related directly and indirectly to the 19th century Mount Lebanon 
(Makdisi, 2000). According to Salibi, the study of the Lebanese identity dates back to 
the first half of the 19thcentury. Richard Hrair Dekmejian argues that Lebanon’s 
multiconfessional elite has its origins in the Ottoman period, and that there is a 
widespread alliance of elites, representing segments of the society that is faithful to the 
conservation of the existing system.  Furthermore, there is a rift between nationalist 
4 
 
growth on one hand and allegedly pre-modern religious leaders on the other hand 
(Makdisi, 1996). Sectarianism, which is known as “taifiya” in Arabic, stands for the 
claimed ancestral or inherited trend among Lebanon’s religious communities in 
weakening patriotism or what is known as “wataniya” in Arabic (Makdisi, 1996, p.23).  
In an attempt of studying sectarianism, Nelsen explains sectarianism from a political 
economy approach, arguing that religious ideology is determined by social class and 
other variables that contribute to one’s perspective of the world (Nelsen, 1972). Nelsen 
(1972) interprets sectarianism as a reflection of how individuals with limited or 
simplistic backgrounds or from the lower classes and rural areas perceive the world. In 
other words, sectarianism interprets the marginalized people’s lives simplistically, 
knowing that religious ideology and life experiences are interconnected.  
Regarding sectarianism in Lebanon, Traboulsi (2007) explains it from a political 
economy approach as well, arguing that the reduction of the Lebanese identity to one 
unique form of identity is insufficient with respect to the complexity of the situation. In 
other words, sects in Lebanon demonstrate how pre-capitalist formations are reprocessed 
to take new roles in a peripheral capitalist economy (Traboulsi, 2007). These capitalist 
formations penetrate Lebanon’s life carrying a struggle for both power and socio-
economic structures (Traboulsi, 2007).  
On the political level, Ziadeh (2006) believes that the political leaders and their allies 
(regionally and internationally) consciously constitute the foundation of the communal 
nature of the power-sharing system, the state administration, the constitution, and even 
the national identity. Moreover, understanding the process of Lebanese nation-building 
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is strongly related to looking at the development of the Lebanese constitution. In other 
words, constitutionalism dates back to the communal system during the 19th century 
Mount Lebanon (Ziadeh, 2006). For a long time, the 1926 Constitution contributed to 
legitimizing a Christian nation-state, unlike currently, in which the constitution is highly 
praised as consecrating communal power-sharing and empowering a Lebanese nation-
state (Ziadeh, 2006). Ziadeh (2006) examines nation-building through three cycles:  
(1) The rise of communal Maronite self-awareness under the two qa’immmaqamiyas 
backed by France, and the success in giving Mount Lebanon proto-national identity as a 
Christian enclave.  
(2) The rise of the Muslim opposing movement of re-assertion in the 1930s supported by 
the growing Arab and British authority in the period, followed by a Second World War. 
Moreover, this cycle is characterized by a complex power fighting between two 
opposing groups (Muslims and Maronites).  
(3) The stage of reincorporation, renegotiation, and compromise within the intervention 
of national, regional, and international actors. Moreover, Muslims backed by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the wave of Arab nationalism attempted 
to make use of the communal power-sharing system for their benefit. However, 
Christians tried to resist that by thinking of dividing the country in a way that preserves 
the Christian majority (Ziadeh, 2006).   
Furthermore, Ziadeh (2006) argues that existing communal identities in Lebanon 
undermine nation-building and the nation-state. In the context of these eighteen 
recognized sects in Lebanon, and the continuous sectarian conflicts happening, 
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Christians, especially the Maronites, and Shiite sectarian identities stand as interesting 
phenomenon in Lebanon to be studied. Christians and Maronites in particular constituted 
the dominant group before the Lebanese Civil War which ruled the Lebanese state and 
nation. This power was regarded by many scholars as “Christian hegemony”. 
Meanwhile, Shiites, who were excluded, started to empower themselves. Now, after it 
was one of the marginalized sects, Shiites in Lebanon are considered as have risen to 
impose a power stronger than that of Christians. Khalifah (2001) believes that the 
Christians in Lebanon have lost the war; that Christians in general and Maronites in 
particular, still feel unsatisfied with their participation in the process of rebuilding 
Lebanon. For this reason, an overview on Christian and Shiite identities is to be 
reviewed in the next section. 
 
 
1.3 – Shiite and Maronite Identities 
 
1.3.1– Why Christians and Maronites? 
Christians, especially Maronites, have their own perspective of Lebanon and of their 
relationship to it. Their belief in Maronite nationalism, which is also called Political 
Maronitism, is the reason behind choosing them as target group for this thesis (Khashan, 
1990).  Moreover, they believe that they are distinguished from other Lebanese 
communities (Khashan, 1990). Furthermore, Maronites constitute the oldest Christian 
sect to inhabit in Mount Lebanon since the arrival of Christianity to Lebanon. 
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Transformation, catastrophe, decay, and adjustment to various conditions, characterize 
their history, which shaped and is still shaping until now the Middle East (Khalifah, 
2001).  Maronites associate themselves with the name Lebanon, believing that the latter 
is a larger manifestation or translation of Mount Lebanon, the “historic” habitat of 
Marnoites (Khalifah, 2001). It is believed that the Maronites in Lebanon have 
traditionally acquired a great importance in determining the outlook of the Lebanese 
political framework, the reason behind having most published work concentrated on the 
Maronite community when discussing individual Lebanese sects (Khasshan, 1992).  
Maronites were always concerned about establishing a Christian Lebanese state or a 
Maronite nation-state. In this context, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon had different 
viewpoints on the independence of the Lebanese state. Muslims did not accept the idea 
of establishing the Greater Lebanon, an idea favored and endorsed by Christians. Prior to 
1958, the year that featured tensions between the two groups, Christians associated 
themselves with modernity and strong ties with the West. On the contrary, Muslims 
associated themselves with pan-Arabism and with other views which consider Lebanon 
as linked to Greater Syria and to the greater Arab region (Nicolaysen, 2008). 
Marnonites’ perception of themselves as a vigorous community should be understood 
through two ways:  first, the way they perceive themselves as a Christian community in 
comparison to other Christian and non Christian sects in and outside Lebanon. The 
second way is by looking at their close ties with Europe, specifically with France and 
Rome (Khalifah, 2001). Moreover, Maronites consider that they have descended from 
the old Phoenicians who settled in the territories of today’s Lebanon and some parts of 
Syria. They also regard themselves as responsible for defending Lebanon, and as 
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representing the only “true” democracy in the Arab world. For example, this perception 
can be recognized in the writings of the Maronite Patriarch Istfan Douaihy, as he says 
that the Maronite history is a permanent struggle to sustain religious and national 
identity in a prevailing Muslim environment (Khalifah, 2001). Furthermore, Maronites 
claim that Lebanon’s roots and history date back to the Phoenician merchant civilization 
for about three to four thousand years ago (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008). Viewing Lebanon 
as a constituent of the Mediterranean civilization, many Maronites do not associate the 
Lebanese culture with the Arabic language and Islam (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008). 
 
Kaufman (2010) calls this claim of having a Phoenician origin in Lebanon a “Phoenician 
myth”. He believes that all national movements, including those in Lebanon, worked on 
creating new communal myths of origin and historical memories which emphasize their 
cultural uniqueness. Furthermore, the Phoenician myth has fulfilled the needs of the 
whole elements of the myth of origin, such as: “myths of ancestry, migration, liberation, 
golden age, and decline and not least of all –rebirth” (p.74). Consequently, groups of 
people found in this Phoenician belief a combination of three main elements that suit the 
way they want to define themselves:  Christian faith, Latin culture, and geographical 
determinism. For instance, in 1919, the Maronite Patriarch, Elias Huwayyek, carried the 
claims of the Lebanese Phoenician descent which differentiate them from their “Arab 
neighbors” to the West; to the Western delegates in Versailles. Moreover, Huwayyek 
associated the Marnoites with the French on an ethnic level, through the ancient 
Phoenician origins of the Crusaders. Furthermore, he describes the creation of a 
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Lebanese nation as being linked to the Maronites who immigrated from 1Antioch and 
into the Mount Lebanon in the sixth century and “assimilated into the indigenous local 
Phoenician population, after they proselytized them to become good Christians” 
(Kaufman, 2010, p. 185). 
According to Kaufman (2010) there are several factors which contributed to the 
formation of the Phoenician myth of origin in Lebanon. One of these factors is the 
Maronite church, by promoting a distinctive Maronite-religious identity for centuries. 
This Maronite identity gained as well political importance with the end of the 19th 
century. However, the first people to support this Phoenician identity were not Maronite 
clergymen, “but rather non-clerical Christians who had been exposed to Western culture 
and education”; a new group of ‘liberal’ Syrians who was willing to modify the political 
situation of the Syrian provinces in the Ottoman Empire (Kaufman, 2010, p.189). 
1.3.2– Christian Hegemony 
The fear of the Maronites losing their community cohesion and Maronite identity, which 
would threaten their Maronite hegemony as well started during the period of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. This fear resulted in the arousal of political parties which held 
progressive slogans and worked on getting as much supporters as possible (Hagopian, 
1989).  During the 1960s and 1970s, the Lebanese National Movement developed under 
the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, who represented a coalition of the left, the Arab 
nationalist Sunni middle class, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
                                                 
1 Antioch on the Orontes, was an ancient city on the eastern side of the Orontes River. It is near the 
modern city of Antakya, Turkey, and was was a cradle of Gentile Christianity. 
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These national movements in Lebanon stimulated the Lebanese Maronites’ fear of 
changing the confessional system, which would reflect negatively on their 
preponderance (Salamey, 2010). Hagopian (1989) asserts that the Maronites had already 
thought that the National Pact and the assumed support from the West would solve the 
“dual problem” of maintaining their exclusive identity and assuring their eternal political 
control of the state, despite any demographic changes. Fearing to lose their control and 
identity, Maronites built their Maronite militancy, encouraged and supported by Israel 
(Snider, 1984). Maronites, under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel, relied on a heavy 
stock of Maronite ideological mythology which dates back to the seventeenth century, 
which played a role in reminding, re-energizing, and recommitting Maronites to their 
identity and their assumed rights and role in Lebanon (Hapogian, 1989).   
The period between late 1960s and early 1970s under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel 
and the Kaslik monks of the University of the Holy Spirit, was clearly focused on re-
launching Christian hegemony and demographic prevalence in Lebanon. Fearing a 
Maronite reduction and aiming at creating a Christian hegemony were two features of 
that era (Hagopian, 1989). 
 
1.3.3– Political Maronitism and the Lebanese Forces 
Khashan (1990) highlights the Maronites’ belief in their uniqueness, through reviewing 
literature on Maronite nationalism (Maronitism or Lebanisim), mostly written by non- 
Lebanese and Western Maronite scholars. This literature better explains how Maronites 
perceive their role in Lebanon. 
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To start with, Bulus Na’aman, a former leader of Maronite monks, believed that the 
uniqueness of the Maronites’ attributes, manifested in three major characteristics, 
allowed them to establish their own nation, and their social and political entity. These 
three attributes of Maronites are: their genuine respect for humans, their “spiritual” 
visualization, and their faithfulness to “authenticity”. Moreover, Na’aman described the 
Maronites as the “owners of their history” due to their connection to their land 
(Khashan, 1990, p. 727). According to Ibrahim Najjar, who was previously a member of 
the Phalange party political bureau, the best way to reconcile the Muslim and Christian 
civilizations is through Muslims’ acknowledgment of Christian superiority (Khashan, 
1992). 
Ibn al-Qila’e portrayed Christians of the fifteenth century as special people chosen by 
God among other Christians in the East to maintain the Christian identity in the 
invulnerable Lebanese mountains (Khashan, 1990). Furthermore, Patriarch Astfan al-
Duwayhie in the seventeenth century called the Maronites to come together under one 
umbrella to dismiss all outsiders, including Muslims or Jacobites. A'kl (1976), a well-
known Maronite poet and ideologue, believed that the Maronites have been victimized 
through history, and that they are closely attached to their spiritual and political leaders 
due to their suffering.  Fahd (1980) regarded Lebanon as the “Maronite heaven” and as 
an international requirement, since the democratic Maronites’ values are not common 
internationally. Furthermore, the preservation of this Christian identity and civilization is 
attributed to history and dictated by the religious authority of the Church, which in turn 
demanded its political representation as well (as cited in Khashan, 1990).  Hagopian 
(1989) indicates that Maronitism shares with Zionism a lot of ideological 
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commonalities. One of those commonalities is the tendency to exclude others. While 
Zionism justifies the establishment of the state of Israel, Maronitism justifies the 
creation of a Christian state and the domination of Lebanon by Maronites over other 
sects and religious groups. During the 1940s, Patriarch A 'rida called for the creation of a 
Zionist state in Palestine and a Christian state in Lebanon (as cited in Khashan, 1990). 
Dagher (2000) argues that Maronites associate their identities with Mount-Lebanon; that 
the Maronite and Lebanese identities have become identical. Maronites concerned about 
the new Lebanon have become uncomfortable with themselves after the war. Elias 
Sarkis, the late president of the Republic, considered that the Lebanon’s history is 
defined by the Maronites. Christian nationalism was established before and during the 
1975 Lebanese Civil War and was mainly manifested in the Lebanese Forces party (as 
cited in Phares, 1995). Moreover, in July 1980, the Lebanese Forces (LF) acknowledged 
a national resistance movement in order to pursue a struggle that started thirteen 
centuries ago; the guaranty of security and freedom to the Christian society (Phares, 
1995).  It was until 1993 that it has become an official party, but was banned a year later 
(1994), in which its leader Samir Geagea was detained and sentenced for several war 
crimes (El Khazen, 2003).  However, the party resumed its work when Geagea was 
pardoned by the parliament on July 18, 2005. The LF party claims that they represent the 
Lebanese Christian community. They also assert that the party was founded after the 
Lebanese Christian community has realized the necessity of defending itself against the 
imminent risks on the internal and external level (Lebanese Forces, 2010).  
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1.3.4– Lebanese Shiites and Hizbullah 
While Maronites were ruling the Lebanese state and nation in all forms (political, 
cultural, and economic) starting 1920 till 1975, Shiites also intended to reconstruct the 
Lebanese national discourse which emphasized their marginality (Eisenlohr, 2008).  The 
Lebanese Shiites have been regarded as both politically and geographically excluded 
within Maronite dominated areas of Lebanon. They were perceived by the general public 
as unfit in either the Libanism national narrative, which is dominated by Maronites, or in 
the project of Arab nationalism, which is dominated by Sunnis. So Shiites were left with 
the option of creating a sub-national narrative focused on South Lebanon.  
Furthermore, Shiites experienced discrimination and marginalization through the state, 
public services and institutions. They also felt that their view of the nation is not well 
represented, which led them to start taking an action in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Eisenlohr, 2008).  Shiites believed that Maronite nationalism did not provide a vision of 
Lebanon which embraces its citizens (Eisenlohr, 2008).  Shiite citizens mobilized not 
only because they were marginalized economically and politically, but because their 
vision was informed by a historical memory that was at odds with the Maronite vision of 
Lebanon. In Shiite Lebanese nationalism, the heavily populated Shiite areas took a more 
central role than Mount Lebanon (Eisenlohr, 2008).  
The Shiites’ perspective of the nation was not only challenged by Christians, but also by 
Sunnis. After the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanese politics was led by the former 
Prime Minister Hariri, whose national view of Lebanon was also far from Shiites’ 
imagination of Lebanon’s identity (Eisenlohr, 2008). While Shiites perceived Lebanon 
from a Shiite Islamic “subaltern” viewpoint, Hariri perceived Lebanon from a secular 
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“yet clearly Sunni- centered, oligarchic model with close ties to the West, especially to 
France” (p.22).   
Shiites’ movement from their rural peripheries of the South and Biqa’ to Beirut, referred 
to as the core, was mainly driven by their extreme deprivation (Ghorayeb, 2002). 
Shiites’ social movements and political mobilization were based on their lack of money, 
political organization, and literacy (Eisenlohr, 2005). Their settlement in Beirut was 
concentrated in slums, which encouraged a communal awareness among the settlers, 
who were displaced on the social, cultural, and psychological levels.  Furthermore, they 
were exposed to the rich and westernized means of life of the Sunni and Christian. As a 
result, they felt that they were self-deprived and identified themselves as Lebanon’s 
proletariat (Ghorayeb, 2002).   
Shiites’ empowerment was facilitated by the establishment of the Shiite-led part, 
Hizbullah or the “Party of God”.  Armed and funded by Iran, Hizbullah, was officially 
founded in 1985, after it has announced itself as an Islamist party dedicated to the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the endorsement of Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s Wilayat Al Faqih (Saouli, 2003).  Hizbullah was originally involved in the 
war, during the Israeli invasion in 1982 (El Khazen, 2003).  Two factors accelerated the 
formation of Hizbullah: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Islamic revolution in 
Iran (Saouli, 2003). However, Ghorayeb (2002) argues that Hizbullah’s establishment 
was not only a result of the 1982 Israeli invasion, but also of the Shiites’ political 
mobilization in Lebanon, which started in earnest in the late 1960s.  
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Hizbullah is an Islamic movement that subscribes to the Shiite version of Islam, and 
believes politically and spiritually in “Wilayat Al Fakih”, a theory of the supreme Shiite 
leader Khomeini who has an unchallenged authority (Saouli, 2003). Hizbullah has been 
calling for making Lebanon become part of a greater Islamic state (Hamzeh, 1993).   
One of the main political goals defined by Hizbullah leaders and Fadlallah (Shiite 
leader) is establishing an Islamic state as stated by the Islamic law; however many 
factors emerged since 1989 and changed their political stance (Hamzeh, 1993).  With the 
beginning of the 21st century, Hizbullah has emerged as the strongest political party in 
Lebanon (Matar, 2010). The July War of 2006 with Israel played a strong role in 
enhancing the party’s credibility in the Muslim and Arab world, and in strengthening its 
position in the Lebanese politics (Matar, 2010).   
1.3.5– A Transformation in Parties’ Representation in the Parliament 
It is worth noting that the sectarian composition of parties’ representation in the prewar 
period is different from that during postwar period (El Khazen, 2003).  Hizbullah’s 
participation in the parliament has strongly increased after 1989 Taif agreement, 
especially in 1992 parliamentary elections. Moroever, Hizbullah obtained the greatest 
number of representatives (8 seats), which increased to 14 seats in the 2005 elections 
(Matar, 2010). 
1.4– May 7, 2008 and the Doha Agreement 
 
Since time of crisis is represented by May 7, 2008 civil clash, and time of 
accommodation is represented by the period after Doha agreement, giving a quick 
overview on each of these two period is necessary. May 7 has been added to Lebanon’s 
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remarkable history of internal wars. The fighting resulted from two decisions taken by 
the government in the beginning of May 2008 which were considered by Hizbullah as a 
strong offense targeting their weapons: first, its attempt of shutting down Hizbullah's 
telecommunication network, and raising the issue to the judiciary. Second is removing 
Wafic Shkeir, the security chief of Beirut Airport over alleged ties to Hizbullah 
Hizbullah (Al Azzi, 2011, paragraph 20). The fighting started on May 7, 2008 when the 
opposition forces attacked Beirut and controlled it in four days only (Al Azzi, 2011, 
paragraph 20).   This conflict was resolved by the interference of Qatari Emir Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, by inviting all Lebanese political parties to Doha  for a 
Lebanese National Dialogue (Salamey, 2010). The agreement was signed on May 21, 
2008 by the Lebanese political leaders participating in the conference and in the 
presence of the president and members of the Arab ministerial Committee (Salamey, 
2010).  Consequently, as a result of this agreement, the opposition received a veto power 
in the new cabinet, which facilitated the election of a new president, General Michel 
Suleiman, the former head of the army. More important, a “national unity government” 
joining Hizbullah and its allies was established 47 days later (Knio, 2008). In addition, 
an accord on a new parliamentary electoral law and ending opposition protest camps in 
central Beirut as also a part of the agreement (Knio, 2008, p.446).  While many believed 
that the Doha agreement is a positive accomplishment, Knio (2008) argues that 
developments carried by Doha agreement did not resolve many primary issues that still 
divide Lebanon’s politics. Others have argued as well that the way the president 
Suleiman was elected weakened the role of the parliament and “stripped the national 
election from any majoritarian or popular meaning” (Salamey, 2010, p.95). Also, 
sectarianism was even more strengthened through the new electoral redistricting, 
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moving from the mid-sized Muhafaza to a small- sized Caza electoral district (Salamey, 
2010).  Pierre Atallah (2008) argues that the only achievement Christians achieved in 
this agreement is electing a Christian president, which emphasizes the troika of 
governance in Lebanon, and the insistence of having a Christian president (An-Nahar, 
2008).   
The identity politics is critically strong among those two sectarian groups, which prompt 
the question of how such identity politics is being emphasized and manipulated by 
populous leadership. It also leads us to ask what does this mean for the establishment of 
a common national vision for the country and the state. 
1.5– Research questions 
Having examined the deep rooted division in identity politics among the sects, this thesis 
aims to examine various questions for revealing the prospect of common politics in a 
divided identity and society.  First, how does language of leaders (speeches in particular) 
contribute to group identity construction? Second, to what extent does each of the 
political leaders of Hizbullah and the Lebanese Forces emphasize their mobilization 
strategies and the exacerbation of group identity politics? Third, where does national 
discourse stand in the political discourse of Geagea and Nasrallah? Fourth, how do 
political discourse and the accompanied mobilization strategies vary with times of crisis 
and accommodation? Fifth, what possible prospects can well target the interrelation 
between language and identity?  
This thesis aims to address these questions by analyzing the framing of identity politics 
vis a vis national consciousness within the context of leaders’ speeches. Revealing the 
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major themes from the speeches will present a strong framework to address the 
questions above.  This research examines identity politics in the context of a society 
deeply divided by sectarian and religiously charged communities. Furthermore, it aims 
at highlighting the importance of language in creating and shaping a group sectarian 
identity, rather than a national identity.    
1.6– Research Design 
 
An examination of the political sectarianization of two communal groups (Shiites and 
Maronites) struggling to control the state and its resources will be compared.  The role 
of leaders determining followers’ political choices and reinventing their sectarian 
communal identities will be studied. Two parties and their leaders will be the target of 
this research: Christian Maronite based Lebanese Forces party, and the Islamic Shiite 
based Hizbullah party. The speeches of the leaders of these parties, Sayyed Hasan 
Nasrallah and Samir Geagea, respectively, will be examined.  Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah is 
the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, and at same time he is the religious/spiritual leader 
of the Shiites, a religious sect in Islam. As for the second leader, Geagea, although he 
did not get the opportunity to pursue his academic work in medicine (Lebanese Forces, 
2012), he is still called as “Dr., or “Hakim” in Arabic, which stands for a medical 
doctor.  Geagea is currently the commander of Lebanese Forces, after he has previously 
led it as well before his imprisonment in 1994 for eleven years due to crime related wars 
(Al Jazeera English, 2006). He was later released on 26 July, 2005, through a vote by the 
new cabinet established that time (Al Jazeera English, 2006). Geagea is currently a 
member of the anti-Syrian “March 14” parliamentary group (Al Jazeera English, 2006).  
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The Lebanese Forces, Lebanon’s most prevailing militia during the Lebanese civil war, 
represents the Christian Maronites, who in turn formed a kind of hegemony in Lebanon 
until the Lebanese Civil War. On the other hand, Hizbullah represents the Shiites, who 
after have been marginalized and excluded politically and socially, have become the 
major represented sect in the parliament. While the Lebanese Forces currently represents 
the pro-government group named as “March 14” Coalition, Hizbullah represents the 
opposition to the government named as “March 8 Coalition”.  This shift in political 
power between the two sects constitutes the main reason behind choosing these two 
parties to be the target of this study.  
The thesis will examine the contexts of parties’ leaders’ speeches in mobilizing 
respective supporters in their struggle for state power.  This is to reveal group/social 
identity construction that dominates leaders’ political appeal, which in turn can serve as 
indicators of the driver of communal identities. A critical discourse analysis will be 
implemented during these periods: first, during May 8 and May 9, 2008 (respectively), 
which stand for time of crisis. The second period is after Doha agreement (May 21, 2008 
and September 21, 2008), and it refers in this thesis to time of accommodation. Through 
speech discourse analysis, main mobilization speech contexts will be examined and 
compared to time of accommodation. It is suspected that Lebanese political leaders work 
on social identity constructions to manipulate their followers and achieve their political 
interests at the expense of national interests. Although social identity mobilization and 
the strengthening of sectarian identity improve sectarian leadership positions, it 
complicates the formation of a collective national consciousness.  
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1.7– Research Plan 
The thesis is divided over five chapters: The first chapter has introduced sectarianism in 
general and Lebanon in particular. It gave a quick overview on different propositions on 
sectarianism mainly four: sectarian communalism (identity politics), economic struggle, 
institutional, and historic. The second chapter will describe the methodology 
implemented in the chapter, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), to examine how 
political leaders can construct a group identity through their discourse. Knowing that 
CDA is considered as a non-specific direction of research since it lacks a unitary 
theoretical framework (Schiffrin & Tanen &Hamelton, 2001); a whole chapter will be 
dedicated to explaining this methodology. The third chapter will analyze thoroughly two 
speeches of Hizbullah’s leader, Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, relating his discourse to group 
identity construction. The fourth chapter will analyze two speeches of Lebanese Forces’s 
leader Samir Geagea, relating his discourse to group identity construction as well. The 
fifth chapter will be the conclusion and will consist of two major parts: first, a 
comparative conclusion to the discourse analyses. Second is my personal opinion about 
possible recommendations for the future supported by experts’ interventions. 
 
21 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1– Discourse and Politics:  Contextualization 
 
Any political action relies heavily on language, whether in the preparation process or in 
later stages of influence and control. Moreover, language plays a significant role in 
converting a political will into tangible social action which is recognized by political 
parties before anybody else (Schaffner, 1997). Dijk (1994) called for discourse analysis 
to involve an actual social, political or cultural analysis. The study of language has 
recently become more central to academic disciplines concerned with politics. But, the 
correlation between language and politics is studied through various theories and 
methods (Schaffner, 1997).  
Matar (2010) describes political speeches as per-formative political speeches and argues 
that they require a semiotic world culture of communication. A culture of 
communication is defined as a communicated aggregation of references in religion, 
history, literacy, and methodology, regarded by a group of people as valid tropes which 
they draw onin all times, and which they treat as authentic (Matar, 2010). Performative 
political practices constitute what Foucault calls the “meticulous rituals or the micro-
physics” of power which characterize ordinary people’s lives in many aspects (Matar, 
2010).    
Althusser (1971) argues that discourse is a medium which produces subject or identity.  
Similarly, Gramsci (1971) believes that hegemony, power through “consensus, 
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persuasion, and complicity” organized by culture industries, is largely practiced through 
discourse (as cited in Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 30).  In other words, the consent of 
subjects to particular constructions of power is a result of the discourse produced by the 
prevailing cultural group, which carries with it persuasion of “essential truth, 
desirability, and naturalness”. This discursive view of identity is followed by Foucault’s 
(1972) “discursive production of the subject”, which states that prevailing discourses 
fixed in social formations and practices constitute the source of production of subjects or 
identities (as cited in Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p.30-31).  Habermas believes that 
language is a means of control and a social force, as it helps in legitimizing relations of 
organized powers (as cited in Wodak& Meyer, 2001).  
The Critical Discourse Analysis is a kind of discourse analytical research that mostly 
studies how social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are created, replicated and 
repelled in written and oral words in the social and political context (Dijk, 2008).  All 
CDA are based on these three concepts: the concept of power, the concept of history, 
and the concept of ideology (Wodak& Meyer, 2001). Dijk (2008) emphasizes that CDA 
is mainly concerned with a specific kind of power, the abuse of power, which is 
manifested in forms of domination that lead to racism, social inequality and 
discrimination. CDA analyzes the demonstration of both opaque and transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control in language 
(Wodak& Meyer, 2001) 
2.2– Requirements of CDA 
There are a number of requirements which critical research on discourse needs to meet 
in order to realize powerfully its objectives. It mainly focuses on social problems and 
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political issues, and particularly how the relationship between power and authority in 
society is enacted, confirmed, legalized, reproduced, or challenged, through discourse 
structures (Dijk, 2008).  There are eight principles of CDA, as described by Fairclough 
and Wodak (1997):  
1. CDA tackles social problems. 
2. Power relations are discursive. 
3. Discourse forms society and culture. 
4. Work of discourse is ideological. 
5. Discourse is historical. 
6. The connection between the text and society is reconciled. 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. 
8. Discourse is a type of social action. 
CDA does not have a unitary theoretical structure, knowing that it is not a definite 
course of research. There are of course many forms of discourse analysis, since an 
analysis of a conversation is different from an analysis of a political speech or a 
professor’s lecture.  However, since CDAs are based on common aims, their theoretical 
frameworks are often highly interrelated. Some of the most familiar terms used by 
critical discourse analysts are: “ideology, power, dominance, hegemony, class, interests, 
discrimination, reproduction, institutions, etc...” (Dijk, 2008, p.4). 
There is no leading theoretical perspective that is constantly applied within CDA 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2001). According to Dijk (2008) discourse studies can be considered 
critical when they meet one or more of these criteria:  
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1) Relations of domination are studied mainly from the standpoint of, and for the 
benefit of the dominated group. 
2) The experiences of (members of) dominated groups are also used as verification 
to assess dominant discourse. 
3) Revealing the illegitimacy of discursive actions of the dominant group. 
4) Formulating feasible alternatives to the dominant discourses that are dependable 
on the interests of the dominated group. 
 
CDA methods focus particularly on the complex relations between social and discourse 
structure. Moreover, it is concentrated on how discourse structures are affected by social 
structure. Language is the only medium through which power abuse can be apparent in 
use, where there is the option of variation or choice, “such as calling the same person, 
terrorist or freedom fighter, depending on one’s position and ideology.” To be more 
specific, CDA is concerned about the “in -out group categorization” (Dijk, 2008, p. 4). 
The “in-group” is what is referred to as “we”, who constitute members inside “our” 
group, while “out group” implies them, those who are outside the group.  So, “in-group 
members” rely on this racist and ideologically discourse, to highlight the positive 
features of one’s own group and its members in comparison to the negative features of 
the out group.  This general strategy is called “in-out group polarization”, or “in-group 
praise versus out group derogation” will be used in this thesis, believing that it may be 
recognized in different ways and at many ranks of discourse.  
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2.2.1– Interpretation 
It is the operation of making meaning of a text through reading and analysis. It relies on 
three dimensions of discursive practice: 1) its linguistic expression. 2) Its representation 
of a social practice (political, ideological, etc...). 3) The concentration on socially 
constructed practices of production, distribution, and consumption which indicate the 
processes of making, circulating, and using texts (Wodak& Meyer, 2001) 
2.3– CDA and Power 
CDA mainly focuses on the relationship between language and power, considering the 
text as the basic element of communication. Critical linguistics (CL) and CDA are 
sometimes used interchangeably (Wodak& Meyer, 2001). However, with time CDA has 
become more appealing, through its focus on language as a social practice. Dijk (2008) 
prefers to replace the label of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with Critical Discourse 
Studies (CDS) because “CDS uses any method which is related to the aims of its 
research projects and such methods are largely those used in discourse studies generally 
(Dijk, 2008, p.2).  Kress outlines the main assumptions of critical discourse analysis that 
were prominent in the early stages and were developed later:  
1) Language is a social phenomenon. 
2) Individuals, institutions, and social groupings have particular significances and 
principles that are manifested in language in systematic strategies. 
3) Texts are related components of language in communication. 
4) Readers and hearers are critical recipients when it comes to their relationship to 
texts. 
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5) There are similarities between the language of science and the language of 
institutions, and so on. 
Since readers and hearers are regarded as critical receipients by CDA, it is worth noting 
that in my speech analysis, I am not assuming that all listeners are not aware of the 
hidden ideologies behind speeches. Morover, I believe that there are many listeners who 
are very critical of leaders, even if they follow their political approach, and this study 
can help them in even becoming more critical. However, since since others may be 
unaware, this study highlights the covert purposes behind speeches.  
2.4– Why CDA? 
What distinguishes CDA from traditional content analysis and other analysis methods is 
that it relates the study of text with context (Dabbous-Sensenig, 2006). CDA is focused 
on discovering power relationship; it aims at “ideological unmasking” by uncovering 
“hidden meanings” or “covert purposes” (Schaffner, 1997, p.51). Being able to analyze 
certain exemplary speech fully in its rhetorical elements might lead to the following 
possible conclusion: that the speech addressed is a powerful device and that a “power 
relationship” has been constructed ideological unmasking. Although CDA is not based 
on rhetorical analysis, we can still leave a space for rhetorical analysis (Schaffner, 1997, 
p.51). In this context, the speech analysis in this research involves some rhetorical 
analysis when necessary.  
Van Dijk (1988) divides the work of CDA into macro and micro levels: The micro is 
focused on syntactic (the study of the patterns of formation of sentences and phrases 
from words), lexical (pertaining to vocabulary of language), and rhetorical features of 
the text. The macro level is concerned with the overall content of the text. In this respect, 
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my analysis is based on two levels rather than one; on the rhetorical analysis within the 
micro level, and the overall content within the macro level. 
Since CDA does not have a specific methodological and theoretical approach and since 
there is no particular framework for the study of manifestation of power relations 
(Dabbous-Sensenig, 2006), I will choose a methodological framework which suits the 
purpose of the study: I will follow different work samples on discourse analysis which 
are mainly related to speech and rhetorical analysis, and therefore can help me identify 
the main elements that are usually used in speech analysis. I will refer as well to 
linguistic references when it comes to structure and grammar. In this respect, I will 
follow Badran’s sample (2010) on critical discourse analysis of Nasrallah’s speech 
(2006), Dabbous-Sensenig’s sample (2006) on critical discourse analysis of Al Jazeera’s 
religious talk show Al Shari’a wal Hayat, Fairclough’s sample teaching on the method 
(2010), and Koch’s article on Language of Arabic Rhetoric (1983). Moreover, the basic 
dogma of critical discourse analysis; that language unmasks the power ideological 
relationship, will lead my analysis. However my analysis will not go deep into the 
method’s implementation and reliance on linguistic dissection of the text. 
Some assume that discourse analysis is only based on linguistic analysis. However, 
discourse analysis is not necessarily reliable on linguistics, but rather it can involve 
various methods in the research of human communication found across humanities and 
social sciences. Discourse analysis in this thesis relies on two main components: the first 
studies the overall content, while the second focuses on some linguistic features. For 
example, the following elements are examined in the overall content:  
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1) In-out group polarization (in group praise versus out group derogation). 
2) Image Theory: enemy categorization. 
3) Mobilization of religion, violence, and emotions. 
4) Repition (in terms of content) and persuausion. 
5) Manipulation. 
As for linguistic and rhetorical analysis, it is based on the following elements:  
1) Modality and extreme case formulations. 
2) Lingusitic empathy. 
3) Transitivity and nominalization. 
4) Rhetorical figures (tropes and figures). 
5) Foregrounding. 
6) Repition in terms of form (cumulative and morphological parallelism). 
It is worth noting that speeches of Hizbullah’s leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, and the 
leader of the Lebanese Forces’s leader Samir Geagea, are originally in Arabic.  
2.5– Social/ Group Identity Approach 
The speech analysis is based on a social/group identity approach. The social identity is a 
social psychological approach developed by Tajfel (1970) and it is concerned with 
studying group processes and intergroup relations. Furthermore, it is used by political 
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psychology to understand conflict between groups (as cited in Hudson& Hogg, 1999). 
Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Preston (2004) define the social identity as the layer 
of identity which develops from the individuals’ knowledge of their membership in a 
social group and from the significance of emotional impact associated with that 
membership. In identity conflict, politicians resort to symbolic politics, the use of 
symbols for controlling the emotions of their audiences in order to achieve their own 
political purposes, instead of endorsing any national interest (Kaufman, 2003).   
The social identity approach is the approach concerned with groups’ categorization. 
According to this approach, there are two categories classified by “us” and “them”: in-
groups and out-groups, respectively. The first is the one which “we” (as perceived by the 
group or party) belongs to, and the latter is the one which we do not belong to, but rather 
“they” do. Furthermore, Tajfel’s experiments (1970) show that groups under 
examination before categorization had no reason or clue about discriminating against the 
other groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) indicate that discrimination against the outer-
group results from the group’s motivation to find theirs as more positively enhanced in 
comparison to others (as cited in Cottam et al., 2004). Furthermore, the there are 
probable reactions to any threatening to their positive social identity: first, social 
mobility, which is a way that depends on putting the other-group in a lower status so that 
the positive social identity would be preserved. Second is social creativity, an approach 
which relies on either changing the comparison dimension or comparing one’s group to 
a lower status. Third is social competition, which depends on competing with the other 
group to gain more uniqueness (as cited in Cottam et al., 2004). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYSIS OF SAYYED HASAN NASRALLAH’S 
SPEECHES BEFORE AND AFTER DOHA 
AGREEMENT 
 
 
3.1– Multifunctional Roles of Nasrallah and types of Persuasion 
The Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Sayyed Hasan, plays multifunctional roles, 
reflected on his position as a speaker. He plays the following roles at the same time: a 
military leader of a group (Hizbullah or “the Resistance”), a political leader since he is 
the leader of the largest parliamentary bloc in the opposition, a spiritual leader of the 
Shiites, a religious group/sect in Islam, and the socio-ethnic leader of the Shiites as a 
“socio-ethnic sect”, which has been usually perceived as the “largest and single poorest 
ethnic group” in Lebanon (Badran, 2010, p. 194). So, ethos, the process of persuasion 
through the moral character of the speaker can be well recognized and maintained at 
multi levels.  It is worth noting that Sayyed Nasrallah is considered as one of the leading 
liberation theologians in contemporary Islam (Matar, 2010). Originally, Hibzullah’s 
discourses are highly influenced by the intellectual contributions of Imam Musa al-Sadr, 
the spiritual leader of the Shiites in Lebanon, and which are approved by the Islamic 
Shiite Higher Council (Matar, 2010).  
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According to ancient rhetoric, particularly the pragmatic subdivision of Aristotle to 
effective argumentative strategy or modes of persuasion, there are three types of 
persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos. Persuasion in each of the three types is 
accomplished differently. Moreover, in ethos, persuasion relies on the morality which 
the speaker holds. Pathos, on the other hand, stands for setting the audience in a specific 
emotional frame of mind. And, in logos, persuasion relies on the speech itself. So, 
persuasion is the ultimate objective of rhetoric (Badran, 2010).  
 
 
3.2– Part One: Nasrallah’s Speech on May 8, 2008 
3.2.1– Introduction and Background 
This chapter will analyze and interpret two speeches of Secretary-General of Hzibullah, 
Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, according to particular elements of CDA. The chapter is 
divided into two sections, each analyzing a speech. In this section, I will analyze 
Nasrallah’s speech during time of crisis, a day after May 7, 2008, events which featured 
strong fractions and fights between alliances of March 8 and March 14.  It is worth 
noting that the Arabic video/audio version is the same from all sources, but the English 
transcribed translation may differ. For this reason, I am relying on Hizbullah’s 
translation available on their website, to guarantee that the message, when translated, is 
transmitted as it is. However, due to some weaknesses in these translations, they are 
further edited by a professional translator.2 
                                                 
2The English version of the speech is cited in the references.  The Arabic version is found at: 
http://video.moqawama.org/details.php?cid=1&linkid=470 (cited as well). 
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3.2.2– Reactions to the Speech 
This speech, delivered by Nasrallah on May 8, 2008, was regarded by pro-government 
(March 14 Coalition) supporters, as aggressive and war leading (An Nahar Newspaper, 
May 9, 2008)3. Following this speech, the situation has exacerbated and the violence 
between each of the two groups (opposition and pro- government) remained and even 
increased until the Doha agreement on 21 May, 2008 (Salamey, 2010). On May 9, 2008, 
a day exactly after his speech, Hizbullah forces targeted Al Mustaqbal centers, and a 
number of injuries and casualties fell due to war dismemberment in the streets (An 
Nahar, 2008).4 Respectively, on May 10, 2008, pro-government media station, Future 
TV was assaulted by the opposition group, and the news channel was unplugged by 
Hizbullah backers (Abu-Fadil, 2008). This action was followed by a supportive protest 
by Lebanese journalists and civil society groups of all leanings, and was considered by 
An-Nahar daily newspaper as an action that represents the rejection of the Lebanese to 
“darkness, oppression, tyranny, injustice” (Abu-Fadil, 2008, paragraph 3). This not to 
say that Nasrallah’s speech constitutes a direct or indirect reason behind the 
exacerbation of violence, but to narrate what happened during this period, especially 
after his speech which held a lot of war and threat connotations (An Nahar, 2008)5. 
Some reactions to his speech came as follows:  Geagea considered Nasrallah’s speech as 
a metaphor of announcing war, believing that his smart approach of attempting to 
                                                 
3There are also other pro–government newspapers that can be checked out such as Al Mustaqbal and Al 
Liwaa, which convey the same description of reactions to the speech 
4 For more information, readers can visit: 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/Arabic/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=41695 
5 Readers can check other newspapers’ headlines and news for further perspectives 
33 
 
obscure the practical positions of Hizbullah does not deny that he announced war in his 
press conference (An Nahar, 2008). The Minister of Communication Marwan Hamadeh 
considered that the resistance has turned into a militia and later a “gang” (An Nahar, 
2008, p. 1). 
3.3– Speech Analysis 
The analysis in this section is based on the image theory, a theory that explains a form of 
group categorization according to the social identity approach. Such a type of 
categorization (image categorization) is not only capable of excluding the out-group as 
discussed before, but even of categorizing the “out-group” as an enemy. Image 
categorization usually applies to states’ categorization of others as enemies or allies.  
However, I argue that this type of categorization is used in this speech, even if the “out-
group” does not constitute any state or outsider in terms of territory. I argue as well that 
the “other”, denoted by Nasrallah as the “authority group” is perceived and represented 
as an enemy. This is manifested in associating the image of the “authority group” with 
the image of Israel and the United States, two well-identified enemies of Hizbullah.  For 
example, Nasrallah (p.130) says that Jumblat is an “employee for Condileeca Rice”, and 
that this war which is initiated by Walid Jumblat against the Resistance and its weapons 
is for the interest of America and Israel and on behalf of them. Nasrallah also accuses 
them of conspiracy, by allying with them for destroying Hizbullah, especially during 
July War 2006. This is when he considers that their decision is made to serve American 
and Israel by igniting a civil war. He makes it clear by saying:  
Secondly, this decision has unveiled the truth about this group, its background 
and the truth of their commitments and behaviors and performance during the 
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July War of 2006, to which they felt sad for its results. Third, this decision is 
intending to disarm the resistance from its most important factor that protects its 
leadership, commanders, and infrastructure. It aims at disclosing it in an attempt 
to assassinate it, kill it, and destroy its infra-structure. Consequently, they are 
partners in the killing, at least by providing the first steps and opening the roads 
(Nasrallah, 2008 a). 
 
3.3.1– Enemy Categorization 
In this speech, two types of enemies appear: first are the external, which are familiar: 
Israel and the United States of America. Second is the internal, represented by March 14 
coalition, Premier Walid Jumblat and government members in particular (Sanyoura, 
Haririri, and Minister of Information). March 14 coalition is usually identified as an 
opposing coalition to March 8, but not as an enemy as it appeals in this speech. This 
becomes evident throughout the following excerpts.  
Nasrallah (2008 a) says: 
What a government? This is not a government at all; it's a gang. It's neither a 
state of laws nor a state of institutions; it's a gang. It isn't even a militia; it's a 
gang. It's a shame, shame in order to turn blinded-eyes to the weapons of the 
resistance you are abusing internal issues and affairs.  
According to image theory, images hold information about a country’s capabilities, 
culture, motives, types of decision-making groups (whether many or few), and views of 
threat or opportunity (Cottam et al., 2004).  Capability refers to the following: military 
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strength, economic status, domestic political permanence and efficiency in making and 
implementing policy (Cottam et al., 2004). It is worth noting that whether the enemy 
(so-called “authority group”) is inferior or superior in capability and culture is not 
clearly indicated.  For instance, it can be superior in terms of capability since according 
to Nasrallah, they own the authority and the money. This description can be realized in 
the following parts, where Nasrallah (2008) says in reference to his discourse about his 
agreement with “authority group” about contacting Hizbullah in case they detected any 
international call: 
Tell us if you detected any international call and we can deal with it together. We 
believe that illegal calling is wrong and its money to us is tainted corruption, and 
stealing of public money 
Nasrallah (2008 a) also accuses them of stealing public money by saying: 
When the government was made, they wanted to monopolize the airport, not for 
taking bribes, for they were already repeatedly doing so. Only God knows what’s 
inside those boxes and bags: weapons, money, white, green, black…God knows. 
On the other hand, the authority group can be inferior due to the fact that they are not 
strong militarily strong as Hizbullah is, and since their authority is considered by 
Nasrallah as illegitimate, since Nasrallah (p.130) keeps on repeating and emphasizing 
that “it’s not a state; it’s a bossy gang…”  Due to the uncertainty and ambiguity of 
defining the ‘enemy’s’ capabilities and culture, the interpretation will include two 
possible types of enemies, in which each of the three is based on applicable criteria: the 
diabolical and the degenerate enemy.  
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A diabolical enemy is the enemy who is strongly linked to threat and intense emotions, 
and approximately equal in capability (Cottam et al., 2004). Nasrallah, in this speech, 
denotes them as “authority group” and “illegitimate cabinet”. Meaning, the capability 
that he perceives in them lies in their authority, despite its illegitimacy in his opinion. In 
extreme cases, the enemy is seen as having the following permanent characteristics: 
aggressive motivation, monolithic decisional structure, and high rational decision 
making (Cottam et al., 2004). The first two characteristics, except the last one, according 
to this speech, apply to the government as perceived and represented as diabolical 
enemy. In such cases, citizens who do not agree or may have a more complicated 
perception of the enemy are often accused as possible traitors (Cottam et al., 2004).  
Expert in political psychology, Lina Kreidie (2011) argues that associating the authority 
group with Israel does not only intend to cause a dichotomy between each of the in- 
group and out-groups, but within the out-group themselves, and the Sunnis in particular. 
Moreover, his statement can be interpreted as showing the Sunnis that their leaders are 
traitors and agents (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov. 1, 2011).  In this respect, it 
is noteworthy that according to some analyses, May 7, 2008 communal strife was 
considered as the climax of Sunni-Shiite confrontation (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 
2011). 
The authority group can be also categorized as a degenerate enemy which is associated 
with disgust, contempt, scorn, and anger, a combination of feelings that can eventually 
end in hatred. Also, contempt and disgust can also lead to dehumanization and to 
genocidal violence. This combination of emotions can also lead to the need of 
eliminating the enemy, and to a risky underestimation of its capabilities. Although a 
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degenerate enemy may be characterized with equal or stronger capability, its leadership 
is perceived as failing to build an efficient strategy (Cottam et al., 2004).  
 Describing the government group as “gangs” stands for Hizbullah’s perception 
(represented by that of Nasrallah) of the culture of the authority group. Nasrallah (2008 
a) also describes Premier Jumblat, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, which is a 
major group within the March 14 coalition, as “a liar and gifted in lying, and a killer by 
his own confession”. As well, he considers Seniora, former Prime Minister and a 
member of the March 14 coalition as “poor employee of Jumblat.” This representation 
does not only stand for his perception of inferiority in terms of culture but also for his 
perception of their brutality, represented by killing and lying. He also mentions that the 
government is “the government of Mr. Jumblat”, who was already described as “a liar 
and killer” (Nasrallah, 2008 a, p.133).  
The next excerpt of the speech denotes the enemy as “the bad seed” or “the spoiled 
child” who needs punishment in order to reform (Cottam et al., 2004).  Planning to 
punish that spoiled child for the past and possible future harm is recognized when 
Nasrallah (2008 a) threatens the authority group saying: 
Excuse me, we have begun a new phase, we aim to arrest those who want to 
arrest us, and shoot at those who want to shoot us. And we are going to cut the 
hand that approaches one of our youth. 
Nasrallah also says: 
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And from now I inform them that we will never tolerate anything related to the 
security of our own commanders and leaders. They would say kidnapping, arrest, 
no problem.  
In other parts Nasrallah (2008 a) mentions that everything that happened before was not 
serious enough to lead to a war, but what happened recently is worth declaring a war, 
saying: 
After the decisions made by the government on the dark night, we consider that a 
war has started and it's our right to defend our weapons, our resistance, and the 
legitimacy of these stipulations.   
3.3.2–Mobilization of Religion and Violence 
As mentioned earlier, knowing that Nasrallah is a religious leader and that Hizbullah is a 
religious-based political party, emphasizing Islam as one of the essential themes is 
expected. However, religion is not only used as an essential theme, but also as a tool of 
mobilization, especially that Nasrallah’s role as a spiritual leader and liberation 
theologian makes persuasion easier.  
Furthermore, giving himself the right to decide that his group and the authority group 
will not meet in the after-life, Nasrallah implies an extreme distancing from the authority 
group based on religious beliefs and not only political ones: 
Anyway in the afterlife we will definitely not be together, but on this earth they 
are not going to see it. This is due to the recommendations of Winograd and 
Welch and the hot summer… 
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The question is: why wouldn’t he and the out-group (authority and government 
members) meet in the afterlife? In general, saying that they would not meet in the 
afterlife may imply that “they” (the other group) is not within the in-group’s category. It 
is not explicitly indicated which category would fit each of them. However, it is clear 
that he is totally distancing himself from them, particularly regarding their life endings6. 
According to Islam, which Nasrallah and Hizbullah and Muslim Sunnis (who are in the 
authority group) follow, after life is based on the Day of Resurrection. Moreover, this 
day rewards the faithful and obedient followers with paradise, and punishes the 
sacrilegious, deviating, and wrong-doers with hell (Qassem, 2005). Since Hizbullah is 
founded on Islam intellectually, religiously, ideologically, and practically (Qassem, 
2005), this implies that he does not mean that the in group would be in hell, and the out 
group would be in heaven.  
Supported by the U.S, Israel requires Hizbullah’s resistance and a holy war (jihad) 
against the enemy’s occupation, since Jihad, the path to God, denotes every single effort 
made to fight against the enemy (Qassem, 2005).  Based on that, the implicit statement 
which Nasrallah made can be: they are going to hell, while we are going to heaven. This 
is an extreme categorization, which is not only capable of leading followers to regard 
them as enemies, but also as inferior. Moreover, in such a case, followers of Nasrallah 
are expected to mobilize through their religious beliefs and to practice jihad towards this 
group which is an enemy in religion, and not only in politics. Knowing that Nasrallah is 
not only a political leader, but also a spiritual religious figure (Sayyed), who stands as a 
                                                 
6However, March 14 coalition is made up of different parties, all which belong to three monotheistic 
religions: Muslim (Sunnis), Christians, and Druzes. While Druzes believe in reincarnation, Muslims and 
Christians believe in the afterlife (Itani, 2008). 
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credible reference by being one of the most leading theologians in Islam (Matar, 2010), 
his religious perception of the enemy’s categorization and punishment in the after-life 
are more likely to be believed. Nasrallah already established himself his image of 
honesty, and he uses his image for his benefits. Even if he lies once time, it’s difficult to 
prove it’s a lie due to this image of credibility (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov. 
1, 2011). 
3.3.4– Extreme Case Formulations 
Nasrallah’s discourse involves a lot of extreme case formulations; that his constructions 
of any issue or belief do not leave much room for alternative choices. Such constructions 
or extreme case formulations can be regarded as having rhetorical and ideological 
appeals and not only merely grammatical. Such formulations are regarded as rhetorical 
since they are constructed to manipulate audiences with his own interpretation, and 
ideological or hegemonic because they empower the existing socio- religious power 
relations through religious consensus and public consent (Dabbous-Senseing, 2006). 
For instance, Nasrallah (2008 a) says: 
Today they want to coax the Lebanese army and Lebanese Security Forces into a 
direct confrontation against the Resistance, by the task of neutralizing this 
network. This is how we see the decision.  
By this, Nasrallah has interpreted the decision and considered that there is no alternative 
interpretation. It could be concluded from the above excerpts of his speech a number of 
constructions and interpretations he made about the authority group and about their 
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position regarding that. These interpretations are not presented in the form of “I think or 
I believe”, but rather as statements. These constructions about the out group, which is 
identified by Nasrallah as “they”, include the following: 
1. They have started the war; they are the first to declare it against Hizbullah. And 
so Hizbullah has “the right to confront them in defending their right, weapon, 
resistance and presence”. He declares that this decision of self-defense is 
“certain”. And by this, he is not declaring any war, but rather declaring defense. 
2. They want to start a civil war or drive a conflict between Lebanese Army and 
Lebanese Security Forces. 
3. That they are illegal, illegitimate, and a gang. 
4. That they are stealing the public money. 
5. That they are allying with “America” and Israel with the aim of destroying 
Hizbullah, and that their project is purely American. 
6. There would be no Sunni-Shiite clash. 
3.3.4– Mobilization of Emotion 
The discussion of social identity falls into the category of cognition and politics (Cottam 
et al., 2004).  However, this discussion leads to the discussion of emotion, another 
important element of political psychology, knowing that even if the reaction to political 
issues is cognitive-based, emotions still permeate this cognitive process.  According to 
Cottam et al. (2004, p. 48) “people have emotional reactions to political issues, actors, 
and events, and also to political principles and ideals they value”.  So, despite the fact 
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that it’s difficult to study emotions and affect taking their presence into consideration is 
important, especially that the reaction that was taken after Nasrallah’s press conference 
on May 8, 2008 by his supporters was violent. In this context, defining affects and 
emotions can be helpful in interpreting the opposition’s reaction to Nasrallah’s speech. 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) define an affect as “a generic term for a whole range of 
preferences, evaluations, moods, and emotions”. They also define an emotion as “a 
complex assortment of affects, beyond merely good feelings or bad to include delight, 
serenity, anger, sadness, fear, and more” (as cited in Cottam et al., 2004, p.48). 
Accordingly, the authority group was dealt as an enemy and emphasized as such not 
only through using insulting descriptions, but also through regarding them as a source of 
threat which aims at destroying Hizbullah, and as inferior in terms of culture by stealing 
money, killing, and acting illegitimately. So, it can be concluded that the emotion which 
was manifested in the action, of the opposition group against the authority group during 
the civil strife of May 7, 2008, was anger. This anger can be interpreted as a result of the 
mobilization strategies which Nasrallah was emphasizing in his speech, within a group 
identity he is forming, which in turn is contradictory to the concept of the nation-state.   
Kreidie (2011) interprets this speech as a justification of an act of violence, through 
representing their action as a result of fear and imminent threat. Nasrallah’s action was a 
reaction to a perceived threat, and that his speech was a continuation of war. It is 
interpreted as well as an act of war knowing that war does not happen through action 
only but also through speeches. Furthermore, his speech did not stop the war, but rather 
continued the war until Doha agreement (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov. 1, 
2011). 
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3.4– Part Two: During Liberation Memory (2008) 
3.4.1– Introduction and Background 
This section will analyze excerpts of Nasrallah’s speech during time of accommodation, 
manifested in the period after signing the Doha agreement on May 21, 2008. The 
process of in and out- group categorization and its possible leading consequences (such 
as discrimination) will be examined. This speech is delivered on the day of the 
Resistance Liberation Memorial on May 26, 2008, after few days from signing the Doha 
agreement of 2008. Unlike Nasrallah’s speech on May 8, 2008 which transmitted direct 
threats against the government and March 14 Coalition7, this speech is less conflictive 
and more nation-oriented. More important, Nasrallah addresses the nation and dedicates 
it the resistance’s victory. While he says so, he addresses his supporters as the purest and 
the noblest people. 
3.5– Speech Analysis 
 
3.5.1– In– out group categorization versus nation address 
 The in-group is what is referred to as “we”, who constitute members inside our group, 
while the out group implies “them”, those who are outside the group. So, the in-group 
members rely on this racist and ideologically discourse, to highlight the positive features 
of the in group (referred to as our) and its members in comparison to the negative 
features of the out group (Dijk, 2008). This strategy exposes participants to deep and 
                                                 
7The speech is cited as both video and transcribed, for readers interested in both listening to it in Arabic 
and reading it in English. 
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complicated “socio-cognitive process” of the participants, in which they are disposed by 
discourse structures on the one hand, and “influence interaction”, and  therefore “future 
discourse”, on the other hand (Dijk, 2008, p.5). Below are two examples on how 
Nasrallah highlights this in-out group categorization: 
Nasrallah (2008 b) starts his speech saying: 
Here you have congregated in huge crowds to prove once more your identity and 
truth, and also the fact that you are the most honorable people, the most generous 
people, and the purest people [followed by yelling from the audience]. 
Here, there is a comparison between the attendees of the liberation memorial and the 
outsiders through using comparatives and superlatives, forms which are used to compare 
between adverbs or adjectives (Winterowd & Murray, 1983). While comparatives are 
used to compare between two adverbs or adjectives in which one is better than the other, 
the superlatives are used to indicate the best, using either er/est or more/most 
(Winterowd&Murray, 1983). Most of adverbs and adjectives form their comparative and 
superlative degrees with the words more and most. Adverbs and adjectives can show 
lesser amounts by using the word less in the comparative degree and least in superlative 
degree (Winterowd & Murray, 1983). When Nasrallah uses the superlative form, he 
explicitly announces that the attendees are more honorable, more generous, and more 
pure than the others, regardless of their identity. 
Nasrallah continues talking about division groups in Lebanon saying: 
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The Israeli occupation split the Lebanese people into numerous groups: a neutral 
group that stands on the sidelines waiting, a second group that is indifferent 
about what happens as long as it eats, drinks, and goes on outings on the 
weekend, a third group of cheap collaborators and tools such as Lahd’s army 
who are both cheap mercenaries and Lebanese...a fourth group that originally 
had intersecting interests with the Israelis and continues to collaborate with them, 
a fifth previously defeated group, of mainly elites, that cooperates with the 
occupiers on all levels within the framework of cutting national losses. And there 
is a sixth group that, politically and publicly rejects occupation, but is not ready 
to practice what it preaches. And lastly, a seventh group that believes that its 
humanitarian, national, religious and moral obligation is to take up arms and 
liberate the country regardless of the price; this is the group of the resistance that 
believes in resistance and resists in practice” [His voice is raised] 
Here, Nasrallah makes it clear that this seventh group, which compromises of the 
resistance’s followers, is the best category. As well, he identifies the identity of the 
outsiders as one of those six categories which are described negatively. Once again, he 
puts the in-group members at the highest rank and the out group members at a lower 
rank. This is at the heart of the social identity approach (Cottam et al., 2004). For more 
clarification, each of these six categories will be dissected and analyzed separately: 
To start with, Nasrallah (2008 b) says that the first group does not react; it just stands 
and waits and that the second group is not concerned about what happens as long as it 
drinks, eats, and goes on outings on the weekend. He emphasizes that these people are 
not concerned about the state and the future of their country; however he does not 
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indicate if these people are concerned about other issues such as studying, working, 
volunteering, etc... In this context and according to three definitions provided by the 
dictionary of such a behavior, it could be interpreted that these people are described as 
passive.  
1. Not reacting visibly to something that might be expected to produce manifestations of 
an emotion or feeling.  
2. Not participating readily or actively; inactive.  
3. Not involving visible reaction or active participation: to play a passive role.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in his description of all of the six groups he uses the 
simple present tense and not present continuous tense, knowing that the simple present is 
used to express the idea that an action is repeated or usual. The action can be a habit, a 
hobby, a daily event, a scheduled event or something that often happens8. Therefore, this 
can imply that these actions taken by each of the six categories are almost stable or 
happening in most of the times. Therefore, those out-group members are heroes in most 
of the times, and in-group members are indifferent and cowards in most of the times.  
The other three groups are described negatively since they are considered as 
collaborators with Israel. The less negative description is appropriated to the sixth group, 
who is similar to the Resistance by its rejection of the occupation. However, unlike the 
Resistance, that group is still incapable of taking an action to end the occupation. 
                                                 
8(http://www.englishpage.com/verbpage/simplepresent.html). 
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Therefore, the Resistance is better than the sixth group in its readiness to take up arms 
regardless of the price.  
However, in the light of this extreme in-out group polarization, Nasrallah insists on 
addressing the nation repetitively in his speech. More important, he dedicates the victory 
of the resistance against defeating Israel to the nation. He gives the nation significance 
by inserting the term “nation” in almost every context.  Furthermore, Arabs, Muslims, 
and the Lebanese nation are all together addressed. In other words, the Lebanese nation 
is considered a target audience as much as the Arabs and the Muslims are. For instance, 
Nasrallah (2008 b) says while he is giving the listeners different choices between 
different types of action: 
Or will you take the stance that is dictated by your religion, your Islam, your 
Arabism, your nationalism, your ethics, and your humanity? 
However, it cannot be considered the nation is the target audience as much as it can be 
considered that the audience is ambiguous. In other words, his discourse appeals to have 
a diverse and unrestricted target audience, but actually the target audience which is 
accredited is the “seventh group”, the resistance members and supporters, which he 
salutes in the beginning of his speech. Furthermore, Nasrallah’s frame of jihad and 
muqawama or “Resistance” is hybrid and ambiguous; he does not differentiate between 
the Islamic frame of Jihad from the political frame of muqawama, as if they have the 
same implication, in order to assemble all the Lebanese people as a national group 
(Matar, 2010). This ambiguity in discourse implies that world perspectives are subject to 
48 
 
interpretation and appropriation by miscellaneous publics, regardless of their political or 
religious beliefs or choices (Matar, 2010). 
In addition to that, he even justifies divisions in the Lebanese nation as a result of a 
natural historic social division, and says that the Lebanese case is not an exception in 
that regard. This justification can be interpreted as if he is saying: no group is to be 
blamed for these sectarian divisions, including Hizbullah, who was accused of war 
waging in his speech on May 8, 2008 and the actions followed his speech. Saying that 
“many tried, through their media, to twist this truth”, proves that he is trying to keep 
away the blame directed against him. It is noteworthy that this speech was only 17 days 
after the 1st speech (May 8, 2008), and 4 days only after signing Doha agreement. So, 
this justification can be interpreted as an attempt of rejecting the accusations that 
Hizbullah has caused divisions between different groups in the nation, especially that he 
emphasizes in this speech that Hizbullah does not seek power in Lebanon, and that they 
believe that “Lebanon’s diversity should be preserved”. Therefore, this justification can 
be inferred as a counter-argument to those who accused him of aiming to take over 
Lebanon and endanger its diversity.  
3.5.2– Modality 
In general, modality generates the degree of authority of an utterance. The modal 
auxiliaries (may, must, can, etc...) play this role of authority, but they contain a 
systematic uncertainty about the nature of authority whether it is based primarily on 
knowledge or on power (Kress and Hodge, 1979). Examples: he can walk means either 
he is able to walk (representing the speaker’s knowledge about his abilities) or he is 
allowed to walk (representing speaker’s permission).The speaker’s choice of modal 
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expressions indicates both the degree and type of involvement a speaker has in the 
content of his/her message, and therefore her/his ideological standpoint/s (Badran, 
personal communication, Aug. 19, 2011).   
 With you as a subject, the speaker is giving himself an authoritative power on the 
other’s actions. The modality depends on specific verdicts about the participant’s 
trustworthiness (Kress and Hodge, 1979). First and second persons are considered as 
determiners that constrain the space and opportunities of the utterance. The relationship 
between the first two persons is controlled and structured by speech roles in what is 
called transactive speech model, due to its conception of the speech exchange as vibrant 
and interactional.  
According to Kress and Hodge (1979) the speech model usually takes three forms where 
in each there is a relationship between the speaker and the hearer, as follows:  
1) Statement, in which the speaker plays the role of the giver of information, while the 
listener is the seeker of information. The neutral form of a statement is declarative. 
Statements forms are present a lot in this speech, in which Nasrallah informs about 
the resistance’s strategy, the divisions in Lebanon, the resistance in Palestine and 
Iraq, and the internal Lebanese situation past then.  
An example from Nasrallah’s speech on that:  
Regarding the resistance, the resistance has set an example and offered a strategy 
in two fields instead of one: the strategy of liberation and resistance, and the 
strategy of defending the people and the nation against invasions and threats.  
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This division is a natural historic social division and is not limited to Lebanon 
and it is the result of losing national consensus on any issue. 
Nasrallah’s statements are not preceded by I believe/I think, which may imply that his 
statements are not opinions but facts. In this excerpt, there are two case formulations:  
first that the resistance was capable enough to set an example of a strategy, and second 
that the division that is occurring in Lebanon is “natural and historic”. Hizbullah 
succeeded in constructing an effective strategy, which his adversary failed to do. The 
emphasis on the enemy’s failure in planning a strategy constitutes one of the factors for 
categorizating the other as a degenerate enemy. (Cottam et al, 2004). 
2) Command, in which the speaker commands and the hearer receives the command. 
The neutral form of a command is an imperative.  
An example from Nasrallah’s (2008 b) speech on that:  
And I call upon any occupied nation as I have in the past that the resistance 
doesn’t wait for consensus. 
This is the command which comes directly after his call: It rather takes up arms and 
moves on to the duty of liberation, the liberation of land, people, and captives. To regain 
dignity and glory with arms, blood, and heavy sacrifices. So, the command is: to be 
dignified; taking part in the resistance is a must.    
3) Question, in which the questioner is an expert and aims at producing the right answer 
through his question rather than finding from the hearer the right answer. So, the 
hearer’s role is receiving the right answer from the speaker. Its neutral form is an 
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interrogative. To demonstrate this type of modality, below are examples from 
Nasralla’s speech (2008 b) presented in a form of question and answer: 
1) Question two raised by the speaker:  
Today you are faced with a test. Will you hand over Iraq to the Americans 
forever and ever? Or will you take the stance that is dictated by your religion, 
you Islam, your Arabism, your nationalism, your ethics, and your humanity? 
Answer as answered by the speaker: 
He does not answer the question explicitly but he gives the audience one of the two 
contradictory and different choices. Moreover, the first choice is regarded as “spy, 
collaborator with the Americans and Israelis, unloyal, etc...”, while the other is 
popularized as “honorable, reputable, etc.” These two distinctions are very clear in this 
speech, as we will see, in which he differentiates between the resistance members and 
others. The command implied here is to: stand against Americans’ take over in Iraq.  
So here is the construction: his above stated command should be recognized as long as 
people are already attached to one of the following: their religion Islam, Arabism, 
nationalism, ethics and humanity.  It can be interpreted that he is declaring that there is 
only his perspective of seeing the issue, the one put forth by him, as if there are not any 
further perspectives and interpretations of the issue. 
2) Question two asked by the speaker:  
52 
 
The July-August 2006 war is the example. How was it possible for a public 
resistance.....? How was it possible, as judge Winnograd put it, for several 
thousands to withhold for weeks in the face of the strongest army in the Middle 
East? 
Answer as answered by the speaker:  
We are not discussing a defensive strategy studied in books and universities, 
rather, of a defense strategy that was implemented and inflicted defeat on the 
aggressor and usurper in the confessions of its entire society 
3.5.3– Foregrounding 
It is a stylistic technique where the text pushes foreground specific element/s (Badran, 
personal communication, August 19, 2011). This technique is used to make a subject of 
the speech more prominent than the other (Freeborn, 1996). This technique can be done 
through many ways as: foregrounding text, foregrounding rhythm, foregrounding the 
final syllables of lines, and foregrounding consonants and vowels (Freeborn, 1996).  
Nasrallah (2008 b) mainly uses text foregrounding, in which he starts the speech by 
informing the audience about the outline of the speech according to priority of 
information.  
Examples on that: 
I will skip all introductions. I will start with Lebanon. Regarding the Resistance, 
the Resistance has set an example and offered a strategy in two fields .So, the 
priority of the speech is the strategy which the resistance has offered. 
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Before I conclude my research on the resistance and move on to the internal 
Lebanese situation, I would like to tell you that we have presented an example of 
a strategy of defense as was the case in the liberation strategy. 
Here he is not offering new information, but rather repeating and emphasizing that 
Hizbullah/the Resistance (referred to as “we”) have presented an example of a 
strategy defense.  
He says as well:  
I prefer, for now to postpone this debate and stand the unjust accusations against 
the Resistance for the sake of reunification. 
This debate is about a press conference held during that week; he indicates his confusion 
of whether he should discuss that or if he should postpone the discussion for later.  He 
decides that this discussion should be postponed so that people’s joy and happiness for 
having a new president elected would not be ruined. Thus, by continuously putting forth 
these statements, he is prioritizing information, and the prioritized information is related 
to the Resistance’ defense strategy. 
3.5.4– Linguistic empathy 
This strategy is done through establishing audience-speaker empathy through using 
personal pronouns as “we/us”, instead of “I/me”. This can be done also through using 
interrupting narratives in the middle of a sentence, such as: Interrupting the sentence to 
say “and now” (time) or “and here” (place) which helps in letting the audience feel that 
they are part of the story and the issue (Badran, personal communication, August 19, 
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2011).  For example: “Yet again, the resistance’s liberation strategy won, and today, I 
repeat, speaking on Hizbullah in precise”. 
He also says: 
I will skip all introductions for we have much to talk about today 
Our eighth anniversary 
We Lebanese are no exception in this matter 
As Arabs, as a nation, and as Muslims, our sole way out of the catastrophe and 
all its ideological, psychological, military, security, political, and social 
implications…  
We are not discussing a defensive strategy studied in books and universities; 
rather, a defense strategy that was implemented and has inflicted defeat on the 
aggressor and usurper in the confessions of its entire society. Yes dear brothers 
and sisters, your nobleness and courage, your resistance which thwarted Israel’s 
war and aggression all weakened the possibility of war in the region. In Lebanon, 
we are the most dignified people because we fought in the July War and will 
continue to fight in any future confrontation. 
Here the audience is considered as part of the resistance not only in terms of support, but 
also in terms of the resistance’s fighting work, and strategic planning. In fact, the 
strategic defense is not put by the audience, but rather by specific officials in the 
resistance, knowing that most probably many of the audience may have known nothing 
about this defensive strategy before the speech. However, by saying “we have 
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presented”, audience would feel more association with the resistance, and more 
important they would feel that they are given credit and importance in the strategic work 
and decision-making of the resistance, while in fact they are only receiving information 
from their leader in that regard.  
Other examples from Nasrallah’s speech (2008 b) on that: 
We sought no thanks, prizes, or gifts from anyone. We did not seek share of 
power or share of offices. We did not want anything at all. 
Yes, dear brothers and sisters, your steadfastness in Lebanon, the blood of your 
martyrs, your nobleness and courage, your resistance which thwarted Israel's war 
and aggression on Lebanon...all weakened the possibilities of war in the region. 
All these examples demonstrate the audience-speaker empathy. Moreover, he 
emphasizes the union and cooperation of the speaker and audience in standing against 
“the other” (Badran, 2010). Simultaneously, distancing from “the other” is empowered 
by using emotionally loaded words to denote followers of Hizbullah as “your 
steadfastness, your martyr, your nobleness and courage, your resistance”,while using the 
words “collaborators with Israel, defeated group, cheap collaborators such as Anthony 
Lahd, cheap mercenaries and Lebanese at the same time” to describe the other. This is at 
the heart of pathos, or persuading through speaking to the emotions of the audience, 
knowing that pathos is entwined in the view that the way reality is understood is deeply 
rooted in the feeling of the audience towards that reality (Badran, 2010).  
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3.6–Conclusion 
 
This chapter started by stating that rhetoric automatically leads to persuasion and that 
there are three types of persuasion. As the speech analyses have shown, the three types 
of persuasion apply to Nasrallah’s discourse and to the speech after the Doha agreement 
in particular, especially that the former fits more with war waging category.  
Moreover, in both speeches Nasrallah’s rhetoric relies on ethos, pathos, and logos in 
persuading the audience, i.e. on the morality of Nasrallah, by:  classifying who is evil, 
liar, and stealer and who is not, specifying the frame of mind for listeners, and third 
through the speeches themselves. These three factors which met together contribute to 
persuading listeners. Furthermore, the speech during time of crisis can be interpreted as 
persuading listeners that the other group deserves to be attacked or deserves the war.  
However, the second speech persuades listeners by the significance existence and 
persistence of the resistance as a force which joins the Lebanese nation, Arabs, and 
Muslims. While Nasrallah’s speech during time of crisis was addressed to the Lebanese 
groups in general and March 14 Coalition in particular, the second speech (during time 
of war) was addressed to the Israelis. While the first was based on war waging against 
the Lebanese “out-group” (March 14 Coalition), the second was based on direct and 
fixed statements directed to the Israelis on the continuity of the resistance’s presence, 
and to the Lebanese who are questioning their weapons.  The speech after the Doha 
agreement shows a shift in his rhetorical frame, this time emphasizing the nation and 
national unity and even Lebanon’s diversity.  
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It can be concluded from the above discourse analysis that Nasrallah’s discourse after 
Doha agreement is not nation-oriented as it appeals, but rather in-group oriented. 
Nasrallah claims to seek a national unity and to care about the nation rather than the 
subdivisions, but in fact he highlighs in this speech intergroup polarization by putting his 
group at the highest rank and the other group at the lowest rank, and by reviving past 
talks related to the in-group’s victory versus the out-group’s concern about nothing more 
than seeking political power.  As for enemy categorization, it is pervasive strongly and 
explicitly during time of crisis. However, it is suddenly replaced during time of 
accommodation by Hizbullah’s concern about national unity. Moreover, the enemies 
referred to in this speech are: Bush, who is associated with Pharaoh, America, and Israel. 
Knowing that during time of crisis, the authority group was associated with these major 
enemies, and therefore with Pharaoh and all the evil image it carries, and knowing that 
Nasrallah did not beg off his associations, it can be concluded that March 14 Coalition is 
still regarded as enemies, without mentioning that explicitly.  So, the tone during time of 
accommodation is much different than that during time of crisis; more peaceful, less 
violent, and concerned about the nation. It can be also interpreted as a justification for 
the violent discourse during time of crisis. In both however, we can recognize the 
presence of:  
1) Mobilization of emotions, religion, and violence.  
2) Persuasion and manipulation.  
3) Extreme case formulations. 
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 4) Extreme in-out group polarization while claiming to address the whole nation and 
call for national unity. 
 5) Ambiguity in discourse.  
Based on the belief that people are expected to discriminate and differentiate when they 
are in a situation which involves prominent and relevant intergroup categorization, in an 
attempt of enhancing their social identities (Tajfel, 1970), an exacerbation of the conflict 
between the two coalitions is expected to occur after such speeches.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS OF SAMIR GEAGEA’S SPEECHES 
BEFORE AND AFTER DOHA AGREEMENT 
 
4.1– Elements of Speech Analysis in Geagea’s speeches 
 
Fairclough’s “three-dimensional model” is based on three levels of analysis: discursive 
practice, text, and social practice. The level of analysis which this research is concerned 
about is the text, since it is the most suitable level to answer the research questions 
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).  Fairclough suggests a number of tools for text analysis 
that help understand how texts construct events and social relations and therefore 
produce specific constructions of truth, social identities, and social relations (Phillips & 
Jorgensen, 2002). Out of his proposed tools, the following are to be considered: 
modality and grammar (nominalization and transitivity). In addition to that, the 
following elements will be examined as well: in-out group categorization, moral 
emotions, mobilization of violence, and mobilization of religion (Christian roots and 
identity). Arabic rhetoric is also examined according to two elements: repetition and 
persuasion (in terms of content and form) and rhetorical figures of speech (tropes and 
figures). 
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4.2– Part One: Geagea’s Speech before Doha Agreement, on May 9, 
2008 
 
Introduction –4.2.1 
 
This speech was delivered on May 9, 2008 after Nasrallah’s speech on May 8, 2008 
(analyzed in Chapter 3), and after the attack of the opposition group (March 8 Coalition) 
to the group of government adherents (March 14 Coalition), which has started on May 7, 
2008 (Al Azzi, 2010, paragraph 20). Unlike the second speech, this one is short, which 
explains the difference in length between the two speech analyses. In this speech, 
Geagea speaks based on his concern about national unity and partnership, which he 
considers is threatened by Hizbullah.  
4.3– Speech Analysis 
4.3.1– Group Polarization and Enemy Categorization: Manipulation towards a 
Sunni– Shiite Clash 
 
Knowing that the main approach of this research is social identity, the speech analysis 
will start by examining the same element examined in Nasrallah’s speech analysis: 
group categorization. This speech shows that like Nasrallah, Geagea works on in-out 
group polarization by differentiating between the in group who is resistant and the other 
group who is leading a bloody and nationally destructive revolution. Unlike the second 
speech under analysis (after Doha agreement), the categories (in-groups and out-groups) 
are not left ambiguous, but rather clearly identified.  The in-group is not only clearly 
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identified as the March 14 group but as Sunnis and Druzes, precisely. That’s when he 
salutes each of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblat, and his father Kamal Jumblat.  
This group categorization is enhanced through a process of manipulation. Manipulation 
is a term that describes an action of rigging decision making by a group member who is 
in most cases the leader. In general, manipulators use three strategies: affecting group 
structure so that their allies would control decision making, manipulating agendas and 
framework of group individuals, and manipulating their personal relationships with 
group members in formal and informal ways. Using the third way, leaders put 
themselves in encouraging and positive stands to influence the decision’s outcome 
(Cottam et al., 2004).  Manipulation occurs when political leaders know what are the 
dominant norms and values of people and appeal to them for certain political interests. 
Leaders can manipulate followers through, for example, encouraging them focus on the 
divisionary factors rather than looking at the historical part of the political issue, a 
strategy used in this speech (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov 1, 2011). In this 
context, language can be used to manipulate thought (Wilson, 2001). 
 Manipulation happens through either persuasion or coercion, and in this speech 
manipulation is achieved through persuasion. This speech is interpreted as trying to 
manipulate listeners by playing on their emotions and their fear in particular. Moreover, 
Geagea addresses the fear of the “Sunnis” and “Beirutis” of Lebanon, rather than 
addressing the fears of Christians (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov 1, 2011).  
Moreover, Geagea (2008 a) says: 
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Beirut did not fall when Israeli invasion raped it, and it resisted, and it will not 
fall today.  
Beirut was invaded treacherously in the darkness, by the hordes of Hizbullah, the 
claimers of resistance, who were embraced by the proud capital of Lebanon… 
 
Although Beirut is for all, it is usually referred to as the demographical site of the Sunnis 
and associated with the Sunni identity. The emphasis is on Beirut, the capital, where the 
Sunnis associate themselves with, in an attempt of causing a Sunni-Shiite division.  
Kreidie (2011) argues that Geagea is manipulating listeners’ fear by using the term 
“invasion” of specifically the capital “Beirut”, knowing that the fights took place in the 
mountain as well. This is a humiliation of the other because it is associated with an 
enemy action (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov 1, 2011). In that respect, it is 
noteworthy that Geagea specifies former Prime Minister Saad Hariri by a special 
salutation for his resistance in “his capital” and among “his people”. Saying that the 
capital is Hariri’s can imply implicitly that the region attacked by Hizbullah is that of the 
Sunnis. This interpretation becomes clearer when he says that although Beirut has 
protected and embraced them, they turned their weapons against it. So, Beirut is not 
represented as their original place, but as a place they were accepted and welcomed by 
the in group (Sunnis) to stay at. Furthermore, Hizbullah is portrayed as the enemy who is 
using his weapon to fight the “Beirutis” and “Sunnis”. 
For social identity purposes, Geagea is trying to persuade his own people with the 
strongest threat, the existential threat: that Shiite threat is challenging the Maronite 
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existence. However, he and who endorse this argument cannot say it explicitly because 
the other group would respond saying that they have been already in the government 
without turning it into an Islamic state. So, they are not able to expose this existential 
threat explicitly and directly, therefore turning the threat to the Sunnis, as if they are 
warning them from the Shiites who may take Beirut from them ( Kreidie, personal 
communication, Nov 1, 2011).  
 
4.3.2– Modality 
 
As explained in chapter three, analysis of modality is mainly concerned with the 
speakers’ degree of affinity with or association to her or his statement by committing 
themselves to their statements according to different degrees (Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002).  A complete commitment of one’s self to truth is one kind of modality, and it is 
practiced in Geagea’s speech. Moreover, Geagea describes Hizbullah’s angry action in 
the street in this way: “it is an armed revolution” and “it is an assault of national 
partnership” rather than saying “I think or we think it is an armed revolution” and “I 
think it’s an assault of national partnership” respectively. 
4.3.3– Appealing to Moral Emotions: Moral Outrage and Empathy 
 
Moral emotions are defined as emotional reactions that encourage supportive actions 
which promote the interests of the other or of society as a whole (Pagano &Huo, 2004). 
Moral emotions apply as well to situations which encourage support for precise political 
actions on behalf of political bodies, an area of focus which this study is concerned 
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about. Moreover, this study is not concerned about studying how Geagea appeal to these 
moral emotions to influence the whole Lebanese society, but rather how he influences 
his in group. Moral emotions include: guilt, empathy, and moral outrage.  Geagea 
appeals to two moral emotions in this speech: empathy and moral outrage. Each of these 
moral emotions has different psychological roots and action tendencies. To explain 
moral outrage, it will be compared witha more frequently used term, guilt. While guilt 
focuses on blaming victims for their pain, moral outrage focuses on the agents that 
caused the victims’ harm. Moreover, unlike guilt, moral outrage does not allocate the 
blame for the victims’ pain to the in- group, but rather to an external “perpetrator”, a 
third party (Pagano &Huo, 2004, p.231).  Moral outrage can stand as well for an 
emotional reaction to an unjustified offense to oneself or to others, or even to communal 
values (Pagano &Huo, 2004).   
For example, Geagea (2008 a) says: 
A salutation to our people in the resistant and proud Beirut… 
A salutation to every one of you 
           A salutation to every resistant mother and frightened child… 
In this extract of the speech, Geagea appeals to the listeners’ moral outrage, by 
representing his in-group as victims who are resisting a third external party.  
Consequently, moral outrage may lead either to retributive actions which aim at 
punishing the perpetrator or to reformative actions that aim at avoiding recurring insults 
(Pagano &Huo, 2004). Furthermore, this type of language used by Gaeagea is 
considered by Fairclough (2010) as conformist, in which speakers speak on the behalf of 
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nations on such occasions using conventional pre-constructed terms (clichés): salutation, 
resilient Beirut, faith in Lebanon, etc...  
Another type of moral emotions featured in this part is empathy, which holds feelings of 
“sympathy and compassion” for the victim or the sufferable individual.  Empathy has  
been regarded  as  the ability  to experience  an  emotional  response  matching with  the 
perceived welfare  of another person  (Pagano & Huo, 2004, p. 233). It is created by 
choosing to depict the mother and her child in a frightening situation. It is also featured 
when Geagea (2008 a) describes the consequences of Hizbullah as follows: 
A number of the innocent citizens have died and others have been wounded. 
These citizens do not own any weapons but their dignities, free wills, and 
attachment to their nation, Lebanon, before anything else. 
Empathy is highlighted once again through describing victims as innocent victims and 
lacking weapons to fight back Hizbullah’s attack. It is worth noting that by saying 
“citizens” and previously “national wound”, he is speaking on behalf of the nation. 
However, this “nation” address contradicts the group categorization he highlights in 
other parts of the speech. While he highlights the Shiite existentialist threat to Sunnis in 
particular and while he addresses Sunnis and Druzes (members of March 14) in some 
parts, he contradicts himself by addressing the nation and the citizens in other parts of 
the speech. 
 
66 
 
4.4– Part II: Geagea’s Speech after Doha Agreement: On September 
21, 2008 Annual Memorial Prayer for the Convenience of the Souls 
of Martyrs of ‘Lebanese Resistance’: 
 
4.4.1– Introduction 
 
 The Doha agreement was signed as a result of May 7, 2008 strife on May 21, 2008 
(Salamey, 2010). The period after signing the agreement, within year 2008, is referred to 
in this research as time of accommodation, despite the continuation of disagreement 
between each of the two groups (March 14 and March 8). This speech was delivered on 
the memorial prayer of martyrs of the Lebanese Forces (LF) which is held every year by 
the Lebanese Forces, and in which its leader, Samir Geagea usually delivers a speech 
after the prayer. Knowing that the prayer is dedicated to the souls of LF martyrs, the 
speech delivered usually tackles political issues arising during the year of the memorial. 
In this speech, Geagea mainly accuses the unspecified “other” for attempting to distort 
the image and purity of LF members’ martyrdom.  
This speech is selected because the occasion (memorial of LF martyrs) in which it is 
delivered is very significant to Christians of the Lebanese Forces. Knowing that it is 
preceded by a religious occasion (Lebanese Forces, 2008), this can help studying how it 
can affect the political discourse. In other words, it can help answer the following 
questions: does this religious spirit of the occasion shape the political discourse of 
Geagea and make it more focused on the Christian, and specifically the Maronite sect to 
which this party belongs to, rather than on the nation? Or does it lead to changes in 
Geagea’s political discourse? And to what extent is the political discourse delivered 
67 
 
influenced by this religious spirit; that is, to what extent does it work on group 
categorization and polarization, instead of calling for national unity?  
Excerpts of this speech are presented in their original version in Arabic whenever 
necessary along with their English translation. The translation is mine, since the website 
of LF does not provide any translations to Geagea’s speeches under analysis, but it is 
edited and approved by a professional translator.  
4.5– Speech Analysis 
 
4.5.1– In– out group Categorization 
 
In their experiment, Tajfel and his colleagues (in Abrams & Hogg, 1999) were able to 
reach the result that social categorization per se was enough to cause inter-group 
discrimination.  Furthermore, in intergroup situations, people struggle for positive 
uniqueness. Meaning, in an attempt of positively evaluating themselves, they distinguish 
their own group from the out group, because in doing that, the positive implication of in 
group membership returns to the self. 
In this respect, it is important to briefly discuss self-categorization theory, a production 
of social categorization, which is evident in this speech when Geagea praises the “in 
group” while antagonizing the “out” group. Moreover, social categorization leads to a 
depersonalization process of group prototypes (defining models), manifested in the 
production of divergent in-group and out-group defining models that incorporate 
relevant group members. Consequently, the way individuals embody themselves, 
perceive issues, feel, and behave are ruled by in-group prototype, when the in-group 
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members apply this process to themselves. Moreover, some possible future 
consequences include: consis tency and group influence, unity and solidarity, and 
stereotyping (Abrams & Hogg, 1999).  
In the majority of the speech, Geagea distinguishes between LF group and martyrs and 
the “other” without explicitly naming it. This is evident by denoting the other as “some 
and “they”. This unidentified other is represented as attacking the in group and 
attempting to distort their image and the truth. For example, Geagea (2008 b) says in 
reference to their attempts of distorting the in group’s logic of right and truth: 
So, the insulters, hypocrites, liars and deceivers shall be silenced by the 
deafening sound of truth, and Lebanon shall triumph. 
It is clearer when he compares between each other’s causes by categorizing the in group 
cause as the one characterized by crucifier and the out group as characterized by 
destruction: 
Their cause is one forever: attempting to damage the symbolism of our 
martyrdom. 
 Our cause is one forever: to be crucified so that we would deserve Lebanon’s 
rise. 
 
This in-out group polarization is enhanced through focusing on the effect and omitting 
the agent.  This is evident in two grammatical features: transitivity and nominalization 
(to be analyzed below, p.67). 
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4.5.2– Mobilization of Violence through Grammar 
 
The two grammatical features (transitivity and nominalization) are used in this speech 
analysis to demonstrate an extreme case of group polarization; mobilization of violence. 
In this respect, a definition of violence is necessary. Violence Prevention Alliance, 
which was formed at the WHO- hosted Milestones of a global campaign for violence 
prevention meeting, defines violence as: 
The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in 
or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, or deprivation.  
There are three main kinds of violence: Inter-personal, self-directed, and collective 
(political, social, and economic). The analysis of this speech is concerned about the third 
kind of violence, the collective political, which stands for violence committed by larger 
groups. The analysis in the following will focus on how the discourse highlights the 
violence perpetrated by the other group against the in-group through studying grammar 
and repetition.  
Transitivity  
Transitivity is a linguistic feature which uses the passive form and excludes the agent. 
Therefore, it omits the agent of responsibility, and highlights the effect rather than 
emphasizing the cause. The purpose of studying transitivity is to study the connection 
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between events and processes and between subjects and objects. Transitivity is 
important as well in examining the ideological consequences of different sentence 
structures (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).   
For example, Geagea (2008) says: 
We were attacked more and more, but this time for our role in putting an end to 
the war 
So, they overturned it on you and portrayed you as criminals and mercenaries 
aiming for a crime on one hand, and stealing bread on the other hand. 
So, the violence, the moral attack of LF members and martyrs, committed by the other 
group is highlighted, through depicting them as criminals. However, the agent behind 
this attack is not identified, for reasons to be analyzed later on (in p.69).   
Nominalization  
It is another linguistic feature that reduces agency and highlights the effect by having the 
noun standing for the process. The majority of the speech is based on nominalization, 
whereby Geagea starts by saying that LF martyrdom is featuring attempts of distortion 
and denial, without indicating the agent behind these attempts. He continues the whole 
speech with that tone, discussing how LF martyrs are treated by “those”, without naming 
them.  
Below are different excerpts of Geagea’s speech (2008 b): 
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And is there any indication of treason more ugly, awful, and painful, than 
delving in empty graves and in the hated past… in order to distort the image of 
the others and to achieve cheap political gains? 
Is there any sign of sedition greater than their intention of forgetting who the 
enemies of Lebanon are, and even defending them …?  And in contrast 
attacking, day and night, the innocent fighters and martyrs, who triumphed over 
the torture and oppression which they experienced in prisons? 
So, the emphasis in this part is on the destructive and violent effects of this action of 
discrimination committed by “the other” on Lebanon’s destiny, on the “in-group”, and 
on the martyrs of the Lebanese Forces. Representing them as violent is achieved through 
the following ways: first is through comparing the violence of the out-group to that of 
Ottomans, who were famous for their oppression and violence. Second is through 
attacking a Christian religious figure and the Christian martyrs of the Lebanese Forces.  
4.5.3– Possible Interpretations for Omitting the Agent of Violence 
The agent behind this violence and the process of the action are left unstated. But, the 
destructive and offending end result that the unspecified “they” has caused is stated. At 
the same time, although Geagea does not explicitly indicate the identity of the agent, the 
target audience, if aware of the political updates, can figure out some of the agents.  
Moreover, Geagea mentions the event of attacking the Patriarch, which was associated 
with Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah’s reply to Sfeir that Lebanon’s glory was 
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given only to the resistant and activist nation of Lebanon9. So, Sayyed Fadlallah and his 
supporters can be considered as one of the missing agents who caused the effect 
emphasized, not to forget the Christian opposition who also criticized the Patriarch 
during that time. Accordingly, the emphasis in this excerpt is on the effect on what the 
other has done to distort LF image and Lebanon’s destiny. 
This dialogue is defensive, and can be interpreted as intending to leave the other 
undetermined and up to people’s interpretations, whether it’s the Christian opposition or 
Hizbullah. Perhaps, Geagea does not want to point the finger against the Christian 
opposition specifically so that his call for Christian unity in this speech would sound 
more acceptable to the Christians.  Therefore, he does not specify the other as either 
Christian opposition or Hizbullah, or both, because he is addressing the Christians and 
calling them to unite, and so it is not for the benefit of his call to attack them directly.  
So, this passive tone is intentionally done to serve his call for Christian unity (Kreidie, 
personal communication, Nov. 1, 2011). 
In addition to that, the other is unidentified in almost the entire speech, although this 
other is accompanied with a lot of demonization. However, Gaegea implicitly reveals 
the identity by mentioning the weapons of Hizbullah for several times in different 
contexts, and at some points without explicitly mentioning the name Hizbullah. For 
instance, he concludes his speech wondering sarcastically how the state acts can be 
powerful if “their weapons” are weakening the state.  Kreidie (2011) argues that it can 
                                                 
9 To check this news on the website of the LF readers can check: http://www.lebanese–
forces.com/web/MoreNews.aspx?newsid=58525. For more information, readers can also check sources 
such as: Jaridat Al Sharq Al Awsat Now Lebanon, Lebanese Forces, Al Rai, Al Hizb Al Takadomi Al 
Ishtiraki. 
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be also a demonization strategy, by not naming the other, but still associating them with 
the bad image (liars, hypocrites, etc...), and with the violent image (attack, 
discrimination, crying mother and children, etc...).  
4.5.4– Mobilization of Violence: Repetition and Persuasion 
 
This section is concerned about an Arabic linguistic analysis, which interprets repetition 
used in this speech; a characteristic of Arabic language, as an attempt of persuading 
listeners with the violence perpetrated by the other against the in-group. 
Through linguistic analysis of a number of texts in contemporary Arabic which are 
characterized by persuasion, Koch (1983, p. 47) focuses on Arabic argumentation and 
concludes that it’s “essentially paratactic10and analogical11”. In other words, Arabic 
modes of argument rely on repetition (in terms of form and content) and paraphrase in 
order to make sure that its argumentation is “present”, and therefore to persuade the 
audience. While Koch (1983) argues that this type of argumentation is a necessity in the 
cultural ‘centrality of the Arabic language in “Arabic-Islamic society”, I argue that this 
mode of argumentation is pervasive in Geagea’s speeches, especially in this speech 
under analysis. In other words, the interpretation of this speech shows that Geagea keeps 
on repeating the same words/phrases which have the same meaning, in order to 
emphasize his message: the violence perpetrated by the outer group against the in-group.  
This strategy, called a presentation, is characterized by proof. To elaborate more, 
                                                 
10 Paratactic: from parataxis, which is 
the placing together of sentences, clauses, or phrases without aconjunctive word or words 
11 Analogical: from analogy; this is similarity or comparability. 
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selective parts from Geagea’s speeches are to be examined. Linguistically, the strong 
presence of repetition can be recognized in these texts on a number of levels and in 
various forms, by using pairs of words which are nearly or almost synonymous (Koch, 
1983). 
The speech is characterized by many types of repetition in terms of content and form, as 
reverse paraphrase, morphological parallelism, and cumulative parallelism. The 
dominant kind is the cumulative parallelism in which the speaker cumulatively repeats 
the same phrase/word (Koch, 1983).  Moreover, the phrase repeated is used in different 
contexts and not in one context only, for raising different issues or various sources of 
conflict between each of March 14 and March 8 Coalitions: Hizbullah’s weapons, the 
July War of 2006, military helicopter, etc… To better explain, below is an excerpt which 
demonstrates cumulative parallelism: 
For God’s sake, tell me for what shall we unite? 
Shall we unite for the decision of leaving Hizbullah’s weapons at the expense of 
the Lebanese government until Palestine is gained back and all the occupied 
Arab lands are liberated...?  
Or shall we unite for the correct opinion of the devastating War of July 2006 and 
about the concept of open war, and for dedicating Lebanon as an only front for 
resistance the time people of the resistance are negotiating Israel? 
 
So, different issues are raised by asking the same repetitive rhetorical question phrase: 
shall we unite about (x and y)?  Or for what shall we unite for? The same element is 
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used repetitively for different situations. Actually, he is implying that unity is hard to be 
achieved according to these different contexts.  Consequently, the divergence in the 
beliefs between the in and the out group is at the heart of group categorization. The 
violence of the other group is highlighted as well by mentioning the July 2006 War, the 
weapons of Hizbullah, etc.  
Below are other types of repetition and contributors of persuasion: 
Morphological parallelism:  
 It is a common type of parallelism which is frequently used in syntactically parallel 
constructions, and in which the morphologically parallel items are not necessarily 
synonyms.  
For example, Geagea (2008 b) addresses martyrs saying:  
Martyrs, you are the martyrs for all of Lebanon… 
When the homeland remained, it remained for everyone. However, some reject 
you, do not want you, do not want to hear about your memory, do not want to 
hear about your victories, nor about the wailing of your mothers, and your 
fathers, your spouses, your children, and your friends… 
So, his cumulative emphasis on the other’s rejection of them is realized as well 
as the appeal on emotions. In other parts, besides cumulative parallelism, listing 
parallelism, the repetition of form and content through a listing form are also 
present: 
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They intend to forget who was threatening them, their country, their earnings, 
their freedoms, their futures, and the future of their children. They are attacking 
who died for defending them. So the loyalty, morality, and values were lost, and 
the history was violated 
Geagea’s main point is that, in this case, the out-group intends to forget who was 
threatening them and their country. However, a consecutive list of words that reflect 
one’s aspects of life and country accompanies the object “them”. In this listing 
parallelism, he appeals to the emotions, not only by accusing the other of forgetting 
intentionally the source of threat, but by listing these emotional terms such as freedom, 
future of the children, loyalty, morality, values, etc..The out-group is violent to an 
extent, that while forgetting the real source of threat, they are “attacking” the in-group, 
the ones who died to defend the out group.  This action, which the other has done, has 
resulted in a strong and destructive effect, described by heavily emotional terms: the loss 
of loyalty, morality, values, and history. This is referred by Fairclough (2010) as “a 
claim to moral authority”, through judging who is evil and hypocrite, and who is not.   
Listing parallelism is also present in other parts of this speech (2008 b), such as 
And more, dear ladies and gentlemen, I hear you in your homes, in your offices, 
in your industries as well as in your schools, your universities, and your homes, 
in your homeland as well as abroad, asking God, day and night, to inspire us to 
agree, to unite. 
Here, he is listing all possible places his audience can be in, starting from home country 
reaching abroad. By this, he is trying to make them feel closer to him by stating that he 
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is listening to them and feeling with them wherever they are (Kreidie, personal 
communication, Nov. 1, 2011). More important, he is speaking in the first singular 
pronoun “I” (Fairclough, 2010).  He is also speaking informally to his people, knowing 
that approaches which are formal and informal, public and private at the same time, and 
join both ceremony and feeling, adds more power to the speech (Fairclough, 2010).   
4.55–Style 
This speech involves a number of figures of speech, which have traditionally been 
categorized into two types in the field of rhetoric: tropes and figures. A trope is a device 
that involves meaning, and a figure is the one which involves expression.  Both figures 
and tropes are to be identified in Geagea’s speech. This speech is full of tropes (simile, 
metaphor, and personification) and figures of speech (irony, hyperbole, and oxymoron), 
which contribute to making the style a rhetorical style and making persuasion easier.   
Hyperbole 
For example, Geagea (2008 b) says: 
After we got out of the past hell fire, the prejudiced people had no choice but to 
live in their collective buries and search in them, evoke the past in their own 
dirty way, and read their devil book to collect all the pain and ugliness of the 
Lebanese Civil War, trying to accuse us for that: we, people of the cause, alive 
and dead.  
Besides being featured by cumulative parallelism, this excerpt is characterized by the 
hyperbole, which is an exaggerated or extravagant statement, used to express strong 
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feeling or produce a strong impression, and not intended to be understood literally 
(Freeborn, 1996).  This exaggeration lies in the strong words used as “collective buries” 
and “devil book”. The latter holds a number of connotations and raises a number of 
questions to stop at: Which book of the other is he talking about? Is it their religious 
book or history book?  In both cases, the word “devil” demonizes (representing the other 
as evil or diabolic) the other, but in case it is referring to their religious book, then this 
an obvious attack on the other’s religion, the Islam religion, and therefore an obvious 
bias to Christianity and a strong contribution to a Muslim-Christian clash, especially that 
the occasion is a Christian occasion. Moreover, this occasion is very special to the 
Christians for two reasons. First, because it is a religious occasion (memorial prayer), 
and second because it is dedicated to the souls of the martyrs of the Lebanese Forces.  
Therefore, mobilization of violence in such a sacred occasion has a stronger power than 
other occasions. 
Personification 
Personification is when an object is turned into a person or entity. For example, Geagea 
turns their lie into a person that kills a person: 
A lie is capable of killing a person, but it cannot kill the truth  
He also continues in demonizing the other, by describing their action as a trading action 
and by turning the latter to an action which is usually done in terms of money into an 
action done in terms of blood and pain: 
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And for the rogue people, who are trading with our pain and the pain of people I 
say: stop trading and making use of peoples’ blood and tears, stop deceiving 
history, fear God he is the only judging ruler. 
4.56–Repetition, Presentation, and Proof 
 
Repetition and balance, synonyms and paradigms, are essentially and authentically 
Arabic. They are at the heart of the language, the discourse, and the rhetoric in a way 
that cannot simply be disposed of. “The ideas are the language, and persuasion is 
presentation, the bringing into the present of the oratorical and poetic history of the 
Arabic language” (Koch, 1983, p.47). According to Koch (1983), argumentation is 
related to truth in various ways, since arguments are based on established truths, and 
truths result from arguments. Moreover, she differentiates between two cases, one that 
conveys presentation, and another which conveys proof.   Presentation, the first kind of 
argumentation, occurs in situations where some truths are clear and universally 
established (in the particular universe of discourse). In such a case, argumentation aims 
only at conveying the truth to the hearer (Koch, 1983). 
Proof, the other kind of argumentation, occurs in situations where the truth is not clear or 
universal. Furthermore, argumentation starts with a situation that doubts the truth, and 
therefore the aim of argumentation is to create or prove the truth (Koch, 1983). 
Being based on repetition, this interpretation shows that this speech involves both 
presentation and proof.  When Geagea (2008) addresses his group, he raises issues that 
constitute for the in group “established mental schemas” (Kreidie, personal 
communication, Nov.1, 2011).  Therefore, it tends to be a presentation, since in such a 
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situation, Geagea is raising issues which are taken for granted as facts among the ‘in 
group’, such as Christian uniqueness, importance of LF’s martyrdom in Lebanon, we 
being better than them, we being right and they being wrong, etc.. 
However, when addressing the out group, which is mainly the opposition in general, and 
Christian opposition in particular, his argument tends to be a proof, where he tries to 
prove the same beliefs which are not considered as facts in the out group’s perception.  
4.57–Mobilization of Religion and Identity building:  History and Past 
Talks 
 
In this speech, Geagea (2008 b) creates what Matar (2010) calls “culturally significant 
frames”, by continuously referring to the past.  In other words, through his reference to 
individuals and locations, military battles, and state organizations from an appropriated 
past, he brings the past to the listener’s mind and makes it applicable to the present 
(Matar, 2010). Moreover, he evokes from the past the victories done by Lebanese Forces 
during the civil war, their efforts done to end it, their sacrifices during and after the war, 
their blood for Lebanon, and their impartiality. That’s for example when Geagea (2008 
b) says: 
When everyone left, you were forced to defend your nation, preserve sovereignty 
and freedom, control security, provide public safety, and even to control the 
smuggling process of merchandise, flour, and bread to Syria and… 
Chelkowski and Dabashi (1999) argue that in this way, he builds frames which are 
culturally significant and which appeal as well to a “symbolic realm of operation” (as 
cited in Matar, 2010).  Such a realm of operation involves a process of defining 
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identities, expressing destinies, and suggesting and legitimizing the sense of purpose in 
life and of meaning in the world.   
Geagea does not only bring the past in terms of the in-group’s achievements, but also in 
terms of their “historical uniqueness” as Christians. He emphasizes the term “history” in 
many parts of his speech, some of which are already analyzed above, linking it to 
Christian existence and unity.  
Moreover, Geagea (2008 b) says:  
Peace is God’s will and the purpose of history, which from we started and to 
which we get back. 
The point of fulcrum of any Christian unity lies in the Christian historical roots 
of Lebanon. 
We are all looking forward a Christian unity, because it’s by itself important, and 
because it is the only natural prerequisite of unity in Lebanon. 
In this respect, it is important to recap a bit of the literature review discussed in chapter 
one about Christian uniqueness in terms of history, religion, and civilization. Moreover, 
many Christians believe that Christians of the fifteenth century are people chosen by 
God among other Christians in the East to preserve the Christian identity in the 
Lebanese mountains. Furthermore, as discuused earlier, Maronites, who are the 
dominant group in the Lebanese Forces, associate themselves with the name “Lebanon”, 
deeming the latter as their “historic” habitat. Furthermore, the emphasis on the historical 
roots and uniqueness of Christianity, are related to this Christian identity which has 
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joined Christians (and Maronites in particular) starting 1960s and 1970s, continuing to 
the era that featured Bachir Gemayle’s power, and reaching the present moment.  
 
The importance and efficiency of Gaegea’s political discourse has increased by lying on 
a socio-historical basis rooted in the wider environment of a culture of communication. 
This is what Focault calls “episteme”, a term referring to the unrestricted political signs 
by being based on a wider socio-historical grounding (Matar, 2010).  
Here is another excerpt which clearly shows that Geagea (2008 b) is warning Christians 
from the demographical threat they are facing (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov. 
1, 2011). He says: 
The Lebanon you want in fact is in danger: the demographical danger, the 
destructive populism, and the poisonous suggestions. But, its rescue is in your 
hands.  
By this, Geagea is constructing a fear of existential threat of the Christian presence and 
manipulating it for political purposes. This is best evident when he (2008 b) explicitly 
asks them to overcome small considerations and vote for the next parliamentary 
elections: 
Dear Christians, 
I will be honest with you as usual. Lebanon’s destiny as well as the destiny of 
your grandsons is in your hands, through the upcoming parliamentary elections.  
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Mobilization of religion is mainly empowered by emphasizing martyrdom as an 
essential cause to the Lebanese Forces and to Christians of March 14 Coalition, but 
faced with the out-group’s attempts of destroying its purity, whether in the past, present, 
or future. Moreover, Gaegea (2008) states their cause as:  “Our cause is one and forever; 
to be crucified so that we would deserve Lebanon’s rise”. The terms “martyrs” and 
“martyrdom” are repeated for more than 16 times in the speech. On par, he repetitively 
emphasizes the other’s destructive attempts of their martyrdom. This emphasis on 
“martyrdom” is a basic element in Christianity, in which Christian believers are 
expected to witness the Christ by either suffering or even dying for him, and their way of 
bearing these elements would be a crucial element of their testimony (Wicker, 2006). As 
mentioned in the Bible, the earlier belief of Christianity in martyrdom is related to 
witnessing to their belief that Jesus died for them, and that they are willing to bear unjust 
treatment from men just like Jesus. Then, the belief developed, and now the belief that is 
agreed on is that martyrs in Christianity are those most respected believers who die for 
refusing to give up on their faith in Christianity. In this context, mobilization of religion 
is also evident in apologizing for past mistakes, asking God to forgive them for those 
mistakes and giving themselves the authority of calling the “out-group” to obey God. 
Furthermore, Kreidie (2011) interprets Geagea’s famous apology for what happened 
during the 1975 Lebanese Civil War as part of persuasion and manipulation since he was 
blamed by the Christian opposition as a “killer”. So, to get rid of this blame he used 
forgiveness, which is a Christian value, and therefore he spoke to the hearts and minds 
of the Christians (Kreidie, personal communication, Nov. 1, 2011). 
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Since the occasion of this speech is both religious and political since it’s a prayer in the 
memorial of martyrs who died for the sake of political beliefs of this political party, the 
emphasis of religion is expected.  
 
4.6– Conclusion 
 
After analyzing two speeches, one representing time of war, and another representing 
time of accommodation, there are a number of comparative conclusions to be outlined 
regarding both speeches:  
1) In-out group polarization is pervasive in both specches with approximate equal 
degrees. The difference in the way the other or the out-group is identified. Moreover, 
while the out-group was clearly identified as Hizbullah during time of crisis, it was 
left ambiguous and unidentified after the Doha agreement of 2008. It was labeled as 
“some” and “the other” without explicitly indicating if it’s Christian opposition or 
Hizbullah, who are the “liars, hypocrites, killers, and history modifiers”.  
2) Enemy construction and categorization was pervasive in both speeches : During May 
7 incidents, the construction of the enemy is associated with the external famous 
enemy (Israel), and in the second speech, after Doha agreement it has become more 
represented as the internal destructive enemy  who aims at destructing the “in 
group”. 
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3) The dialogue is conflictive in both speeches, since it reached a stage claiming that 
“we are right” and “the other” is wrong (Kreidie, personal communication,Nov. 1, 
2011). 
4) Mobilization of violence is pervasive in both speeches. 
As for time of crisis: 
1) Geagea addresses the Sunnis and highlights a Shiite threat, which is interpreted as an 
attempt of causing a Sunni-Shiite clash. 
2) Gaegea’s discourse emphasizes the nation and its wounding by Hizbullah’s forces. 
However, while he appeals to the nation, his discourse is interpreted as an attempt of 
causing a sectarian clash (Sunni-Shiite clash, as mentioned above). The speech relied 
on demonization of the other, victimization, and strong appeal to the emotions. 
3) The “other” is constructed as an enemy, but associated with the big external one 
(Israel). 
4) Mobilization of religion was highlighted more than that of violence. 
 
As for time of accommodation: 
1) Geagea’s distancing from the other relies on his emphasis on the ‘in-group’s” 
Christian uniqueness which is grounded in history. 
2) Geagea’s discourse does not emphasize the nation and “national unity and 
cooperation” as much as he does during time of war (May 7, 2008).  His discourse is 
rather concentrated on the Christian belief which joins members of the LF, through 
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emphasizing Christian uniqueness and the purity of LF martyrs in comparison to the 
violence of the out-group (March 8 Coalition, and Hizbullah in particular).  
3) Although the speech was delivered during a religious occasion and the period did not 
include violent confrontations (like May 7 street confrontation), the speech carried a 
lot of humiliating descriptions of the other.  
4) The speech was persuasive and relied on a lot on repetitive and rhetorical language. 
Although the speech was delivered during time of accommodation, it carried heavy 
mobilization of violence as well as enemy categorization. 
5) Mobilization of both religion and violence were highlighted interchangeably and 
with almost equal degrees. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 CONCLUSION 
5.1– General Findings 
 
This thesis analyzed social identity construction in the discourse of the leaders of the 
two Lebanese parties: Hizbullah, a Shiite Lebanese party, and the Lebanese Forces, a 
Christian Maronite party. Two speeches for each of Nasrallah and Geagea were analyzed 
during two different times, times of crisis and times of accommodation: One before 
Doha agreement and during the events of May 7, 2008, and another after the Doha 
agreement of 2008. The analysis of speeches is mainly based on social identity 
approach, a theory which is based on the belief that identities are formed by a process of 
distancing between the in-group, the group which the individual belongs to, and the out-
group, which refers to those who are outside and different from the group (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006).  This process is referred in my thesis as in-out group polarization, and 
forms a basic element of concern to critical discourse analysis (CDA), the methodology 
used in this thesis. Furthermore, CDA is selected as well due to its emphasis on studying 
how social and political talk endorses and reproduces social power abuse, authority, and 
discrimination (Schiffrin& Tannen & Hamilton, 2001).  
According to social identity (or group identity), the approach used in this thesis, 
individuals are strongly concerned about preserving a positive social identity, which to 
some extent leads them to make affirming comparisons between the in-groups and out-
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groups.  This in-out group categorization is capable of causing stronger stereotyping and 
prejudice because out-groups are “more easily and reductive characterized than in 
groups” (Benwell&Stokoe, 2006, p.25).  Believing in the strong role that language plays 
in politics, this study is concerned about studying language as a medium of 
manipulation. However, this does not deny the importance of studying other elements in 
speeches such as the unspoken words and semiotics.  
 
5.2– Comparative Conclusions 
 
The separate analyses of the discourse of Gaegea and Nasrallah lead to the conclusion 
that the process of in-out group polarization is pervasive in the speeches of the two 
leaders in both, times of crisis and times of accommodation. Positive self-categorization 
is dominant as well, in which the “in-group is praised, while the “out-group” is 
antagonized. As previously argued, this trains the in-group on conformity and 
consistency when stereotyping and discriminating against the other.  It is concluded as 
well that both Nasrallah and Geagea claim to represent and address the nation and 
national unity, especially after the Doha agreement. However, their conflictive 
discourse, works on categorizing the other as an enemy and on distancing the in-group 
from the out-group even when claiming to address this nation.  During time of crisis, 
Nasrallah’s discourse was offensive and defensive at the same time, while Gaegea’s was 
defensive. Perhaps, believing that Christians did not receive any new interest or benefit 
from Doha agreement (Atallah, 2005) may be the reason behind Geagea’s offensive 
tone. And perhaps, being able to receive a veto power in the cabinet, a great 
achievement to Hizbullah, can be the reason behind Nasrallah’s satisfaction reflected in 
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the calmness of his speech after Doha agreement. Furthermore, the following main 
elements appear in both speeches: 
1. Categorizing the other as an enemy 
Both categorized each other as enemies, and associated the image of the other with the 
image of Israel. During time of crisis, while Geagea associated Hizbullah with the image 
of Israel, which is aiming at invading Beirut and Lebanon, Nasrallah categorized the 
whole “authority group” (March 14 Coalition) as traitors and agents of “America” and 
“Israel”. He also associated them with threat and intense emotions, and this association 
is interpreted as capable of causing a dichotomy between the “out-group” itself, i.e. 
between Sunnis themselves, since their leaders are represented as agents of Israel, the 
eternal major enemy.  The “authority group” is also associated with feelings of intense 
disgust, contempt, scorn, and anger, a combination of feelings that can eventually end in 
hatred.  
However, during time of accommodation, Nasrallah’s enemy categorization has become 
replaced by his concern about the nation, national unity, and diversity in Lebanon. On 
the other hand, Geagea’s enemy categorization has instead increased during time of 
accommodation, in which he represented the other as attempting to destruct the image of 
Lebanese Forces and the pure image of LF martyrs.  
2. Appealing to emotions and highlighting the fear and threat of the other 
In both speeches, both leaders highlighted the threat of the other in destructing the “in-
group”, and the fear of the “in-group” of this threat. Both Nasrallah and Geagea 
highlighted this fear during time of crisis: While Nasrallah pictured the authority group 
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as has been willing to destruct Hizbullah; Geagea highlighted the Shitte existential 
threat, which is interpreted as capable of causing a Sunni-Shiite dichotomy. As for time 
of accommodation, the threat of the other was not the main focus in Nasrallah’s speech, 
but it remained as such in Gaegea’s speech. In addition, appealing to the emotions is 
present in both times of crisis and accommodation in the discourse of both leaders. 
Moreover, during time of crisis Gaegea’s discourse played on two moral emotions: first 
is moral outrage, by focusing on the agents behind victims’ harm, and allocating the 
harm to a third party, a third perpetrator.  Second is empathy by describing the victims’ 
helplessness (children and mothers in particular) in front of Hizbullah’s weapons.  
3. Mobilization of Religion 
Mobilization of religion is recognized in Nasrallah’s speech, since Nasrallah gives 
himself the authority to decide the after-life ending of his in-group and the out-group; 
that they will be in different places in the after-life. This categorization can be 
interpreted as: we will be in heaven, while they will be in hell. Consequently, listeners 
are mobilized to take a religious jihad action against the out-group. 
As for Geagea’s speech, mobilization of religion is recognized through emphasizing 
martyrdom as an essential cause to the Lebanese Forces and to Christians of March 14 
Coalition. It is reconginzed as well through highlighting that martyrdom is faced with 
the out-group’s attempts of destroying the purity of their martyrdom, whether in the past, 
present, or future. Furthermore, as the literature review on Christians’ perspectives of 
themselves and their presence in Lebanon says, Geagea highlights the uniqueness of the 
Christian roots.  This shows that as the literature review explains, stressing on the 
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uniqueness of Christianity (and Maronism in particular) as a religion, history, and 
civilization, is used as a tool of mobilization in Geagea’s speeches.  
It can be realized as well that martyrdom is a common essential theme used for 
mobilization by both leaders during time of accommodation; especially that time of 
accommodation is represented by two special occasions that relate to these martyrs who 
devoted their lives for the political and religious beliefs of these two religiously-driven 
political parties. 
4. Mobilization of Violence 
During time of crisis, discourse of Nasrallah mobilized violence through extreme group 
polarization, enemy categorization, and mobilization of religion. During time of 
accommodation, mobilization of violence has almost disappeared. As for Gaegea’s 
discourse, it mobilized violence in both times with almost equal degrees. Moreover, his 
discourse during time of accommodation focused on the destructive and violent effects 
of this action of discrimination committed by “the other” on Lebanon’s destiny, on the 
“in-group” (most probably LF), and on the martyrs of the Lebanese Forces. 
Representing them in a violent image is achieved through the following ways: first, 
through comparing the violence of the out-group to that of Ottomans, who were famous 
for their oppression and violence practiced. Second is through accusing them of 
attacking a Christian religious figure (the Partiarch) and the Christian martyrs of the 
Lebanese Forces as well.  
 
5. Modality (committing one’s self to statements) 
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Both leaders have committed themselves to truths through their statements which 
represent their extreme perspectives of issues whether in times of crisis or time of 
accommodation, which contribute to the process of manipulation and persuasion of 
their stands on issues. Enemy categorization, in-out group polarization, and 
mobilization of religion and violence are considered as being facilitated by leaders’ 
commitment to truth, which convey discriminatory representations of the other.  
 
5.3–Possible Prospects 
 
As discussed earlier, sectarianism in Lebanon is examined based on different 
propositions, as the historical/cultural, political economic, institutional, and the political 
psychology, which this thesis has adopted. In this respect, many scholars, thinkers, civil 
society activists, professors, political scientists, and even young intellectuals have been 
recommending several ways for combating sectarianism and increasing the level of 
national consiousness. In the light of these attempts of fighting sectarianism in Lebanon 
or at least reducing its level, this study highlighted the importance of language in 
contributing to the empowerment of this sectarian identity, which is by being used 
violently is discriminating against the other, and even excluding it.  Therefore, in my 
opinion, possible prospects should target this interrelation between language and 
identity, through: first, increasing the level of critical thinking of citizens, to rethink their 
identities and the speeches of their leaders. Second is through working on educating 
citizens in Lebanon on peace, since leaders’ speeches involved mobilization of violence. 
However, to give my perspective of possible prospects more credibility, experts in 
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education were interviewed, and they agreed that we cannot rely on any of those tools 
alone, but rather collaboration between these elements is needed.  
Based on the belief that education is a future investment, (Ismail, Dec. 1, 2011), and 
since sectarianism is embedded in education as well (Al Habbal, 2011), national 
consciousness and critical thinking can be acquired at schools and universites. Mona 
Nabahani (2011)12, an Associate Professor of Education at the Lebanese American 
University, argues that the education system can contribute to raising awareness on 
national consciousness.  Moreover, Nabahani states that each of the foreign schools, 
religious schools, and different faith schools, instill the love of its culture in the students 
indirectly through making that culture attractive. Also in the absence of a national 
identity that focuses on pride in being Lebanese and belongingness to the nation, the 
Lebanese children grow falling in love with whatever culture is endorsed and presented 
at school (Nabahani, personal communication, December 5, 2011). 
Mahmoud Natout (2011), 13a professor of cultural studies at LAU, believes that national 
consciousness can result from many factors, which education can furnish the ground for.  
Moreover, education can provide students with certain predispositions that can let them 
reconsider their identities in critical ways, which can therefore help them think of 
national consciousness (Natout, personal communication, Nov.1, 2011).  Moroever, it is 
important to get the student become reflective and approach historical narratives with 
critical thinking.  Similarly, Nabahani (2011) recommends Al Amine’s suggestion of 
                                                 
12Dr. Mona Nabhani is also the director of LAU’s Teacher Training Institute. 
 
13 Dr. Natout holds a PhD in Education as well.  
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engaging students in critical thinking after studying authentic history documents in order 
to formulate their own convictions and beliefs.  
5.4– Peace Education in Lebanon 
Peace education constitutes both a philosophy and a process which involves the 
following skills: listening, reflection, problem-solving, cooperation, and conflict 
resolution”.   Providing students with the knowledge about the causes of violence and its 
preventions, skills, and attitudes, this process teaches them “nonviolence, compassion, 
and reverence for all life” (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p.9). The meaning of peace 
education differs with the difference of individuals and regions (Salomon & Nevo, 
2002).   It is taught to both children and adults, in Nursery School, college, and even 
beyond (Harris & Morrison, 2003).  For some, its main objective is to encourage the 
understanding of the past enemies, and therefore to change attitudes.  Introducing peace 
education programs in violent regions can be an example on that.  However to others, 
peace education is about gaining peaceful dispositions and conflict resolution skills. The 
implementation of this perspective of peace education can be achieved through the 
integration of violence-prevention programs, peer mediation, and conflict resolution 
skills (Salomon & Nevo, 2002). 
Ziad Mikati, adviser of the Prime-Minister Nagib Mikati (2011), recommends 
introducing peace education to the Lebanese educational systems, arguing that Lebanon 
is the only country which went through communal strife, and still lack peace education.   
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5.5– Final Word 
 
After summarizing the main findings of this study, this chapter attempted to suggest 
some possible prospects. We conclude that within these manipulative and persuasive 
techniques that are practiced by political leaders over followers through their speeches, 
increasing national consciousness in Lebanon is not an easy or quick task. This study 
recommended one basic element to be focused on: increasing the level of critical 
thinking of citizens, especially of children and youth. For this reason, education is 
considered as a medium for change, due to the belief in its power in producing critical 
minds. We conclude that such an ambitious task demands the collaboration of more than 
one agent and medium and the hard work and commitment of the involved individuals.  
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ﺍﻥﻩ ﺍﻥﻕ.ﺏ ﻡﺱﻝﺡ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭ ﻭﺍﻝﻥﻅﺍﻡ ﺍﻝﺩﻱﻡﻭﻕﺭﺍﻁﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﺕﻉﺩﺩﻱﺓ ﺏﻙﻝ ﻡﺍ ﻝﻝﻙﻝﻡ ﺓ ﻡﻥ ﻡﻉﻥﻯ. ﺍﻥﻩ 
  .ﺍﻥﻕﺽﺍﺽ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺵﺭﺍﻙﺓ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ ﻭﻡﻱﺙﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﻉﻱﺵ ﺍﻝﻡﺵﺕﺭﻙ
 
  .ﻥ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﻝﻡ ﺕﺱﻕﻁ ﻱﻭﻡ ﺍﻍﺕﺹﺏ ﻩﺍ ﺍلاحتلاﻝ ﺍلاسﺭﺍﺉﻱﻝﻱ ﻭﺹﻡﺩﺕ، ﻭﻝﻥ ﺕﺱﻕﻁ ﺍﻝﻱﻭﻡﺍ
 
ﺕ ﺝﻥﺡ ﺍﻝظلاﻡ ﺝﺡﺍﻑﻝ ﺡﺯﺏ الله ﺃﺩﻉﻱﺍء ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡ ﺓ ﻡﻡﻥ ﺍﺡﺕﺽﻥﺕﻩﻡ ﻉﺍﺹﻡﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍلأﺏﻱﺓ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﺍﺝﺕﺍﺡﺕﻩﺍ ﻍﺩﺭًﺍ ﻭﺕﺡ 
ﻭﺡﻡَﺕ ﻩﻡ ﺏﺭﻡﻭﺵ ﻉﻱﻭﻥﻩﺍ ﻭﺍﻕﺕﺱﻡﺕ ﻡﻉﻩﻡ ﻝﻕﻡ ﺓ ﺍﻝﺥﺏﺯ ﻭﻕﻁﺭﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺍء ﺡﻱﻥﻡﺍ ﻉﺯﺕ. ﻑﺃﺩﺍﺭﻭﺍ ﺱلاﺡﻩﻡ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻁﺍﻝﻡﺍ ﺕﻍﻥﻭﺍ 
ﻝﻕﺫﺍﺉﻑ ﺍﻝﻡﺭﺱﻝ ﺓ ﻡﻥ ﻁﻩﺭﺍﻥ ﺏﻕﺩﺱﻱﺕﻩ ﻭﺍﺡﺍﺩﻱﺓ ﻭﺝﻩﺕﻩ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺹﺩﻭﺭ ﺃ ﻩﻝ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﻑﺍﺝﺕﺍﺡﻭﺍ ﺍﺡﻱﺍء ﻩﻡ ﻭﺩّﻙﻭﺍ ﻡﻥﺍﺯﻝﻩﻡ ﺏﻭﺍﺏﻝ ﺍ
ﻉﺏﺭ ﺏﻭﺍﺏﺓ ﺩﻡﺵﻕ. ﻑﺍﺱﺕﺵﻩﺩ ﻡﻥ ﺍﺱﺕﺵﻩﺩ ﻭﺝﺭﺡ ﻡﻥ ﺝﺭ ﺡ ﻭﻩﺝﺭ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩﺝﺭ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﻭﺍﻁﻥﻱﻥ ﺍلابرﻱﺍء ﺍﻝﻉﺯﻝ ﺍﻝﺫﻱﻥ لا 
  ﻱﻡﻝكون سلاحا سوى ﻙﺭﺍﻡﺍﺕﻩﻡ ﻭﺍﺭﺍﺩﺕﻩﻡ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺓ ﻭﺕﻉﻝﻕﻩﻡ ﺏﻭﻁﻥﻩﻡ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍﻭلا وقﺏﻝ ﺍﻱ ﺵﻱء ﺁﺥﺭ.
 
ﺓ ﻭﺱﻱﻙﺕﺵﻑ ﺍﻥقلاﺏﻱﻭ ﺡﺯﺏ الله سرﻱﻉﺍ ﻑﺩﺍﺡﺓ ﺍﻝﺥﻁﻱﺉﺓ ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﻑﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﻭﺃﻝﻑ ﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﻝﻙﻡ ﻱﺍ ﺃﻩﻝﻥﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﺍلاﺏﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺹﺍﻡﺩ
ﺍﺭﺕﻙﺏﻭ ﻩﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺡﻕﻩﺍ ﻭﻉﻡﻕ ﺍﻝﺝﺭﺡ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﺍﺡﺩﺙﻭﻩ ﻑﻱ ﺝﺱﻡ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ. ﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﺇﻝﻱﻙﻡ ﻑﺭﺩًﺍ ﻑﺭﺩًﺍ، ﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻯ ﻙﻝ ﺃﻡ ﺹﺍﻡﺩﺓ 
ﺭﻱ ﻭﻁﻑﻝ ﻡﺫﻉﻭﺭ ﻭﺭﺝﻝ ﺹﺍﺏﺭ ﻡﻉﺕﺹﻡ ﺏﺡﺏﻝ ﺍلاﻱﻡﺍﻥ ﺏﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ. ﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺱﻉﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺭﻱ ﻭﻙﻝ ﺕﻱﺍﺭ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﺕﻕﺏﻝ، ﺱﻉﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱ
ﺍﻝﺹﺍﻡﺩ ﻑﻱ ﻕﻝﺏ ﻉﺍﺹﻡﺕﻩ ﻭﺏﻱﻥ ﺍﻩﻝﻩ، ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺉﺏ ﺱﻉﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺭﻱ ﺍﺏﻥ ﺍﻝﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﺭﻑﻱﻕ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺭﻱ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻅﻥﻭﺍ 
ﺍﻥﻩﻡ ﺏﺍﻍﺕﻱﺍﻝﻩ ﻱﺱﺕﻁﻱﻉﻭﻥ ﺍﻍﺕﻱﺍﻝ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥ، ﺕﺡﻱﺓ ﺇﻝﻯ ﻭﻝﻱﺩ ﺝﻥبلاط واﻝﻝﻕﺍء ﺍﻝﺩﻱﻡﻕﺭﺍﻁﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﺡﺯﺏ ﺍﻝﺕﻕﺩﻡﻱ ﺍلإشتراكي، وليد 
ﻱﻡ ﻙﻡﺍﻝ ﺝﻥﺏلاط ﺍﻝﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻱﺽﺍ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻱﻥ ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﻕﺍﻭﻡﺕ ﻡﺥﺭﺯ ﺍﻝﻥﻅﺍﻡ ﺝﻥبلاط اﻝﺫﻱ ﺃﺏﻯ ﺍﻥ ﻱﻍﺍﺩﺭ، ﻭﻝﻱﺩ ﺝﻥبلاط اﺏﻥ ﺍﻝﺯﻉ
  ﻉﺍﻡﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻍﺕﻱﺍﻝﻩ. 28ﺍﻝﺱﻭﺭﻱ ﻭﺍﻥﺕﺹﺭﺕ ﻉﻝﻱﻩ ﺏﻉﺩ 
ﺍ ﻥ ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍلاﻥقلاب اﻝﺩﻡﻭﻱ لا ﻱﺱﺕﻩﺩﻑ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﻭﺡ ﺩﻩﺍ ﺏﻝ ﻙﻝ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻝﻥ ﻥﺭﺽﻯ ﺍﺏﺩﺍ ﺍﻥ ﻱﺱﻕﻁ ﻡﺝﺩﺩ ﺍ ﺭﻩﻱﻥﺓ ﻑﻱ ﻱﺩ ﺍﻱ 
ﺍﺹﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻥﺽﺍﻝ ﻑﻱ ﺱﺏﻱﻝ ﺕﻙﺭﻱﺱ ﺍﺱﺕقلاﻝ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻭﺱﻱﺍﺩﺕﻩ ﺕﻙﺭﻱﺱﺍ ﻙﺍﻥ.  ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍلاﻥﻕلاﺏ لا ﻱﺵﻙﻝ ﺭﺍﺩﻉﺍ ًﻝﻥﺍ ﺏﻝ ﺡﺍﻑﺯًﺍ ﻝﻡﻭ
  ﺁﺫﺍﺭ ﺕﺅﻙﺩ ﻡﺍ ﻱﻝﻱ: 14ﻥ ﻩﺍﺉﻱﺍ ﺍﺯﺍء ﻙﻝ ﺫﻝﻙ، ﻑﺍﻥ ﻕﻭﻯ 
 
ﺍﻭًلا: ﺍﻥ ﻡﺍ ﺝﺭﻯ ﻑﻱ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﻭﻡﺡﻱﻁﻩﺍ ﻭﻡﻁﺍﺭ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﻱ  ﻩﻭ ﺍﻥﻕلاﺏ ﻡﺱﻝﺡ ﻥﻑﺫﻩ ﺡﺯﺏ الله، ﺍﻥﻕلاﺏ ﺽﺩ ﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭ 
ﺏﻩﺩﻑ ﺕﺝﻭﻱﻑ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ  4704ﺁﺥﺭﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻕﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺍﺕﻑﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﻁﺍﺉﻑ ﻭﻡﻱﺙﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﻉﻱﺵ ﺍﻝﻡﺵﺕﺭﻙ ﻭﺍﻝﻕﺭﺍﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﻱﺓ ﻭ
ﺍﻝﻡﺱﺕﻕﻝﺓ ﻭﺍﺥﺽﺍﻉ ﻩﺍ ﻭﺽﺭﺏ ﺍﻝﺩﻱﻡﻭﻕﺭﺍﻁﻱﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺍﺕ. ﺍ ﻥ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﻡﺡﺍﻭﻝﺓ ﺍلاﻥقلاﺏﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺱﺍﻑﺭﺓ ﻕﺩ ﺍﺱﻕﻁﺕ ﻥﻩﺍﺉﻱﺍ ﺵﺭﻉﻱﺓ 
سلاﺡ ﺡﺯﺏ الله ﻭﻥﺯﻉﺕ ﻉﻥﻩ ﺹﻑﺓ السلاﺡ ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡ، ﻙﻡﺍ ﺍﺱﻕﻁﺕ ﻡﻕﻭﻝﺓ ﻉﺩﻡ ﺍﺱﺕﻉﻡﺍﻝ ﺡﺯب الله لسلاحﻩ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺩﺍﺥﻝ 
ﻭﻁﻥﻩ، ﻭﻝﻥ ﻱﺝﺩﻱ ﻥﻑﻉا الادﻉﺍء ﺍﻥ ﺍﺱﺕﻉﻡﺍﻝ السلا ﺡ ﻩﻭ ﻝﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉ ﻉﻥ السلاﺡ" ﻑﺍﺱﺕﻉﻡﺍﻝ ﺍﻝسلاﺡ ﻕﺩ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺍﻝﻯ  ﻭﺽﺩ ﺍﺏﻥﺍء
 ﺱﻕﻭﻁ السلاﺡ.
 
ﺍﺫﺍﺭ ﺭﻑﺽ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻕﺍﻁﻉ ﻝﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﻥﻁﻕ ﺍلاﻥقلاﺏﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻥﻑﻱ، ﺍﻝﺫﻱ لا ﻱﻡﻙﻥ ﺍﻥ ﻱﻍﻱﺭ ﻑﻱ ﻕﻥﺍﻉﺍﺕﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ  14ﺙﺍﻥﻱًﺍ: ﺕﺅﻙﺩ ﻕﻭﻯ 
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ﻝ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺓ ﺽﺩ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻥ ﻝﻡ ﺕﺹﻥﻉﺍ ﻱﻭﻡﺍ ﺍﻥﺕﺹﺍﺭًﺍ لأﻱ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻑﻱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، ﻭﻙﻝ ﻡﺍ ﻭﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭﻱﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺱﻱﺓ. فالسلاﺡ ﻭﺍﺱﺕﻉﻡﺍ
  .ﻱﻡﻙﻥ ﺍﻥ ﻱﻥﺕﺝ ﻉﻥ ﻩﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﺡﺹﻝ ﺓ ﻩﻭ ﻭﺏﺍﻝ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﺹﺡﺍﺏ ﻩﺍ ﻭﻉﻝﻯ ﺱﺍﺉﺭ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ.
 
ﺙﺍﻝﺙﺍ: ﺡﻱﺍﻝ  ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍلاﻥﻕلاب ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺵﺭﻉﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭﻱ ﺓ ﻭﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﻉﺩﻭﺍﻥ ﺍلاجرامي ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻉﺍﺹﻡﺓ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ ﻭﺍﻝﻡﻭﺍﻁﻥﻱﻥ ﺍلاﺏﺭﻱﺍء 
ﻑﺍﻥ ﻕﻱﺍﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﺝﻱﺵ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱ ﻡﺩﻉﻭﺓ ﺏﻙﻝ ﺇﻝﺡﺍﺡ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍلاﺽطلاﻉ ﺏﺍﻝﻭﺍﺝﺏﺍﺕ ﺍلاساسﻱﺓ ﻝﻝﻡﺅﺱﺱﺓ ﺍﻝﻉﺱﻙﺭﻱﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺡﻡﺍﻱﺓ ﻑﻱﻩﺍ، 
ﺍﺭﻭﺍﺡ ﺍﻝﻡﻭﺍﻁﻥﻱﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﻡﺡﺍﻑﻅﺓ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍلاﻡلاﻙ ﺍﻝﺥﺍﺹﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﺍﻡﺓ ﺡﻕﻥﺍ ﻝﻝﺩﻡﺍء ﻭﻡﻥﻉﺍ ﻝﺕﻑﺍﻕﻡ ﺍلاﺯﻡﺓ ﻭﻭﺽﻉ ﺡّﺩ ﻝﺡﺍﻝﺓ 
 ﺍلاﻥفلاﺕ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻥﻑ.
 
والاعلاﻡﻱﻱﻥ ﻭﺍﺡتلال وﺡﺭﻕ ﻡﺝﻡﻭﻉﺓ ﺍﻝﻭﺱﺍﺉل الاعلاﻡﻱﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ  ﺭﺍﺏﻉًﺍ: ﺇﺩﺍﻥﺓ ﺍﺱﺕﻩﺩﺍﻑ ﺍﻝﻭﺱﺍﺉﻝ ﺍلاﻉلاﻡﻱﺓ
 ﺍﺱﺕﻙﻡﺍًلا ﻝﻝﻉﻡﻝﻱﺓ ﺍلاﻥﻕلاﺏﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﺡﺹﻝﺕ.
ﺍﺫﺍﺭ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﺏﻱﺓ ﻝﺕﺡﻡﻝ ﻡﺱﺅﻭﻝﻱﺍﺕ ﻩﺍ ﺡﻱﺍﻝ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ لاﻥ ﺍلاﻥﻕلاب ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻝﺡ ﻭﺍﻝﺩﻡﻭﻱ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ  14ﺥﺍﻡﺱﺍ: ﺕﻭﺝﻩ ﻕﻭﻯ 
ﺁﺫﺍﺭ ﻕﻭﻯ ﺍلإﻉﺕﺩﺍﻝ ﻑﻱ  14ﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻡﺕﻭﺱﻁ ﻭﺏﺍﻝﻡﻥﺍﺱﺏﺓ ﻭﺕﺩﻉﻭ ﻱﻥﻑﺫﻩ ﺡﺯﺏ الله هﺩﻑﻩ ﺍﻉﺍﺩﺓ ﺱﻭﺭﻱﺍ ﺍﻝﻯ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻭﺇﻱﺹﺍﻝ ﺍﻱﺭ
  ﺍﻝﻉﺍﻝﻡ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﺏﻱ ﻭﺇسلامي ﻝﻝﺕﺡﺭﻙ ﻝﻝﺽﻍﻁ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍلإﻥقلاﺏﻱﻱﻥ ﺏﻙﻝ ﺍﻝﻭﺱﺍﺉﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﺕﺍﺡﺓ.
 
ﺱﺍﺩﺱًﺍ: ﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﺝﺕﻡﻉ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﻱ لا ﻱﻡﻙﻥ ﺍﻥ ﻱﻕﻑ ﻡﺕﻑﺭﺝﺍ ﺡﻱﺍﻝ  ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺕﻡﺍﺩﻱ ﻭﻡﻥ ﻭﺍﺝﺏﻩ ﺏﺵﻙﻝ ﺥﺍﺹ ﻡﻡﺍﺭﺱﺓ ﺍﻝﺽﻍﻁ 
ﻱ ﺕﺱﺍﻉﺩ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺕﻡﺭﻱﺭ السلاﺡ ﺍﻝﻯ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻭﺍلاسﺕﻡﺭﺍﺭ ﻑﻱ ﺕﻕﺩﻱﻡ ﺍﻝﺩﻉﻡ ﻝﺵﻉﺏ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍللازم ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﺝﺍﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻝﺕ
 ﻭﺡﻙﻭﻡﺕﻩ.
 
 
ﺁﺫﺍﺭ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ ﻝﺕﺅﻙﺩ ﻝﻩﻡ ﺕﻡﺱﻙ ﻩﺍ ﺏﺍﻝﻡﺏﺍﺩﻯء ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﻕﺍﻡﺕ ﻉﻝﻱ ﻩﺍ ثورة الأرز ﻡﻥ ﺱﻱﺍﺩﺓ  14ﺱﺍﺏﻉًﺍ: ﺕﺕﻭﺝﻩ ﻕﻭﻯ 
ﺕﺡﻕﻱﻕ ﺍ ﻩﺩﺍﻑ ﻩﺍ ﻙﻡﺍ ﺕﺅﻙﺩ ﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ ﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﺱﺕقلاﻝ ﻭﺡﺭﻱﺓ ﻭﺩﻱﻡﻭﻕﺭﺍﻁﻱﺓ  ﻭﻩﻱ ﺕﻉﺍﻩﺩ ﺵﻉﺏ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍلاسﺕﻡﺭﺍﺭ ﻑﻱ ﻡﻉﺭﻙﺕﻩﺍ ﻝ
ﺍﺫﺍﺭ ﻭﻕﻭﻑ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻙﺍﻡﻝ ﻭﺏﻙﻝ ﻕﻭ ﺍﻩﺍ ﺥﻝﻑ ﺡﻙﻭﻡﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ  14ﺍﻉﻡﺍﻝ ﺍﻝﻉﻥﻑ لا ترهﺏ ﻩﺍ ﺏﻝ ﺕﺯﻱ ﺩﻩﺍ ﺕﺵﺏﺙﺍ ﺏﻡﻭﺍﻕﻑ ﻩﺍ. ﻭﺕﺝﺩ ﻕﻭﻯ 
ﺍﻝﺵﺭﻉﻱﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭﻱﺓ ﺏﺭﺉﺍﺱﺓ ﺍﻝﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﻑﺅﺍﺩ ﺍﻝﺱﻥﻱﻭﺭﺓ ﻭﺕﻁﺍﻝﺏﻩﺍ ﻉﻥﺩ ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﻑﺕﺭﻕ ﺍﻝﻡﺹﻱﺭﻱ ﻝﻝﻙﻱﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﺝﻡ ﻩﻭﺭﻱﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﺙﺏﺍﺕ 
  ﺍﻝﻡﻭﻕﻑ ﺍلاسﺕقلاﻝﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﺵﺭﻑ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﺥﻁﺕﻩ ﻝﻥﻑﺱ ﻩﺍ ﻡﻥﺫ ﺕﺵﻙﻱﻝ ﻩﺍ. ﻉﻝﻯ ﻩﺫﺍ
 
 
 
 II xidneppA
 :8002 ,12 rebmetpeS no hceepS s’aegaeG
 )b 8002 ,aegeG sa ot derrefeR(
ﻙﻝﻡﺓ ﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﺍﻝﻩﻱﺉﺓ ﺍﻝﺕﻥﻑﻱﺫﻱﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﺏﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﻙﺕﻭﺭ ﺱﻡﻱﺭ ﺝﻉﺝﻉ ﻑﻱ ﻡﻥﺍﺱﺏﺓ ﺍﻝﻕﺩﺍﺱ ﺍﻝﺱﻥﻭﻱ ﻝﺭﺍﺡﺓ ﺃﻥﻑﺱ 
 ﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﻑﻱ 28 ﺍﻱﻝﻭﻝ 2008: 
 سلام ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﻥ ﻱﺡﺏ السلاﻡ
 ﻭﺱلاﻡ ﺃﻱﺽًﺍ ﻭﺃﻱﺽًﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﻥ لا ﻱﺡﺏ ﺍﻝﺱلاﻡ
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 ﻑالسلام ﺇﺭﺍﺩﺓ الله وﻍﺍﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥ،
 ﻡﻥﻩ ﺍﻥﻁﻝﻕﻥﺍ ﻭﺇﻝﻱﻩ ﻥﻉﻭﺩ.
 سلام ﻉﻝﻱﻙ ﻱﺍ ﺭﻑﻱﻕﻱ ﺏﻱﺍﺭ ﺍﺱﺡﻕ،
 ﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱة والإلﺕﺯﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻝﻭﻑﺍء
  ﺓ.ﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﻙﻭﺭﺓ، ﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﺵﻡﺍﻝ، ﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱ
 سلام ﻡﻥﺍ ﻙﻝﻥﺍ ﻥﺡﻡﻝﻙ ﺇﻱﺍﻩ ﺇﻝﻯ ﺭﻑﺍﻕﻥ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﺍﻝﺫﻱﻥ ﺱﺏﻕﻭﻙ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺩﻯ ﺍﻝﺱﻥﻱﻥ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺩﻯ ﺍﻝﺡﻥﻱﻥ.
 ﺃﻱﺕﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏ ﺍﻥﻱﺍﺕ ﺃﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ
 ﺃﻱﺕ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺭﻑﻱﻕﺍﺕ ﺃﻱ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺭﻑﺍﻕ
 ﻝﻱﺱﺕ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﺍﺩﺓ ﺏﺡﺩ ﺫﺍﺕ ﻩﺍ ﻡﺍ ﻱﻭﺝﻉ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﻱﺩ ﺃﻭ ﺃﻩﻝﻩ ﺃﻭ ﺃﻕﺭﺏﺍءﻩ ﺃﻭ ﺭﻑﺍﻕﻩ ﺃﻭ ﻡﺝﺕﻡﻉﻩ،
  ﻩﺍ ﻭﺕﺵﻭﻱﻩ ﻩﺍ ﻭﺕﻕﺯﻱﻡ ﻩﺍ ﻭﺕﺡﻭﻱﺭ ﻩﺍ ﻭﺍلإﺯﺩﺭﺍء ﺏﻩﺍ، ﺱﻉﻱًﺍ ﻝﺽﺭﺏ ﺥﺹٍﻡ ﺃﻭ ﻝﺭﺏٍﺡ ﺹﻍﻱﺭ.ﺇﻥﻡ ﺍﻝﻭﺝﻉ ﻑﻱ ﻡﺡﺍﻭلات إﻥﻙﺍﺭ
ﻥﺡﻥ ﻑﺥﻭﺭﻭﻥ ﺏﺵﻩﺩﺍﺉﻥﺍ ، ﻭﻝﻥ ﺕﻥﺍﻝ، لا ﻡﻥﻩﻡ ﻭلا ﻡﻥﺍ، ﺱﻩﺍﻡ ﺡﺍﻕﺩﺓ ﺝﺍﺡﺩﺓ ﻡﺽﻝﻝﺓ ﻡﻭﺕﻭﺭﺓ، ُﺕﻁﻝﻕ ﻉﻝﻱﻥﺍ ﻍﺩﺭًﺍ ﻭﻅﻝﻡًﺍ ﺏﻱﻥ 
 ﺍﻝﺡﻱﻥ ﻭﺍلآخر.
  ﻕ ﻭﺍﻝﺡﻕﻱﻕﺓ ﺃﻝﻑ ﺝﻭﻝﺓ ﻭﺝﻭﻝﺓ.ﺇﻥ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻝﻝﻙﺫﺏ ﻭﺍﻝﺕﺡﻕﻱﺭ ﻭﺍﻝﺕﺵﻥﻱﻉ ﻭﺍلإفتراء جولﺓ، ﻑﺱﻱﻙﻭﻥ ﻝﻝﺡ
ﻱﻡﻙﻥ ﻝﻝﻙﺫﺏﺓ ﺍﻥ ﺕﻕﺕﻝ ﺇﻥﺱﺍﻥًﺍ، ﻝﻙﻥﻩﺍ ﻝﻥ ﺕﺕﻡﻙﻥ ﻡﻥ ﻕﺕﻝ ﺍﻝﺡﻕﻱﻕﺓ، ﻭﺡﻕﻱﻕﺕﻥﺍ ﻡﺡﻑﻭﺭﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺃﺝﺱﺍﺩﻥﺍ ﻭﻉﻝﻯ ﺃﺭﺽ ﺍﻝﻭﺍﻕﻉ، ﻡﻥ 
ﺫﺭﻯ ﺹﻥﻱ ﻥ، ﻭﻩﺽﺍﺏ ﺯﺡﻝﺓ ﺱﻝﻱﻡ ﻉﺍﺹﻱ ﻭﻥﺹﺭﻱ ﻡﺍﺭﻭﻥﻱ، ﻭﻕﻝﻉﺓ ﺍﻝﺹﻡﻭﺩ ﻑﻱ ﻉﻱﻥ ﺍﻝﺭﻡﺍﻥﺓ، ﻭﺃﺵﺭﻑﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺏﺵﻱﺭ، ﺇﻝﻯ 
  ﻡﺍء ﺕﺱﻕﻱ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍلارﺽ ﻝﻱﺏﻕﻯ ﺍلإﻥﺱﺍﻥ ﻝﻱﺏﻕﻯ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ.ﺭﻭﺍﺏﻱ بلا ﻭﻕﻥﺍﺕ ﻭﺃﺭﺯ ﺍﻝﺭﺏ، ﺩ
ﺃﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﺩﺍء، ﺍﻥﺕﻡ ﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﻙﻝ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱ، ﻙﻝ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ. ﻉﻥﺩﻡﺍ ﺏﻕﻱ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥ ﺏﻕﻱ ﻝﻝﻥﺍﺱ ﺝﻡﻱﻉًﺍ. ﻝﻙﻥ ﺍﻝﺏﻉﺽ ﻱﺭﻑﺽﻙﻡ، لا 
 ﻱﺭﻱﺩﻙﻡ، لا ﻱﺭﻱﺩ ﺫﻙﺭﺍﻙﻡ، لا ﻱﺭﻱﺩ ﺱﻡﺍﻉ ﺏﻁﻭلاﺕﻙﻡ ولا أﻥﻱﻥ ﺃﻡ ﻩﺍﺕﻙﻡ ﻭﺁﺏﺍﺉﻙﻡ ﻭﺃﺯﻭﺍﺝﻙﻡ ﻭﺃﻭلادكم ﻭﺭﻑﺍﻕﻙﻡ.
ﻙﻡ ﺏﺵﺕﻯ ﺍﻝﺕﻩﻡ، ﻱﺡﻭﻝﻭﻥ ﺏﻁﻭلاﺕﻙﻡ ﺇﻝﻯ ﺝﺭﺍﺉﻡ ﻱﺭﻡﻭﻥﻙﻡ ﻑﻱ ﻡﻕﺍﺏﺭ ﻩﻡ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﺍﻉﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻭ ﻩﻡﻱﺓ، ﻱﺹﻭﺭﻭﻥ ﺭﻑﺍﻕﻙﻡ، ﺯﻭﺭًﺍ ﻱﺕﻩﻡﻭﻥ
 ﻭﺕﺯﻭﻱﺭًﺍ،
 ﻱﻁﻝﻕﻭﻥ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺭ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺩﻥﻱﻱﻥ، ﻱﻩﺯﺃﻭﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺃﺩﺍﺉﻙﻡ ﻝﻝﻭﺍﺝﺏ ﻱﻭﻡ ﻉﺯ ﺍﻝﻭﺍﺝﺏ، ﻭﻡﻥ ﻡﺱﺍﻉﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺡﺕﺍﺝﻱﻥ ﻉﻥﺩﻡﺍ ﻍﺍﺏ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻉ.
ﻝﺡﻑﺍﻅ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺓ ﻭﺽﺏﻁ ﺍلاﻡﻥ ﻭﺕﺃﻡﻱﻥ السلاﻡ ﺓ ﺍﻝﻉﺍﻡﺓ ﻉﻥﺩﻡﺍ ﻍﺍﺏ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻉ، ﺍﺽﻁﺭﺭﺕﻡ ﻝﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉ ﻉﻥ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥ ﻭﻝ
 ﻭﺡﺕﻯ ﺽﺏﻁ ﺕﻩﺭﻱ ﺍﻝﺏﺽﺍﺉﻉ ﻭﺍﻝﻁﺡﻱﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﺥﺏﺯ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺱﻭﺭﻱﺍ ﻭﻕﺏﺭﺹ ﻝﻡﺹﻝﺡﺓ ﺥﺯﻱﻥﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ،
 ﻑﻕﻝﺏﻭﻩﺍ ﺽﺩﻙﻡ ﻭﻉﻝﻱﻙﻡ ﻭﺹﻭﺭﻭﻙﻡ ﻡﺝﺭﻡﻱﻥ
  …ﻡﺭﺕﺯﻕﺓ ﻱﺱﻉﻭﻥ ﻝﺝﺭﻱﻡﺓ ﻡﻥ ﻩﻥﺍ ﻭﻝﺱﺭﻕﺓ ﺭﺏﻁﺓ ﺥﺏﺯ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩﻥﺍﻙ
ﻡﺍ ﺩﻕﺕ ﺱﺍﻉﺓ ﺍلسلام، ﻙﻥﺍ، ﻥﺡﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﺝﺭﻡﻱﻥ ﺍﻝﻑﺍﺱﻕﻱﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺭﻕﻱﻥ ﻕﻁﺍﻉ ﺍﻝﻁﺭﻕ ﻝﻙﻥ ﺡﺏﻝ ﺍﻝﻙﺫﺏ ﻕﺹﻱﺭ ﻭﻕﺹﻱﺭ ﺝﺩًﺍ، ﻑﺡﺍﻝ
 ﺍﻭﻝ ﻡﻥ ﻝّﺏﻯ ﺍﻝﻥﺩﺍء.
 ﺇﻥ ﺍﻝﻕﺍﺹﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﺩﺍﻥﻱ ﻱﻉﺭﻑﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻝﻉﺏﺕﻩ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻥ ﻩﺍء ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ ﻭﻭﻝﻭﺝ ﻡﺭﺡﻝﺓ السلام.
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 ﻝﻙﻥﻥﺍ  ﻩﻭﺝﻡﻥﺍ ﺍﻱﺽًﺍ ﻭﺍﻱﺽﺍ،ً ﺇﻥﻡﺍ  ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﻡﺭﺓ ﻝﺩﻭﺭﻥﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺇﻥﻩﺍء ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ.
  ، ﺍﻥ ﻕﺍﻭﻡﻥﺍ ﻑﻥﺡﻥ ﻡﺝﺭﻡﻭﻥ ﻭﺍﻥ ﺱﺍﻝﻡﻥﺍ ﻑﻥﺡﻥ ﻡﺕﻭﺍﻁﺉﻭﻥ.ﻉﺝﺏًﺍ ﻉﺝﺏﺍ ً
 ﺃﻱ ﻡﻕﻱﺍ ﺱ ﻩﻭ ﻡﻕﻱﺍﺱﻩﻡ؟ ﺃﻱ ﻡﻥﻁ ﻕ ﻩﻭ ﻡﻥﻁﻕﻩﻡ؟
 ﻕﺽﻱﺕﻩﻡ ﻭﺍﺡﺩﺓ ﺩﺍﺉﻡًﺍ ﺃﺏﺩًﺍ: ﻡﺡﺍﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﺍء ﻉﻝﻯ ﺭﻡﺯﻱﺓ ﺵﻩﺍﺩﺕﻥﺍ.
 ﻕﺽﻱﺕﻥﺍ ﻭﺍﺡﺩﺓ ﺩﺍﺉﻡًﺍ ﺃﺏﺩًﺍ ﺃﻥ ﻥُﺹﻝﺏ ﻝﺕﺱﺕﺡﻕ ﻕﻱﺍﻡﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ.
  ًﺍ، ﺡﺩﻱﺩًﺍ، ﻭﻥﺍﺭًﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱﻱﻥ ﺝﻡﻱﻉًﺍ، ﻭﻥﺡﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺏﻱﻥﻩﻡ.ﻭﺝﺍءﺕ ﻡﺭﺡﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﺱﻝﻡ، ﻭﺏﻉﻙﺱ ﻡﺍ ﻙﻥﺍ ﻥﺕﻡﻥﺍﻩ، ﺝﻭﺭًﺍ، ﻅﻝﻡ
  ، ﻭﻙﻥﺍ ﺃﻙﺙﺭ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻡُﺕﺡﻥ.”ﻭﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺭ ﻱﻡﺕﺡﻥ ﺍﻝﺫﻩﺏ“
ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺭ ﺭﻡﻱﻥﺍ، ﻭﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺭ َﺫ ﻩﺏًﺍ ﺥﺭﺝﻥﺍ، ﺇﻥﻩ ﺍﻡﺕﺡﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥ، ﻱﻉﻝﻭ ﻑﻭﻕ ﻙﻝ ﺍﻡﺕﺡﺍﻥ، ﻡﻥﻁﻕ ﺍﻝﻭﺍﻕﻉ ﺍﻝﺡﻱ، ﻱﻉﻝﻭ ﻑﻭﻕ ﻙﻝ 
 كلام، ﻡﻥﻁﻕ ﺍﻝﺡﻕﻱﻕﺓ ﻡﻥﻁﻕ ﺍﻝﺡﻕ.
  ، ﺍﻝﺵﺕﺍﻡﻭﻥ، ﺍﻝﻙﺫﺍﺏﻭﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﺥﺍﺩﻉﻭﻥ ﻙﻝﻩﻡ. ﻭﻝﺕﻥﺕﺹﺭ ﺍﻝﺡﻕﻱﻕﺓ، ﻭﻝﻱﺡﻱﺍ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ.ﻑﻝﻱﺱﻙﺕ ﺍﻝﻡﺭﺍﺅﻭﻥ
 ﺃﻱ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺭﻑﺍﻕ ﻭﺍﻝﺭﻑﻱﻕﺍﺕ،
 ﺃﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ،
ﺏﻉﺩ ﺥﺭﻭﺝﻥﺍ ﻡﻥ ﻥﺍﺭ ﺍﻝﺝﺡﻱﻡ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱ، ﻝﻡ ﻱﺏﻕ ﻝﻝﻡﻍﺭﺽﻱﻥ، ﺱﻭﻯ ﺍﻝﻉﻱﺵ ﺏﻱﻥ ﻕﺏﻭﺭﻩﻡ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﺍﻉﻱﺓ ﻭﻥﺏﺵﻩﺍ، ﻭﺍﺱﺕﺡﺽﺍﺭ 
ﻝﺵﻱﻁﺍﻥﻱ، ﻭﺕﺝﻡﻱﻉ ﻡﺁﺱﻱ،ﻭﺏﺵﺍﻉﺓ، ﻭﻕﺫﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱ ﺏﺵﻙﻝ ﻡﺵﻭﻩ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻁﺭﻱﻕﺕﻩﻡ، ﻭﺍﻝﻕﺭﺍءﺓ ﻑﻱ ﻙﺕﺍﺏﻩﻡ ﺍ
 ﻙﻝﻩﺍ، ﻭﻡﺡﺍﻭﻝﺓ ﺭﻡﻱ ﻩﺍ ﻉﻝﻱﻥﺍ، ﻥﺡﻥ ﺃﺏﻥﺍء ﺍﻝﻕﺽﻱﺓ، ﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﻭﺃﺡﻱﺍء.
ﻱﺕﻥﺍﺱﻭﻥ ﻡﻥ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻱﺕﻩﺩ ﺩﻩﻡ، ﻭﻱﺕﻩﺩﺩ بلا ﺩﻩﻡ، ﻭﺍﺭﺯﺍﻕﻩﻡ، ﻭﺃﻉﻥﺍﻕﻩﻡ، ﻭﺡﺭﻱﺍﺕﻩﻡ، ﻭﻡﺱﺕﻕﺏﻝﻩﻡ ﻭﻡﺱﺕﻕﺏﻝ ﺍﻭلا ﺩﻩﻡ، ﻭﻱﻥﻕﺽﻭﻥ 
ﻭﺽﺍﻉﺕ ﺍﻝﻕﻱﻡ ﻭﺍﺱﺕﺏﻱﺡ ﺍﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥ. ﻁﺏﻉًﺍ ﻥﺡﻥ ﻝﻡ ﻥﻙﻥ ﻡﻩﻱﺉﻱﻥ ﻝﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉ ﻉﻥ  ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﻥ ﺍﺱﺕﺵﻩﺩ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉ ﻉﻥﻩﻡ، ﻑﻉّﺯ ﺍﻝﻭﻑﺍء
 ﺍﻝﺏلاﺩ ﺏﺃﻑﺽﻝ ﻡﺍ ﻱﻙﻭﻥ، ﻝﻙﻥﻥﺍ ﻕﻡﻥﺍ ﺏﺫﻝﻙ ﺏﻡﺍ ﺕﻱﺱﺭ، ﻭﺃﺡﻱﺍﻥًﺍ ﺏﺍﻝﻝﺡﻡ ﺍﻝﺡﻱ.
ﻉﻥﺩﻡﺍ ﺱﻕﻁﺕ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ، ﺡﺍﻭﻝﻥﺍ ﺇﻥﻕﺍﺫ ﻡﺍ ﻱﻡﻙﻥ ﺍﻥﻕﺍﺫﻩ، ﺏﻙﻝ ﺹﺩﻕ ﻭﺇﻝﺕﺯﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻥﺩﻑﺍﻉ ﻭﺡﻡﻱﺓ. ﻭﺝﻝ ﻡﻥ لا ﻱﺥﻁﻯء، ﺥﺹﻭﺹًﺍ 
ﺕﻝﻙ ﺍﻝﻅﺭﻭ . ﻑﻝﻕﺩ ﺍﺥﻁﺃﻥﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺏﻉﺽ ﺍلأوقات، ﻙﻡﺍ ﻕﺍﻡ ﺍﻑﺭﺍﺩ ﻡﻥﺍ، ﺏﻡﺥﺍﻝﻑﺍﺕ، ﻭﺍﺭﺕﻙﺍﺏﺍﺕ، ﻝﻡ ﻥﻙﻥ ﻉﻥﺩﻡﺍ ﻱﻕﺩﻡ، ﻑﻱ ﻡﺙﻝ 
 ﻝﻥﺭﺕﺽﻱ ﻩﺍ، ﻝﻭ ﻙﺍﻥ ﺏﺇﻡﻙﺍﻥﻥﺍ ﺕﺩﺍﺭﻙﻩﺍ. ﺏﻉﺽ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﻡﺥﺍﻝﻑﺍﺕ ﻭﺍلاﺭﺕﻙﺍﺏﺍﺕ ﻙﺍﻥت وللأسف ﺍﻝﻙﺏﻱﺭ ﺵﻥﻱﻉﺓ ﻡﺅﺫﻱﺓ.
ﻭﺍﻝﻥﺍﺱ، ﺃﺕﻕﺩﻡ ﺏﺇﺱﻡﻱ، ﻭﺏﺇﺱﻡ ﺃﺝﻱﺍﻝ  ﻑﻱ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﻡﻥﺍﺱﺏﺓ ﺍﻝﺝﻝﻱﻝﺓ، ﻭﺏﻕﻝﺏ ﻡﺕﻭﺍﺽﻉ، ﺹﺍﻑ، ﻭﺏﻙﻝ ﺹﺩﻕ ﻭ ﺵﻑﺍﻑﻱﺓ، ﺃﻡﺍﻡ الله
ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡﻱﻥ ﺝﻡﻱﻉًﺍ، ﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﻭﺍﺡﻱﺍء، ﺏﺍﻉﺕﺫﺍﺭ ﻉﻡﻱﻕ، ﺹﺍﺩﻕ ﻭﻙﺍﻡﻝ، ﻉﻥ ﻙﻝ ﺝﺭﺡ، ﺍﻭ ﺃﺫﻱﺓ، ﺍﻭ ﺥﺱﺍﺭﺓ، ﺍﻭ ﺽﺭﺭ ﻍﻱﺭ 
 ﻡﺏﺭﺭ، ﺕﺱﺏﻥﺍ ﺏه، خلاﻝ ﺃﺩﺍﺉﻥﺍ ﻝﻭﺍﺝﺏﺍﺕﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ، ﻁﻭﺍﻝ ﻡﺭﺡﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱﺓ،
ﺍﻝﺱﻡﺍﺡ، ﻭﺍﻝﺕﻉﺍﻝﻱ، ﻭﺍﻝﻡﺡﺏﺓ. ﻭﻝﻝﻡﺍﺭﻕﻱﻥ، ﺍﻝﻁﺍﺭﺉﻱﻥ، ﺍﻝﻡﺕﺍﺝﺭﻱﻥ ﻙﻡﺍ ﺍﻁﻝﺏ ﻡﻥ الله ﻉﺯ ﻭﺝﻝ ﺍﻝﺱﻡﺍﺡ، ﻭﻡﻡﻥ ﺃﺱﺃﻥﺍ ﺇﻝﻱﻩﻡ 
ﺏﺁلاﻡﻥﺍ ﻭﺁلاﻡ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺱ ﻭﺍﻭﺝﺍﻉﻩﻡ ﺍﻕﻭﻝ: ﻙﻑﻯ ﻡﺕﺍﺝﺭﺓ، ﻭﺍﺱﺕﻍلاًلا ﻝﺩﻡﺍء ﻭﺩﻡﻭﻉ ﺍﻝﻥﺍﺱ، ﻙﻑﻯ ﺕﺯﻭﻱﺭًﺍ ﻝﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥ، ﺍﺕﻕﻭﺍ الله ﻑﻩﻭ 
 ﻭﺡﺩﻩ ﺍﻝﺡﺍﻙﻡ ﺍﻝﺩﻱﺍﻥ.
ﺍﻥﻉﻙﻡ ﻙﻡﺍ ﻑﻱ ﻡﺩﺍﺭﺱﻙﻡ ﻭﺝﺍﻡﻉﺍﺕﻙﻡ ﻭﺃﺩﻱﺍﺭﻙﻡ، ﻭﺏﻉﺩ، ﺃﻱﺕ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺱﻱﺩﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻝﺱﺍﺩﺓ، ﺃﺱﻡﻉﻙﻡ ﻑﻱ ﻡﻥﺍﺯﻝﻙﻡ، ﻑﻱ ﻡﻙﺍﺕﺏﻙﻡ، ﻑﻱ ﻡﺹ
 ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻭﻁن الأم ﻙﻡﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝ ﻡﻩﺝﺭ، ﺕﻁﻝﺏﻭﻥ ﻡﻥ الله، ﻝﻱﻝ ﻥﻩﺍﺭ، ﺃﻥ ﻱﻝﻩﻡﻥﺍ ﻙﻱ ﻥﺕﻑﻕ، ﻙﻱ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ.
 ﻥﺡﻥ ﺝﻡﻱﻉًﺍ ﻥﺕﻭﻕ ﺇﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﺓ، لأ ﻩﻡﻱﺕﻩﺍ ﺏﺡﺩ ﺫﺍﺕﻩﺍ، ﻭلأﻥﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺩﻡ ﺓ ﺍﻝﻁﺏﻱﻉﻱﺓ ﻝﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ.
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 ﻭﻝﻙﻥ ﻕﻭﻝﻭﺍ ﻝﻱ ﺏﺭﺏﻙﻡ ﺡﻭﻝ ﻡﺍﺫﺍ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ ؟
ﻩﻝ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ، ﺡﻭﻝ ﺍلإﻕﺭﺍﺭ، ﺏﻡﺏﺩﺃ ﺏﻕﺍء ﺡﺯﺏ الله ﻡﺱﻝﺡًﺍ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﺡﺱﺍﺏ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ، ﺍﻝﻯ ﺡﻱﻥ ﺕﺡﺭﻱﺭ ﻙﺍﻡﻝ ﻑﻝﺱﻁﻱﻥ، 
 ﻭﺍﺱﺕﺭﺝﺍﻉ ﺍﻝﻕﺩﺱ، ﻭﻙﺍﻡﻝ ﺍلاﺭﺍﺽﻱ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﺏﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺡﺕﻝﺓ، ﻭﺡﻝ ﻡﺵﻙﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﺵﺭﻕ ﺍلاﻭﺱﻁ ﺏﺭﻡﺕ ﻩﺍ؟
ﺭﻱﺓ، ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﺍﺱﺕﺵﻩﺩ ﻑﻱ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻥﻕﻱﺏ ﺱﺍﻡﺭ ﺍﻡ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ، ﺡﻭﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﻁﺍﻝﺏﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﺕﺡﻕﻱﻕ ﻡﻉ ﻕﻱﺍﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﺝﻱﺵ، ﻝﻡﺍﺫﺍ ﺃﺭﺱﻝﺕ ﺍﻝﻁﻭﺍﻑﺓ ﺍﻝﻉﺱﻙ
 ﺡﻥﺍ ﺇﻝﻯ ﺱﺝﺩ؟
ﺍﻝﻡﺩﻡﺭﺓ، ﻭﺡﻭﻝ ﻡﻑﻩﻭﻡ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ ﺍﻝﻡﻑﺕﻭﺡﺓ، ﻭﺕﻙﺭﻱﺱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، ﺝﺏﻩ ﺓ ﻱﺕﻱﻡ ﺓ  2778ﺃﻡ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ ﺡﻭﻝ ﺹﻭﺍﺏﻱﺓ ﺡﺭﺏ ﺕﻡﻭﺯ 
 ﻝﻝﺹﻡﻭﺩ ﻭﺍﻝﺕﺹﺩﻱ، ﺏﻱﻥﻡﺍ  ﺃﻩﻝ ﺍﻝﺹﻡﻭﺩ ﻭﺍﻝﺕﺹﺩﻱ ﻱﻑﺍﻭﺽﻭﻥ ﺇﺱﺭﺍﺉﻱﻝ؟
  ﺍ؟ﺍﻡ ﺕﺭﻱﺩﻭﻥﻥﺍ ﺃﻥ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ، ﺡﻭﻝ ﺍﻉﺕﻡﺍﺩ ﺱﻭﺭﻱﺍ ﻙﺃﻡ ﺡﻥﻭﻥ ﺝﺩﻱﺩﺓ ﻝﻥ
 ﺍﻭ ﺡﻭﻝ ﻡﺡﺍﺭﺏﺓ ﺍلإﻡﺏﺭﻱﺍﻝﻱﺓ ﺍلأﻡﻱﺭﻙﻱﺓ، ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺵﺭﻕ ﺍلأﻭﺱﻁ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﺍﻝﻡ ﻙﻝﻩ، ﺡﺕﻯ ﺍﻝﻥﺹﺭ؟
 ﺍﻡ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ ﺡﻭﻝ ﺽﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﺕﻉﺩﻱﻝ ﺍﻝﺩﺱﺕﻭﺭ، ﻝﻱﻉﺍﺩ ﺍﻥﺕﺥﺍﺏ ﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﺍﻝﺝﻡ ﻩﻭﺭﻱﺓ، ﻡﺏﺍﺵﺭﺓ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺵﻉﺏ؟
  ﻍﻱﻱﺭ؟ﺍﻡ ﺡﻭﻝ ﺍلاﻉﺕﺹﺍﻡ ﻑﻱ ﻕﻝﺏ ﺍﻝﻭﺱﻁ ﺍﻝﺕﺝﺍﺭﻱ، ﻭﻕﻁﻉ ﺍﻝﻁﺭﻕﺍﺕ ﺏﺍﻝﺡﺝﺍﺭﺓ، ﻭﺍﻝﺡﺩﻱﺩ، ﻭﺍﻝﻥﺍﺭ، ﻭﺱﻱﻝﺓ ﻝلإصلاﺡ ﻭﺍﻝﺕ
 ﺇﻥ ﻥﻕﻁﺓ ﺍﺭﺕﻙﺍﺯ، ﺍﻱ ﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱ ﺓ، ﻩﻱ ﺍﻝﺙﻭﺍﺏﺕ ﺍﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥﻱﺓ ﻝﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﻱﻥ ﻑﻱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ،
ﺍﻝﺕﻱ ﻙﺍﻥﺕ ﺩﺍﺉﻡًﺍ، ﻡﺡﺭﻙ ﺍﻝﻭﺝﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﺍﻉﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱ، ﻙﻡﺍ ﻙﻝ ﺍﻝﺕﺡﺍﻝﻑﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﻱﺽﺓ، ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺡﻝﻑ ﺍﻝﺙلاﺙﻱ ﺇﻝﻯ 
 ﺍﻝﺝﺏﻩ ﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ.
ﻭﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺏﻱﺍﻥﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﺡﻝﻑ ﺍﻝثلاﺙﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﺝﺏﻩ ﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ، ﻭﻡﻕﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻱﺭﻱﺩ ﺍﻥ ﻱﻉﺭﻑ ﻡ ﺍ ﻩﻱ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﺙﻭﺍﺏﺕ، ﻑﻡﺍ ﻉﻝﻱﻩ، ﺇلا ﺍﻝﻉ
ﺱﻱﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﺏﻱﺭ ﻭﺩﻱﺭ ﻉﻭﻙﺭ، ﻭﻙﻝ ﻡﺍ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻱﻥﺍﺩﻱ ﺏﻩ ﺍﻝﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﻙﻡﻱﻝ ﺵﻡﻉﻭﻥ، ﻭﺍﻝﺵﻱﺥ ﺏﻱﺍﺭ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻝ، ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻡﻱﺩ ﺭﻱﻡﻭﻥ ﺍﺩﻩ، 
 ﻭﺵﺍﺭﻝ ﻡﺍﻝﻙ، ﻭﺍﺩﻭﺍﺭ ﺡﻥﻱﻥ، ﻭﺝﻭﺍﺩ ﺏﻭﻝﺱ ﻭﺏﺵﻱﺭ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻝ.
  ﺁﺫﺍﺭ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﺙﻭﺍﺏﺕ ﺍﻝﻱﻭﻡ؟ 2ﻑﺃﻱ ﻥ ﻩﻡ ﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﻭ 
ﺭﻭﺭﻱ ﺃﻥ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ، ﺏﻝ ﻝﺯﺍﻡ ﻉﻝﻱﻥﺍ ﺃﻥ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ. ﻑﻩﻝ ﻱﻭﺍﻑﻕ ﺍلآخروﻥ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﺃﻥ ﻥﺕﻭﺡﺩ ﺡﻭ ﻝ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍﻝﺙﻭﺍﺏﺕ، ﻑﻱﻥﺍﺽﻝﻭﺍ، ﻥﻉﻡ، ﺽ
ﺏﺵﻉﺍﺭ ” ﻭﻁﻥﻱ ﺩﺍﺉﻡًﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺡﻕ” ﻭﻥﻥﺍﺽﻝ ﻡﻉًﺍ ﻡﻥ ﺍﺝﻝﻩﺍ ﻭﻡﻥ ﺍﺝﻝ ﺕﺭﻙﻱﺯ ﻩﺍ ﻭﺕﺙﺏﻱﺕﻩﺍ؟ ﺃﻡ ﺃﻥﻩﻡ ﺍﺱﺕﺏﺩﻝﻭﺍ ﻥﻩﺍﺉﻱًﺍ، ﺵﻉﺍﺭ
  ؟”ﺱﻭﺭﻱﺍ ﻭﺡﺯﺏ الله ﺩﺍﺉﻡًﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺡﻕ“
  ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻭﺡﺩﺓ، ﻱﺝﺏ ﺍﺱﺕﺏﻉﺍﺩ ﻉﻭﺍﻡﻝ ﺍﻝﻑﺭﻕﺓ ﺏﻱﻥﻥﺍ.ﺃﻱ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﺱﺍﺩﺓ، ﻝﻝﻭﺹﻭﻝ 
ﻭ ﻩﻝ ﻡﻥ ﻉﺍﻡﻝ ﻑﺭﻕﺓ، ﺃﺵﻥﻉ ﻭﺃﺏﺵﻉ، ﻭﺃﻙﺙﺭ ﺇﻱلاﻡًﺍ، ﻡﻥ ﺫﺍﻙ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ، ﻱﻥﺏﺵ ﻕﺏﻭﺭًﺍ ﻍﻱﺭ ﻡﻭﺝﻭﺩﺓ، ﻭﻱﻥﻙﺃ، ﻭﺏﺵﻙﻝ ﻡﻝﺕٍﻭ، 
ﺝﺭﺍﺡًﺍ ﻡﺍ ﺯﺍﻝﺕ ﻡﻝﺕﻩﺏﺓ، ﻭﻱﻉﻭﺩ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱ ﺍﻝﺏﻍﻱﺽ ﺍﻝﻙﺭﻱﻩ، ﺏﺵﻙﻝ ﻡُﻉﺕﻭﺭ، ﻡﻥ ﺍﺝﻝ ﺕﺵﻭﻱﻩ ﺹﻭﺭﺓ ﺍلآﺥﺭﻱﻥ، ﻭﺕﺡﻕﻱﻕ 
  ﺍﺱﻱﺓ ﺭﺥﻱﺹﺓ.ﻡﻙﺍﺱﺏ ﺱﻱ
ﻩﻝ ﻡﻥ ﻉﺍﻡﻝ ﻑﺭﻕﺓ ﺃﺱﻭﺃ، ﻡﻥ ﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻱﻕﻭﻡ ﻱﻭﻡﻱًﺍ، ﺏﺕﺃﻝﻱﺏ ﻡﺝﻡﻭﻉﺓ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺃﺥﺭﻯ، ﻭﻡﻥﻁﻕﺓ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﻥﻁﻕﺓ، ﻭﻁﺍﺉﻑﺓ ﻉﻝﻯ 
 ﻁﺍﺉﻑﺓ.
ﻩﻝ ﻡﻥ ﻉﺍﻡﻝ ﻑﺭﻕﺓ، ﺃﻙﺏﺭ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﻱﺕﻥﺍﺱﻯ ﺍﻉﺩﺍء ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، لا ﺏﻝ ﻱﺩﺍﻑﻉ ﻉﻥﻩﻡ ﺏﺵﻙﻝ ﻡﺱﺕﻡﻱﺕ؟ ﻭﺏﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﺏﻝ، ﻱﻥﻕﺽ ﻝﻱًلا 
  ﻝﻱﻥ ﺍلأحﺭﺍﺭ، ﻭﺍﻝﺥﺍﺭﺝﻱﻥ ﻡﻥﺕﺹﺭﻱﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺱﺝﻭﻥ ﺍﻝﺕﻉﺫﻱﺏ ﻭﺍلاضطﻩﺍﺩ.ﻥﻩﺍﺭًﺍ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﺍلأﺏﺭﺍﺭ، ﻭﺍﻝﻡﻥﺍﺽ
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ﻩﻝ ﻡﻥ ﻉﺍﻡﻝ ﻑﺭﻕﺓ ﺃﻕﺱﻯ، ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﺍﻥﻕﺽ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺏﻙﺭﻙﻱ ﻭﻡﺍ ﺯﺍﻝ، ﻡﻉ ﻙﻝ ﻡﺍ ﺕﻡﺙﻝﻩ، ﻭَﺹّﻭﺭ ﺱﻱﺩ ﻩﺍ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻥﻩ ﻡﻭﻅﻑ 
 ﺹﻍﻱﺭ ﻉﻥﺩ ﺱﻑﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﺝﻥﺏﻱﺓ، ﺍﻭ ﻉﻥﺩ ﺱﻱﺍﺱﻱ ﻡﺡﻝﻱ؟ ﺡﺕﻯ ﺍﻝﻉﺙﻡﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ ﺭﻍﻡ ﺝﻭ ﺭﻩﻡ ﻝﻡ ﻱﺹﻝﻭﺍ ﺍﻝﻯ  ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺡﺩ.
  ﻱﻭﻥ،ﺃﻱ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡ
 ﺱﺃﻙﻭﻥ ﻙﺍﻝﻉﺍﺩﺓ ﺹﺭﻱﺡًﺍ ﻡﻉﻙﻡ،
ﻡﺹﻱﺭ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺏﺭﻡﺕﻩ، ﻙﻡﺍ ﻡﺹﻱﺭ ﺍولادﻙﻡ ﻭﺍﺡﻑﺍﺩﻙﻡ، ﺏﻱﻥ ﺍﻱﺩﻱﻙﻡ ﺍﻝيوم، من خلاﻝ ﺍلاﻥﺕﺥﺍﺏﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻥﻱﺍﺏﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﻕﺏﻝﺓ، ﻑﺇﻡﺍ ﺍﻥ 
ﺕﻕﺩﻡﻭﺍ، ﻭﺕﺥﻝﻭﺍ ﻉﻥ ﺍلاﻉﺕﺏﺍﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﺹﻍﻱﺭﺓ ﺍﻝﺽﻱﻕﺓ، ﻭﺕﻕﺕﺭﻉﻭﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﺱﺱ ﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥﻱﺓ ﻙﺏﻱﺭﺓ اخلاقﻱﺓ ﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ ﺵﺍﻡﻝﺓ، ﻭﺍﻡﺍ 
  ﺙ لا ترﻱﺩﻭﻥ، ﺏﻡﺯﻱﺩ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺕﻑﺭﻕﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﺓ، ﻭﻡﺯﻱﺩ ﻭﻡﺯﻱﺩ ﻡﻥ ﺕﺭﺍﺝﻉ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﺕﺭﻱﺩﻭﻥ.ﺕﺱﺏﺏﻭﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺡﻱ
ﺍﻥ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺫﻱ ﺕﺭﻱﺩﻭ ﻥ، ﻩﻭ ﺏﺍﻝﻑﻉﻝ ﻑﻱ ﺥﻁﺭ، ﺥﻁﺭ ﺍﻝﺩﻱﻡﺍﻍﻭﺝﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻕﺍﺕﻝﺓ، ﻭﺍﻝﺵﻉﺏﻭﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺩﻡﺭﺓ، ﻭﺍﻝﻁﺭﻭﺡﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﺱﺍﻡﺓ. ﻝﻙﻥ 
ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﻱﺕﻭﺡﺩ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﻭ ﻥ، ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﻱﺥﻝﺹ  ﺥلاﺹﻩ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻱﺩﻱﻙﻡ. ﻑلا ﺕﺕﺃﺥﺭﻭﺍ، ﻙﻭﻥﻭﺍ ﻁﻝﻱﻉﻱﻱﻥ، ﻡﺕﻥﻭﺭﻱﻥ ﺃﺏﻁﺍًلا ﻙﺍﻝﻉﺍﺩﺓ،
 ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ.
ﻭﺏﺍﻝﻡﻥﺍﺱﺏﺓ، ﻙﻝﻡ ﺓ ﺃﺥﻱﺭﺓ، ﺃﺥﺹ ﺏﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﻱﻥ، ﺍﻝﺫﻱﻥ  ﻩﻡ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻉﺩﺍء ﻡُﺱﺕﺡﻙﻡ ﻡﻉ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ، ﺃﻭ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻉﺩﺍء ﻡﻉﻱ 
ﺃﻥﺍ ﺵﺥﺹﻱًﺍ. ﺃﺱﺕﺡﻝﻑﻙﻡ ﺃﻥ ﺕﺕﺝﺭﺩﻭﺍ، ﻭﺃﻥ ﺕﻥﻕﻭﺍ ﺍﻝﻕﻝﺏ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻕﻝ، ﻑﻙﺭﻭﺍ ﺏﺇﻱﻡﺍﻥﻙﻡ ﻭﺏﻡﺹﻝﺡﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، ﺕﺝﺍﻭﺯﻭﺍ ﺍلإﻉﺕﺏﺍﺭﺍﺕ 
ﻕﺓ، ﺕﺝﺍﻭﺯﻭﺍ ﺍﻝﺕﺭﺍﻙﻡﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻡﺕﻭﺍﺭﺙﺓ، ﺕﺝﺍﻭﺯﻭﺍ ﺍلأفكار ﺍﻝﻡﺱﺏﻕﺓ، ﺕﺥﻁﻭﺍ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱ ﻭﺡﻙﻡﻭﺍ، ﺡﻕﻭﻕ ﺃﻁﻑﺍﻝﻙﻡ ﻭﺍلأﺝﻱﺍﻝ ﺍﻝﺽﻱ
ﺍلآﺕﻱﺓ. ﺡﺩﺩﻭﺍ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻙﻡ ﻑﺕﺝﺩﻭﺍ ﺃﻥﻩ ﺕﻡﺍﻡًﺍ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻥﺍ. ﻙﻭﻥﻭﺍ ﻡﺕﺥﻁﻱﻥ، ﻡﺕﻱﻕﻅﻱﻥ ﻭﺍﻉﻱﻥ.  ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﻱﺕﻭﺡﺩ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱﻭﻥ،  ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﻱﺥﻝﺹ 
  ﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﺥﺍﺭﺝ ظلال الأرز، ﺥﺍﺭﺝ ثورة الارز؟ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ. ﻭﻙﻱﻑ ﻱﺥﻝﺹ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﺏﻥﻱﻩ؟ ﻭﺍﻱ 
 ﺍﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ
ﺍﺫﺍ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺙﻭﺭﺓ ﺃﻩﻝﻱﺓ ﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ، ﻕﺍﻡﺕ ﻑﻱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﺡﺩﻱﺙ، ﻑﻩﻱ ﺙﻭﺭﺓ ﺍلأﺭﺯ. ﻭﺍﺫﺍ ﻙﺍﻥ ﻡﻥ ﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡﺓ، ﺡﻕﻱﻕﻱﺓ، ﺝﺍﻡﻉﺓ، 
  ﺁﺫﺍﺭ. 14ﺵﺍﻡﻝﺓ، ﻥﺍﺏﻉﺓ ﻡﻥ ﺹﻡﻱﻡ ﻭﺭﻭﺡ ﺍﻝﺕﺭﺍﺙ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﻱﺡﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱ، ﻑﻩﻱ ﺙﻭﺭﺓ ﺍلأرز وحرﻙﺓ 
ﻥ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﺓ ﺵﻉﺏﻱﺓ ﻭﻁﻥﻱﺓ ﺹﺍﺩﻕﺓ، ﺝﻭﺏﻩﺕ ﺙﻭﺭﺓ ﺍلأﺭﺯ، ﻡﻥﺫ ﺍﻝﻝﺡﻅﺓ ﺍلاولى، بأﻉﺕﻯ ﻭﺱﺍﺉﻝ ﺍﻝﺽﻍﻁ ﻭﻙﻙﻝ ﺙﻭﺭﺓ، ﺕﻉﺏﺭ ﻉ
ﻭﺍلارهاب واﺏﺵﻉﻩﺍ، ﻑﺱﻕﻁ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﺵﻩﺩﺍء ﺍﻝﻭﺍﺡﺩ ﺕﻝﻭ ﺍلآخر، وﻡﻭﺭﺱﺕ ﻉﻝﻱﻥﺍ ﺽﻍﻭﻁ، ﻡﺱﺕﻡﺭﺓ، ﻩﺍﺉﻝﺓ ﻕﺍﺕﻝﺓ، ﻭﺹﻝﺕ ﺍﻝﻯ 
ﻕﻁ، ﻭﺙﻭﺭﺓ ﺍلأرﺯ ﻝﻥ ﺕﻩﺩﺃ، ﻝﻥ ﺕﺕﻭﻕﻑ، ﺡﺩ ﺍﺝﺕﻱﺍﺡ ﺏﻱﺭﻭﺕ، ﻭﻡﺡﺍﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﺝﺕﻱﺍﺡ ﺍﻝﺝﺏﻝ. ﻝﻙن الأرز لا يلوي، وﺍﻝﺕﺍﺭﻱﺥ لا ﻱﺱ
 ﻝﻥ ﺕﺱﺕﻙﻱﻥ .
 ﺍﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ
 ﻝﻥ ﻥﺥﺍﻑﻩﻡ، ﺏﻝ ﺱﻥﺱﺕﻡﺭ، ﻭﻝﻥ ﻥﺱﺕﻙﻱﻥ ﺡﺕﻯ ﺕﺡﻕﻱﻕ ﺍﻝﺡﻝﻡ ﺍﻝﻯ ﺁﺥﺭ ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﻡﻥﻩ.
ﺡﻝﻡ ﺍﻝﺏﺵﻱﺭ، ﺏﺡﺩﻭﺩﻩ ﻡﺭﺱﻡﺓ ﻭﺍﺽﺡﺓ، ﺏﻡﺍ ﻑﻱ ﻩﺍ ﻡﺯﺍﺭﻉ ﺵﺏﻉﺍ،  8ﻙﻝﻡ  80174ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻙﻱﺍﻥ، ﺏﺃﺭﺽﻩ ﻙﺍﻡﻝﺓ، ﺏﺍﻝ 
 ﻭتلاﻝ ﻙﻑﺭﺵﻭﺏﺍ.
  ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻑﻉﻝﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ ﺡﻱﺙ ﺍﻝﻕﺭﺍﺭ ﻙﻝﻩ ﻭالسلاﺡ ﻙﻝﻩ. ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ
 ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﺭﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺡﺭﺭﺓ، ﺡﻱﺙ ﺍلاﻥﺱﺍﻥ ﺱﻱﺩ ﻥﻑﺱﻩ، ﺡﺭ، ﻱﺕﻭﻕ ﺇﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻉﻝﻯ، ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻉﻕﺩ ﻭلا ﺕﻉﻕﻱﺩﺍﺕ.
ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﺍﻝﺩﻱﻡﻕﺭﺍﻁﻱﺓ، ﺕﻡﺍﺭﺱ ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺱﻭ ﺍﻩﺍ، ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻉﻥﻑ، ﻭﺍﻙﺭﺍﻩ، ﻭﺍﺽ ﻁﻩﺍﺩ، ﻭملاحﻕﺍﺕ ﻭﺕﻭﻕﻱﻑﺍﺕ، ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ 
  لات.ﺕﻩﺩﻱﺩ ﻭﻭﻉﻱﺩ ﻭﺱلاح واﻍﺕﻱﺍ
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ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﺍﻝﻉﺩﺍﻝﺓ ﻑﻱ ﻡﻥﻁﻕﺓ ﻉﺯﺕ ﻑﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻉﺩﺍﻝﺓ، ﺏﺩءًﺍ ﺏﺍﻝﻡﺡﻙﻡ ﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﻱﺓ، ﻭﺍﻥﺕﻩﺍء ﺏﺇﺹلاﺡ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﺍء، ﻡﻥ ﻙﻝ ﻡﺍ ﺵﺍﺏﻩ ﻑﻱ 
 ﺍﻝﻡﺭﺍﺡﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﺍﺽﻱﺓ.
 ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﺍﻝﻥمو الاقﺕﺹﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﺱﺕﻡﺭ ﺍﻝﻡﺽﻁﺭﺩ، ﺥﺩﻡﺓ ﻝﺝﻱﺍﻉ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻭﻑﻕﺭﺍﺉﻩ، ﻭﻙﻝ ﻑﺉﺍﺕ ﺵﻉﺏﻩ ﻭﺍﺝﻱﺍﻝﻩ ﺍﻝﻕﺍﺩﻡ ﺓ.
ﺍﻝﻡﻑﻙﺭﻱﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﺵﻉﺭﺍء ﻭﺍﻝخلاقين، وﺃﺹﺡﺍﺏ ﺍﻝﻁﻡﻭﺡ، ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻉﻱ ﺍﻝﺩﺍﺉﻡ ﻥﺡﻭ ﻡﺵﻩﺩ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﺝﺏﺭﺍﻥ ﺥﻝﻱﻝ ﺝﺏﺭﺍﻥ، ﻭﺱﺍﺉﺭ 
 ﺍﻝﺥﻝﻕ ﻭﺍلإﺏﺩﺍﻉ.
 ﺃﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ
ﺍﻥ ﻡﻭﺍﺝﻩ ﺓ ﺍﺱﺭﺍﺉﻱﻝ، ﻝﻱﺱﺕ ﺵﻉﺍﺭًﺍ ﻑﺍﺭﻍًﺍ، ﻱﻁﺭﺡ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻁﺍﻭﻝﺓ ﺍﻝﻡﺹﺍﻝﺡ ﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺱﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﺍﺥﻝﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺽﻱﻕﺓ، ﺏﻝ ﺱﻉﻱ 
ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﺝﺍﻭﺭﺓ لإسﺭﺍﺉﻱﻝ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﺱﺕﺭﺍﺕﻱﺝﻱﺓ،  ﺵﺍﻡﻝ ﻙﺍﻡﻝ ﺩﺅﻭﺏ، ﻱﻕﻭﻡ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﺕﻑﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﺏﻱﺓ ﻙﺍﻑﺓ، ﺥﺹﻭﺹﺍ ً
 ﻭﺍﺡﺩﺓ، ﻡﻭﺡﺩﺓ، ﻡﺩﺭﻭﺱﺓ ﻭﺍﻕﻉﻱﺓ، ﺕﺃﺥﺫ ﺏﺍلاﻉﺕﺏﺍﺭ ﻙﻝ ﺍﻝﻉﻭﺍﻡﻝ ﺍﻝﻡﻁﻝﻭﺏﺓ، ﻝﺕﻙﻭﻥ ﺍﺱﺕﺭﺍﺕﻱﺝﻱﺓ ﻥﺍﺝﺡﺓ .
ﻙﻡ ﻡﻥ ﺝﻩ ﺓ ﺕﻥﻁﺡﺕ، ﻡﻥﺫ ﺱﺕﻱﻥ ﻉﺍﻡًﺍ ﻭﺡﺕﻯ ﺍﻝﻝﺡﻅﺓ، ﻝﻡﻭﺍﺝﻩ ﺓ ﺍﺱﺭﺍﺉﻱﻝ، ﻭﻙﻡ ﻡﻥ  ﻩﺯﻱﻡ ﺓ، ﻭﻡﺃﺱﺍﺓ، ﻭﺥﺱﺍﺭﺓ، ﻭﺥﻱﺏﺓ 
  . ﺃﻡﻝ ﻭﻡﺭﺍﺭﺓ ﻝﺡﻕﺕ ﺏﻥﺍ ﺝﻡﻱﻉﺍ ً
ﺍﺫﺍ ﻙﺍﻥﺕ ﻁﺭﻱﻕ ﺝﻩﻥﻡ، ﻡﺭﺹﻭﻑﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﻥﻭﺍﻱﺍ ﺍﻝﺡﺱﻥﺓ، ﻑﻁﺭﻱﻕ ﺍﻝﻥﺝﺍﺡ ﻡﺭﺹﻭﻑﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﻡﻥﻁﻕ، ﻭﺍﻝﺡﺱﺍﺏﺍﺕ، ﻭﺍﺡﺕﺭﺍﻡ ﺍلآخر 
 ﻭﺭﺃﻱﻩ، ﻭﺏﺍﺕﻑﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻉ.  ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﺕﻙﻭﻥ ﻡﻭﺍﺝﻩﺓ ﺍﺱﺭﺍﺉﻱ ﻝ، ﻩﻙﺫﺍ ﺕﻥﺕﺹﺭ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﻱﺓ.
ﻉًﺍ، ﻑﺵًلا ﺝﺩﻱﺩًﺍ، لا ﻥﻉﻱﺩﻥ ﺕﺝﺍﺭﺏ ﻑﺍﺵﻝﺓ، ﻑﻥﺝﻝﺏ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻭﻁﻥﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﺹﻍﻱﺭ، ﻙﻡﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻑﻝﺱﻁﻱﻥﻱﺓ، ﻭﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﺏ ﺝﻡﻱ
 ﻭﻥﻙﺏﺓ ﺝﺩﻱﺩﺓ، ﻭﺩﻡﺍء ﻭﺩﻡﻭﻉًﺍ ﻭﺩﻡﺍﺭًﺍ ﻭﺥﺭﺍﺏًﺍ، ﻝﻡ ﻱﻉﺩ ﺏﺍﻡﻙﺍﻥﻥﺍ ﺍﺡﺕﻡﺍﻝﻩﺍ .
ﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﻑﻝﺱﻁﻱﻥﻱﺓ ﻝﻱﺱﺕ ﻕﺽﻱﺓ ﺡﺯﺏ، ﺃﻭ ﻑﺉﺓ ﻡﻥ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ، ولا قﺽﻱﺓ ﺕﺡﺕﻙﺭﻩﺍ ﺙﻭرة اسلاﻡﻱﺓ، ﺏ ﻝ ﻩﻱ ﻕﺽﻱﺓ 
ﻥ ﻑﻝﺱﻁﻱﻥ ﻡﻥ ﺝﺩﻱﺩ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺫﺏﺡ ﺕﻕﺍﺱﻡ ﺍﻝﻥﻑﻭﺫ ﻑﻝﺱﻁﻱﻥﻱﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﺩﺭﺝﺓ ﺍلاوﻝﻯ، ﻭﻉﺭﺏﻱﺓ ﺏﺍﻝﺩﺭﺝﺓ ﺍﻝﺙﺍﻥﻱﺓ ﻭﺍلاخيرة، فلا ﻥﺽﻱﻉ
 ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﻥﻁﻕﺓ، ﻭلا ﻥﺱﻡﺡﻥ، ﺏﺕﺡﻭﻱﻝ ﻕﺽﻱﺕﻩﺍ، ﻡﻁﻱﺓ، لإﺱﺕﻉﺍﺩﺓ ﺃﻡﺝﺍﺩ ﺍﻡﺏﺭﺍﻁﻭﺭﻱﺍﺕ ﻍﺍﺏﺭﺓ ﻡﻥﺩﺙﺭﺓ.
ﺍﻡﺍ ﻉﻥ ﺍلاسﺕﺭﺍﺕﻱﺝﻱﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉﻱﺓ، ﺍﻝﻭﺍﺝﺏ ﺍﻉﺕﻡﺍ ﺩﻩﺍ ﻑﻱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ، ﻑﺏﺫﻭ ﺭﻩﺍ، ﻭﺥﻁﻭﻁ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻉﺭﻱﺽﺓ، ﻡﻭﺝﻭﺩﺓ ﻑﻱ ﺍﺕﻑﺍﻕ 
  .ﺍﻝﺩﻭﺡﺓ، ﻭﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺏﻱﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻭﺯﺍﺭﻱ ﺍلاﺥﻱﺭ
ﺡﺹﺭ ﺍﻝﺱﻝﻁﺓ ﺍلاﻡﻥﻱﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﺱﻙﺭﻱﺓ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ، ﻭﺍﻝﻡﻕﻱﻡﻱﻥ ﺏﻱﺩ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ، ﺏﻡﺍ ﻱﺵﻙﻝ ﺽﻡﺍﻥﺓ، ” ﻑﺍﺕﻑﺍﻕ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﺡﺓ ﻥﺹ، ﻉﻝﻯ 
  ”.لاسﺕﻡﺭﺍﺭ ﺹﻱﻍﺓ ﺍﻝﻉﻱﺵ ﺍﻝﻡﺵﺕﺭﻙ ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻝﻡ ﺍلأهﻝﻱ
 ﻙﻡﺍ ﺝﺍء ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺏﻱﺍﻥ ﺍﻝﻭﺯﺍﺭﻱ:
علاقات ﺏﻱﻥ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻱﻥ، ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺱﺓ ﺕﺅﻙﺩ ﺍﻝﺡﻙﻭﻡﺓ، ﺕﻡﺱﻙﻩﺍ، ﺏﻡﺏﺩﺃ ﻭﺡﺩﺓ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻭﻡﺭﺝﻉﻱﺕﻩﺍ، ﻑﻱ ﻙﻝ ﺍﻝﻕﺽﺍﻱﺍ ﺍﻝﺥﺍﺹﺓ ﺏﺍﻝ“
  ”.ﺍﻝﺩﻑﺍﻉﻱﺓ، ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺱﺓ ﺍﻝﺥﺍﺭﺝﻱﺓ
ﻭﺏﺍﻝﺭﻍﻡ ﻡﻥ ﺫﻝﻙ، ﻝﻡ ﻱﺝﺩ ﺍﻝﺏﻉﺽ ﺡﺭﺝًﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﻝ: ﻱﺝﺏ ﺍﻥ ﻥﺏﻕﻯ ﻡﺱﻝﺡﻱﻥ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺍ ﻥﺡﻥ ﻉﻝﻱﻩ، لأﻥ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻝﻱﺱﺕ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ 
 ﺏﻉﺩ؟
 ﻭﻥﻕﻭﻝ ﻝﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺏﻉﺽ: ﻁﺍﻝﻡﺍ ﺍﻥﺕﻡ ﺏﺍﻕﻭﻥ ﻉﻝﻯ ﻡﺍ ﺍﻥﺕﻡ ﻉﻝﻱﻩ، ﻑﻝﻥ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻱﻭﻡًﺍ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ.
  ﻑ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ، ﻭﺃﻥﺕﻡ ﺕﺹﺍﺩﺭﻭﻥ ﻕﺭﺍﺭﻩﺍ، ﻭﺍﺱﺕﺭﺍﺕﺝﻱﺕﻩﺍ، ﻭﺱﻝﻁﺕ ﻩﺍ ﻭ ﻩﻱﺏﺕ ﻩﺍ؟ﻭﻙﻱ
 ﻭﻙﻱﻑ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ، ﻭﺍﻥﺕﻡ ﺕﺩﻭﺱﻭﻥ ﻙﻝ ﻱﻭﻡ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺭﺝﻝﻩﺍ، ﻭﺃﺡﻱﺍﻥًﺍ ﻉﻝﻯ ﺭﺃﺱﻩﺍ؟
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 ﻭﻙﻱﻑ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ، ﻭﺃﻥﺕﻡ لا ﺕﻉﺕﺭﻑﻭﻥ ﺏﺍﻙﺙﺭﻱﺓ ﻡﻙﻭﻥﺍﺕ ﻩﺍ؟
 ﺃﻱﻩﺍ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﻭﻥ،
ﺍﺩ ﻡﻱﺵﺍﻝ ﺱﻝﻱﻡﺍﻥ، ﻑﻝﻥﺕﺭﻙ ﺝﻡﻱﻉًﺍ ﺥﻁﻁﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﻑﺭﺩﻱﺓ، ﻭﺭﺅﺱﺍء ﻥﺡﻥ ﺍﻝﻱﻭﻡ ﺍﻡﺍﻡ ﻑﺭﺹﺓ ﺝﺩﻱﺩﺓ، ﻡﻉ ﺭﺉﻱﺱ ﺝﺩﻱﺩ ﻝﻝبلاﺩ، ﺍﻝﻉﻡ
 ﻭﺯﻉﻡﺍء ﻡﺍ ﻭﺭﺍء ﺍﻝﺡﺩﻭﺩ، ﻭﻝﻥﺕﻙﻭﻙﺏ ﻡﻥ ﺡﻭﻝﻩ، ﻝﺕﻕﻭﻡ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻭﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﻑﻉًلا ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ.
 ﻝﻥ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ ﻝﻭﺡ ﺩﻩﺍ
 ﻝﻥ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ ﻡﻥ ﺩﻭﻥﻥﺍ ﺝﻡﻱﻉﺍ ً
 ﻝﻥ ﺕﺹﺏﺡ ﺍﻝﺩﻭﻝﺓ ﻕﺍﺩﺭﺓ، ﺍﺫﺍ ﻭﺍﺹﻝﻥ ﺍﻉﺕﺭﺍﺽ ﻁﺭﻱﻕ ﻩﺍ، ﻭﺕﻉﻁﻱﻝ ﺱﻱ ﺭﻩﺍ.
ﻱﻡﻙﻥ، ﻭﻥﺡﻥ ﻥﺝﺕﻡﻉ ﻑﻱ ﻕﻝﺏ ﻙﺱﺭﻭﺍﻥ، ﻭظلاﻝ ﺱﻱﺩﺓ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻑﻱ ﺡﺭﻱﺹﺍ، ان لا أﺕﻭﻕﻑ ﻉﻥﺩ ﺏﻙﺭﻙﻱ، ﻉﻥﺩ ﻭﺏﻉﺩ، ﻙﻱﻑ 
 ﺏﻁﺭﻱﺭﻙﻥﺍ ﻡﺍﺭ ﻥﺹﺭالله ﺏﻁﺭﺱ ﺹﻑﻱﺭ، ﻭﺍﻡﺍﻡ ﻙﻥﻱﺱﺕﻥﺍ، ﺹﺥﺭﺓ ﻭﺝﻭﺩﻥﺍ، ﻑﻱ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﺍﻝﻡ ﻭﺍﻝﻙﻭﻥ.
  ﻕ،ﺍﻥ ﻩﺍ ﺍﻡ ﻡﺏﺍﺭﻙﺓ، ﺭﺍﻑﻕﺕﻥﺍ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﻡﺭﺍﺡﻝ ﻭﺍﻝﻅﺭﻭﻑ ﻭﺍﻝﻉﻩﻭﺩ ﻙﻝﻩﺍ، ﻉﻝﻯ ﻁﺭﻱﻕ ﺝﻝﺝﻝﺕﻥﺍ ﻑﻱ  ﻩﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺵﺭ
 ﻭﺏﺫﻝﺕ ﺍﻝﻍﺍﻝﻱ ﻭﺍﻝﺭﺥﻱﺹ، ﻑﻱ ﺱﺏﻱﻝ ﺏﻕﺍﺉﻥﺍ ﻭﻥﻡﻭﻥﺍ ﻭﺍﺯﺩﻩﺍﺭﻥﺍ.
 ﻭﺍلا ﻩﻡ ﻡﻥ  ﻩﺫﺍ ﻙﻝﻩ، ﺍﻉﻁﺕﻥﺍ ﻕﺩﻱﺱﻱﻥ، ﺍﺏﺭﺍﺭًﺍ، ﺍﻁﻩﺍﺭًﺍ، ﺍﻥﻕﻱﺍَء ﺍﺏﻁﺍًلا،
 ﻩﻡ ﻕﻭﺕﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﻑﻉﻝﻱﺓ، ﻭﺡﻡﺍﻱﺕﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﻁﺏﻱﻉﻱﺓ، ﻭﻥﻭﺭ ﺩﺭﺏﻥﺍ.
ﺥﻁ ﻝﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﺩﺭﺏ ﻭﻥﺡﻥ ﺏﻉﺩﻩ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺃﻥﺱﻯ ﻙﻱﻑ ﺃﻥﺱﻯ، ﻡﺅﺱﺱ ﻕﻭﺍﺕﻥﺍ، ﻭﻕﺍﺉ ﺩﻩﺍ ﺍلأوﻝ، ﻭﺵﻩﻱ ﺩﻩﺍ ﺍلاﻙﺏﺭ ﺏﺵﻱﺭ ﺍﻝﺝﻡﻱﻝ، ﺍﻝﺫﻱ 
ﻡﺱﺕﻡﺭﻭﻥ. ﺵﻱﺥ ﺏﺵﻱﺭ، ﺵﻩﺩﺍءﻥﺍ ﺍلأبرﺍﺭ، ﻙﻥﺕﻡ، ﻡﺍ ﺯﻝﺕﻡ، ﻭﺱﺕﺏﻕﻭﻥ ﻡﻥ ﻉﻝﻱﺍﺉﻙﻡ، ﺡ ﺭﺍﺱ ﻩﺫﻩ ﺍلارض وهﺫﺍ ﺍﻝﺵﻉﺏ. 
ﻥﺍﻡﻭﺍ ﻕﺭﻱﺭﻱ ﺍﻝﻉﻱﻥ، ﻡﻁﻡﺉﻥﻱ ﺍﻝﺏﺍﻝ، لأﻥ ﺍﻝﻡﺵﻉﻝ ﻑﻱ ﺃﻱﺍﺩ ﺃﻡﻱﻥﺓ. ﺱﻥﻙﻡﻝ ﻑﻱ ﺍﻝﺱﻝﻡ ﻭﺍﻝﺱﻱﺍﺱﺓ، ﻡﺍ ﻙﻥﺕﻡ ﻕﺩ ﺏﺩﺃﺕﻡﻭﻩ ﻑﻱ 
 ﺍﻝﺡﺭﺏ ﻭﺍﻝﻡﻕﺍﻭﻡ ﺓ.
  ﺩ ﻝﺵﻩﺩﺍﺉﻥﺍ ﺍلأبرﺍﺭﺍﻝﻡﺝﺩ ﻭﺍﻝﺥﻝﻭ
 ﺍﻝﻉﺯﺓ ﻭﺍﻝﺭﻑﻉﺓ ﻝﺵﻉﺏﻥﺍ ﺍلأبي
 ﺍﻝﺏﻕﺍء ﻝﻭﻁﻥﻥﺍ ﺍﻝﺡﺏﻱﺏ
 ﻉﺍﺵﺕ ﺍﻝﻕﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻝﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥﻱﺓ
 ﻝﻱﺡﻱﺍ ﻝﺏﻥﺍﻥ
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Appendix III 
Nasrallah’s Speech on May 8, 2008: 
(Referred to as Nasrallah, 2008 a) 
Source: Official Website of Hizbullah 
 
Sayyed Nasrallah : We are in a new period ~ Unconstitutional government 
must back down and accept dialogue 
 
In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Praise be to Allah Lord of 
the Worlds. Peace and Prayers be upon Mohammad, The Seal of Prophets, and 
on his family and elected followers, and upon all the messengers and prophets. 
May Allah's peace and mercy be upon you all. 
 
Certainly, the subject of this press conference that we hold, which is the first 
since the end of July (2006) War, is the important and dangerous developments 
that have been occurring for the past few days in Lebanon.  
 
In the beginning, I must say that after the decisions taken by the ruling party on 
that dark night, a completely new era has begun in Lebanon. Meaning that the 
date of that session to us is like February 14, 2005, the earthquake of the 
assassination of PM Rafik Hariri that sent Lebanon into an entirely new era. 
Lebanon after that dark gloomy session is not what it was before. The ruling 
party must know that it has entered Lebanon in a completely new phase due to 
the seriousness, backgrounds and dimensions of the decisions it took. 
 
I will discuss several headlines: 
 
First: The Resistance's communication networks. In this conference we shall 
call a spade a spade...the phase is difficult but it is also a phase for logic, 
thinking, and wise decisions.  
Second: The airport and General Shokeir.  
Third: The current severe political dilemma, dealing with it, and the way out of 
it 
 
In the first point I have a definition. In Lebanon people may understand what 
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the Resistance communication network is, but foreigners might think that we 
have set up a private phone network and a ministry of communication which 
brings us proceeds illegally, and to answer the deductions made by the ruling 
party that knows the truth but denies it.  
There is a code-weapon in all armies in the world even in armies in the past. 
Various codes were used, including birds and sounds among other things. Every 
time infantry and firearms and combat tactics developed, the code or 
communications developed simultaneously. Hence, any fighting group be it an 
army or party or militia or security team, all need communication between the 
leadership and groups and cadres and individuals. This weapon is an 
elementary part of the administrative organization and control if not the primary 
factor in any victory and battle leadership. 
 
These communications take various forms and it is a technical issue. Hence, it 
is crucial that I mention it. There are various radio frequency communications 
such as a walkie-talkie and cellular phones in which sound is transferred by 
waves and they take several technological forms. There's also the wire in which 
sound is not broadcasted in waves. It is transferred in wires from one 
instrument to another and sound is usually confined. Usually non-wired 
communications are facilitated and easier, and every person can take his 
receiver from place to place. Now each of you can hold a cellular phone and 
talk from the street from any place you chose. It is not so with cables, not so 
flexible. There is a group of problems with non-wired communication, and I tell 
u, there is no non-wired communication in Lebanon or the world that is 
surveillance-proof and cannot be decoded and analyzed.  
 
This is a fact given the technological development in the world. There is an 
issue of surveillance. Second, there is the issue of interference. The enemy may 
log onto the communication channel and jam it disconnecting the leadership 
from the cadres and bases and centers. In result, the entire leadership and 
control network disperses. The third issue is targeting. Quite simple, a 
cellphone tower can be bombed. The wireless network can be bombed similar 
to what occurred in the (2006) war and in previous wars. Yet the wired 
communication network, especially if it is secret, is difficult to bomb in the first 
few days, and may be employed in a wider margin. We in the resistance do not 
have the capabilities of large armies or the technology of the USA nor the 
‘Israeli' technology. Naturally, when we are faced with complicated advanced 
technology we resort to simplified technology since in the technological scale 
we cannot match. The best and most effective means to face complex 
technology is simplification. In result came the wired network. To be precise I 
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can say the wired resistance network is a communication center and a group of 
cables connected to houses of leaders and centers and resistance related posts. 
This is the wired communication network.  
 
Wired communication is a part of the code weapon of the resistance in 
Lebanon. It is not a secondary weapon; it is the most fundamental one in the 
battle, and in any battle. Before the year 2000, one of the most important 
reasons behind the success of the resistance operations is that when 200, 300 or 
400 resistance fighter attack ‘Israeli' posts in the occupied zone, the ‘Israeli' 
only knew about the attack the second the first shot was fired. This is because 
we didn't rely on wireless equipment, but on the wired network. In the July 
(2006) war the most important point, our greatest point of strength, was 
leadership and control because communication was upheld between the 
leadership and command centers and operational combat posts. The enemy 
admitted to this. Remember after the second Qana massacre when a ceasefire 
was agreed upon for 48 hours to facilitate the exit of the injured and others, 
how were we able to stop firing when we are not an regular army? It was due to 
our ability to communicate with all our points in those posts.  
 
As to the declaration of the Minister of Information, and I regret this since he 
was an old friend, that it is wrong to consider that this weapon protects 
Hizbullah. I would like to say that many of our leaders have died due to 
wireless communications and cellular phones. And in the July (2006) war in 
many posts where we lost wired communication and were forced to 
communicate wirelessly and by cellular phones, cadres and leaders were killed 
in operation. Today, when we approach the Winograd report we find that the 
most important recommendation by Winograd was the necessity to destroy the 
organization and capacity of leadership and control of Hizbullah in which the 
communication constitutes a decisive factor. This is the Winograd 
recommendation which we must not forget, and you can go back to it. 
 
We come to the negotiations that were going on between us and the ruling party 
in the recent past. You all know that this (communication) network existed 
before the year 2000 and continued after that, and it is not a new or a recently 
introduced network. Yes, it is true that it has been developed and advanced, and 
this is a natural and logical issue. I would like to remind them that when we 
agreed with them in the sinister quadric-partite alliance that the network was 
existent then and wasn't a aggression of sovereignty, law, or public money.  
 
When the ministerial Declaration was made and talked about the resistance and 
120 
 
its arms, and this is part of its arms, this network wasn't an aggression on 
sovereignty and public money. Now, at this moment, the four-party accord is a 
dream, an illusion, the matter which angered some members of the ruling party. 
I pronounce that it is an illusion; they will not see it in this life or in the 
afterlife. In any case, we will not meet in the afterlife. Yet in this life they will 
never see it. After the Winnograd recommendations, and after Welch's 
recommendations and the ‘hot Summer', and after the Lebanese crisis was 
magnified and after (Terje Rod) Larsen and his report that is useless unless the 
Lebanese government says, "The Lebanese Government says..." ...and after the 
insulting report of the US State Department to the (Lebanese) government...thee 
Government came and reopened the case even though in the past few months 
we were negotiating and had reached a certain defined agreement and had 
answered all the questions.  
 
They had come before and we had communicated, the subject was brought up 
and high levels of Lebanese security institution chiefs were put in charge of 
communicating with us and discussing the (phone) communication network 
with us and certain distressing issues. We met and answered their issues and 
they said, "Fine, you have addressed our issues and we have no problems, but 
there is a cable laid between the (southern) suburb and western Beirut." This 
cable was laid out in the July 2006 war a few days after the suburb was bombed 
and not on the first day; we laid a cable between the suburb and Beirut. They 
told us that this cable spurs fear from this person and that person, and hope u 
can remove it, and in case of a new war God forbid, we, the official security 
forces, vow to lay out a new cable. We agreed to that with our hearts, and told 
them if it relieves you, remove it, and we have removed it. End of story.  
 
The region is undergoing a phase. The issue is not about the wired network. 
There were gambles on the Government that lost. Certain gambles were put on 
regional and international developments that lost, lost gambles on wars. 
Therefore, the war in Iraq and Palestine and Lebanon and even with Iran and 
Syria was required to be waged in a different manner. They came and opened 
the issue of the wired (network). The officers came and a meeting was held. 
What's the problem? They said we have a group of issues you must solve for us. 
We are a people of negotiation and solving issues, and we want to keep our 
arms. We don't want to fight for our arms. Fighting is not our objective. They 
said we want to lay out a network in Jubeil and Kisirwaan. We told them that it 
is untrue. And the one (Jumblat) who held a press conference and lied for 25 
years knows that he was lying. We informed the officers who informed the 
ministerial committee who in turn informed the unconstitutional government 
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that Hizbullah says, as a matter of fact that it doesn't want to lay down a 
network in Jubeil and Kisirwaan, and we told them that we lay it only in places 
where there are leaders and centers and where there are targets. They said, 
"Fine, what about the North?" We responded that not even in the North. They 
said, "fine...And the line between the suburb and the South?" We answered, "It 
is natural. It is crucial since it provides communication between the suburb and 
the south." They said, "We fear you might lay lines to your allies in the Choof." 
We said, "We will not lay lines to the Choof, and we vow not to lay lines to our 
allies." This is the first time I discuss such information. We said, "Fine, There's 
no problem."  
 
They said, "One more thing. This network is a replacement of the Government's 
network and in effect it will deprive the treasury of proceeds." We told them 
that this network is for the sole use of the leaders and cadres of the resistance 
and is not for public use. And if you want to make sure, be our guests. They 
said there's a third issue, that this network may be used for making international 
calls. We told them that it isn't possible, and despite that, you can pick up any 
international call. Be our guests and tell us where the international calls are and 
let us deal with it. We believe that international calls of this sort are illegal and 
are deemed a source of dissolute money and a theft of public money. They said 
this is perfect.  
 
The officers went and said the atmosphere was positive and matters were going 
well. Then they came back and said we have a deal: we overlook your wired 
communication network in trade for stopping the strike in Beirut. They want a 
compromise to overlook the resistance's wired network. Here, I would like to 
ask: Had we accepted this proposal, would the resistance network have become 
legal and not against the law and a theft of public money? What kind of 
government is this? This isn't a government, it's a gang! It is not a government 
of law or institutions. It's a gang. It's not even a militia. Shame on it! It's a 
shame to use internal issues to overlook the issue of the resistance's arms. It is a 
patriotic internal issue associated with defending this country and confronting 
the Zionist enemy. Second, the communication network's decision is mine, but 
the decisions relating to the strike camp lies in the hands of all the opposition. 
 
The issue ended at this level and we provided assurances and showed our 
willingness (to cooperate) by saying ‘be our guests and come examine (this 
network) and see that there are no international calls on it and that it isn't for 
public use and that it takes nothing from the government given the fact that 
there are phone networks in various places in Lebanon for religious institutions 
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and political parties in Lebanon some of which are licensed and others not so. 
Allah willing the members of parliament will soon reveal some details in 
relations to this. But apart from this side, this issue is related to the resistance, 
with the struggle with ‘Israel', and with defending this country.  
 
Yet the topic has risen to the surface again via the Prime Minister Mr. Walid 
Jumbtatt since it has become clear to me that it is wrongful to say ‘the 
government of Fuad Saniora' since Fuad Saniora is a poor employee for Walid 
Jumblaat. And when the latter wants to fire and employee he tells the 
employees (like Mr. Saniora) to fire them. Of course he (Jumblaat) is an 
employee for Condaleeza Rice...The Government of Mr. Walid Jumblaat has 
returned to stir up the topic again and waged a comprehensive attack starting 
from the camera and conluding with the airport. And it is possible the he 
(Jumblaat) brought the Frensh Member of Parliament to the suburb. And on the 
occasion, have you any idea where the mp was arrested? He was arrested in the 
very alley of my house with camera taking pictures! Who took him there? A 
person from the Progressive Socialist party! 
 
They took him so that we would arrest him! I tell you, we will not be merciful 
with the security of any of our leaders at all. They will say kidnap or 
detainment, not a problem. The issue was brought up and reopened and, hence, 
the government held a meeting and took decisions that you are aware of. This is 
what happened up to now. 
 
The second point in the issue of the wired network is describing the decision. I 
would like to describe the government's decision after the report of the US 
Department of State which ‘insulted' them. They used the same phrase which 
came in the State Department's report. They are employees that abide to the 
text. Fine. A ‘hot summer' and internationalization and after 10 hours of calls 
made to the countries and capitals that covered the July War, the sinister 
decision was made which you heard of and which considered the Hizbullah's 
resistances wired network an aggression against sovereignty, and law and 
public money, and they requested from the judicial authorities and security 
forces to pursue everyone that is charged with establishing this network. 
 
First, this decision is a declaration of war and a commencement of war from the 
government of Walid Jumblatt on the resistance and its arms and a 
commencement of war from the government of Walid Jumblatt on the 
resistance and its arms on behalf of and for the benefit of the United States and 
‘Israel'. We have no doubts or confusion on the subject. It's as clear as the sun 
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at midday. 
 
Second: this decision revealed the truth of this party and its backgrounds, the 
truth of its commitments, and the truth of its behavior and performance during 
the July 2006 war the results of which saddened it (the party). 
 
Third: This decision aims at confiscating the prime factor that protects the 
resistance's leadership, cadres and infrastructure, and aims at exposing (the 
resistance) as an introduction to assassination and death, and the destruction of 
its infrastructure. Hence they become partners in killing and assassinating even 
if by only by providing introductions and opening the way. 
 
Fourth: This decision is aimed at stirring discord between the national Lebanese 
army, security forces and the resistance after the failure of all previous 
conspiracies and collusions that were foiled by the patience, wisdom, attention, 
and responsibility of the resistance and the army leadership. Today they want to 
push the Lebanese army and the Lebanese security forces into direct combat 
with the resistance through assigning the issue of removing and disabling this 
network to them. This is our description of the decision, of course it is also 
aimed at providing subject matter for Mr. Larsen for the UNSC, supervising 
UNSCR 1959 so that it is not said ‘Larsen said...' but ‘The government said...' 
In its simplest terms this is our description of the decision. I wish not to venture 
regionally and internationally, and into Bush's visit to the region and very long 
commitments... 
 
Our response to this decision is, naturally, that he who declares war against us 
and begins a war with us, be he a father or brother, it is our right to face them 
with defending our rights and arms and resistance and existence. The wired 
network is the most crucial part of the resistance's arms, not just a crucial part. 
From Bint Jubeil I talked about it and was clear and transparent during that 
election period. And I wasn't searching for electoral voices. The government's 
Prime Minister Mr. Walid Jumblaat was present sitting and swaying his feet 
around while I was giving a speech and clearly said, "The hand that extends to 
the resistance's arms whomever it is for and wherever it comes from...we will 
cut it!" Today is the day of truthfulness to that decision. 
 
The ‘Israeli' hand extended to the resistance's arms in the July war and it was 
cut. In the interior (Lebanon), there have been attempts that have not yet 
reached the level of seriousness, action, and the commencement of a war. But 
after the gloomy decisions of the dark government we consider that a war has 
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been waged and it is our duty to defend our arms and resistance, and the 
legality of our decisions. "He who has warned is excused!" To us the issue has 
passed all red lines. There will be no lenience with anyone whoever it be 
wherever it be. We also know, and our information confirms that the issue of 
the wired network is but a first step to be followed by other steps. And if we are 
tolerant with the wired network issue, tomorrow we will face a battle on the 
missile and anti-armor missiles and on every capability the resistance ahs to 
defend itself and its country or to confront any future ‘Israeli' aggression. 
 
Second: The subject of judicial reference. This communication network is 
under the control of Hizbullah, and therefore Hizbullah owns the network. I, the 
Secretary General, am the owner of the network and its editor-in-chief, as the 
media might put it, and its main financer, and I am a user of this network in 
which many loyal mujahidin worked implementing my decisions. Despite the 
illegal reference from the unconstitutional government and I don't believe in the 
legality of this reference, the Lebanese judiciary can send a judge in the 
appropriate place on the level of security and allow me to meet him, for I too 
have a litigation against those who took the decision that they have taken a 
decision in favor of the US and ‘Israel' and to ignite a civil war. Let the law 
(rule) between us. As to the rest, the people who facilitated, aided, and 
considered that they helped the resistance, they are untouchable, be that person 
an engineer, a company, a mayor, an employee, a contractor, a day laborer... 
Harming them is equivalent to harming me. Harming any cadre in the resistance 
in Lebanon is unacceptable, and is equivalent to harming our weapons. 
 
Forgive me. We are in a completely new era. We will arrest those who seek to 
arrest us. We will shoot anyone who shoots at us. We will cut the hand that 
extends to (hurt) those young men. There is no need for this entire story. Come, 
let us talk and see who contradicts the law and who is assaulting public money. 
It is a shame that, today, the Lebanese Prime Minister (Walid Jumblaat) 
confesses that he is a thief and admits on TV that he has two notebooks. He 
admits to lying-the difference between lying and a liar is that lying becomes a 
second nature to a liar. He's a liar with 25 years of experience in his confession 
and a killer in his confession. Today, the person ruling the country, and it is 
required of leaders, religious leaders, and sects to follow his plan, is a liar, a 
thief, a murderer! He heads the government today, gives out orders, and lays 
out red lines...while the resistance and the fathers and sons of martyrs who, if 
not for them Lebanon would have become ‘Israeli', are to be sent to court?! 
Nobody will take anyone to court! 
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This is not a government. It's a gang dominating people even if the whole world 
supported them, even if Bush rendered his support to it daily. This is a 
condemnation in their right, not ours! 
The second title: The issue of the airport. Its subject is not General Wafik 
Shokeir though its title is General Wafik Shokeir. After the parliamentary 
elections we were massively pressured to dismiss General Wafik Shokeir in 
order to bring a new general I don't want to name. Many names were presented 
and we rejected them. There were problems over this issue. Why the insistence? 
I would like to say that General Shokeir doesn't belong to Amal movement or 
Hizbullah or to any other opposition party. He's a general in the national 
institution (the Army), and we all agree on its patriotism and its pioneering 
unifying role. We all agree on the army. (He is) Like all other patriotic officers 
that are the sons of this institution, they were raised to apply the law and not 
abide to (party) leaders. 
 
The issue from the beginning is when this government was formed they wanted 
to put their hand on the airport not to steal because they already are stealing. 
Now in the airport there are several issues, entering and exiting, that concern 
them (the government), and even General Shokeir doesn't know about them. 
Many are the boxes and baggage that have entered and left the airport and God 
knows what is in them: weapons, money, white (drugs), green (money), black 
(weapons)....God knows. This is existent. Yet this is not the story. The issue is 
that it is required of the Beirut airport to become a base for the FBI, CIA, and 
‘Israeli' Mossad. Quite honestly this is the issue. If not, where is the security 
disorder in the airport? Trips arrive and depart and so are people, and there is 
no problem at the airport or in its vicinity at all. Yes, the presence of a patriotic 
general that abides to the law whom they know very well through his patriotism 
is an obstacle in transforming Beirut's Martyr Rafiik Hariri airport into a spying 
base for the United States and the Mossad, Shabak, Shin Bet, etc.  
 
This is the issue. That's why it is required that General Wafik Shokeir should be 
fired meanwhile they weren't able to in the past. Even after we resigned from 
the government they attempted that, but they faced the obstacle of His 
Excellency President Emile Lahoud who would refuse to sign such decree. 
Now this unconstitutional government which believes that it has the jurisdiction 
of the president has taken this step. What is intended is bringing a general loyal 
to one of those leaders who are employed by the CIA and FBI. This is the 
airport's story in a nutshell. 
 
Quite frankly we cannot tolerate the presence of a CIA, FBI, or Mossad base in 
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our neighborhood. People's blood, dignity, and safety are more precious and 
over any other consideration. Yet the logic of the government and gang exists. 
His Eminence Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan called the Deputy Prime Minister 
Fouad Saniora and told him that this issue can't be dealt with in this manner, 
and if General Shokeir was negligent in the issue of the cameras which is a 
ridiculously absurd obvious issue, let there be an investigation and send it to 
court...We will not defend negligent generals that have broken the law. And if 
he is not negligent, why do you want to fire him? 
 
His Eminence Sheikh Qabalan and everyone that has stood by General Shokeir 
in this matter is not defending a Shiite general; he's defending a patriotic 
general. Since when General Shokeir is desecrated all patriotic generals in 
Lebanon will be desecrated. And every general will observe that his security 
institution and government are not protecting him, and that the ones that protect 
him are the political leaders. The last thing left in this country is the army, and 
if it crumples nothing will be left. These couple of days what has stopped a civil 
war from breaking out is a national willpower in the country and the presence 
of a military institution... and if the patriotic generals are desecrated the country 
is gone. We look at the issue at a deeper level than the airport and farther than 
the issue of General Shokeir. The issue is preserving what has been left of this 
country, the army with the hope that matters in this country will straighten up 
again. He (Saniora) promised him (Qabalan) and told the latter "Allah 
willing..." But he (Saniora) is but an employee. The true Premier (Jumblat) told 
them no, he had taken the decision to fire General Wafik Shokeir. Why didn't 
he (Jumblat) hold a press conference in Clemenseau, but went to AL Mukhtara 
and make the decision to fire (Shokeir) from there? Employees must follow 
their orders 
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Appendix IV. 
Nasrallah’s Speech on May 26, 2008: 
(Referred to as Nasrallah, 2008 b) 
Source: Official Website of Hizbullah, translated by english.hizbollah 
 
Sayyed Nasrallah: Resistance has Presented a Strategy in Two Domains: 
Liberation and Defense 
In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Praise be to Allah the 
Sustainer and Cherisher of the Worlds. Peace and Prayers be upon Mohammad, 
The Seal of Prophets, and on his family and elected followers, and upon all the 
messengers and prophets. May Allah's peace and mercy be upon you all. 
 
To begin, we salute the pure souls of the martyrs, the martyrs of the resistance 
and the martyrs of the nation, all the nation, the leader of the martyrs of the 
Islamic Resistance our leader Sayyed Abbas Moussawi, the sheikh of our 
martyrs of the Islamic Resistance Sheikh Ragheb Harb, and the soul of our 
beloved brother whom we miss among us today our martyr leader Hajj Imad 
Moghnieh...and to all martyrs. 
 
I welcome you all in the eighth anniversary of the Resistance and Liberation 
ceremony. Here you are filling the fields to prove once more your identity and 
truth, the fact that you are the most honorable people, the most generous 
people, the purest people. 
 
The Lord Almighty said in His glorious book (the Quraan): 
((Truly Pharaoh elated himself if the land and broke up is people into sections, 
depressing small group among them: their sons he slew but he kept alive their 
females for he was indeed a maker of mischief)). Among today's pharaohs is 
America and its tool ‘Israel', and in corresponding to that is Allah's promise for 
ever and ever to the end of time, ((And We wished to be Gracious to those who 
were being depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in Faith) and make 
them heirs, To establish a firm place for them in the land, and to show Pharaoh, 
Haman, and their hosts, at their hands, the very things against which they were 
taking precautions)). 
 
Dear brothers and sisters, our eighth anniversary, the anniversary of the 
liberation and the victory of the resistance, the people, and the nation... 
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coincides with the 60th anniversary of usurping Palestine and the establishment 
of the oppressive entity. It also coincides with the 30th anniversary of the 1978 
‘Israeli' invasion to south Lebanon and the setup of the occupied zone which 
was later expanded. Hence this is a time to contemplate and draw lessons 
whether in Lebanon or in the Arab and Islamic worlds. 
 
I will skip all introductions, despite the fact that the occasion bears (significant) 
thought, emotions, and moral and literary rights. I will skip all introductions for 
we have much to talk about today.  
 
I will start with Lebanon. Regarding the resistance, the resistance has set an 
example and offered a strategy in two fields, not one: the strategy of liberation 
and resistance, and the strategy of defending the people and the nation against 
invasions and threats. So there is an example of two strategies and views for 
liberation and defense. This is our message today to Lebanon and the Arab and 
Islamic worlds; it's a joint message by the resistance in Lebanon, Palestine and 
Iraq to the whole nation. When ‘Israel' invaded south Lebanon in 1978, UNSC 
resolution 425 was issued, we waited for its implementation and we bargained 
on the international community. In Lebanon, there were suggestions that a 
united Arab strategy be formed to confront the aggression with the pretext that 
Lebanon couldn't confront ‘Israel' on its own. None of this happened... the 
international community didn't move a finger to implement the resolution nor 
did Arab governments budge to place a defense strategy since the official 
community had abandoned the choice of confrontation.  
 
The bargain wasn't placed here alone since Imam Mussa Sadr here in Lebanon 
had established the choice of resistance with the help of southerners and 
Lebanese and, of course, trust in Almighty Allah and with the employment of 
available self-resources. 
 
What was the result of wrong bargains? ‘Israel' thought Lebanon was weak and 
incapable of confrontation... and the result was the invasion in 1982, [which 
was undertaken] in an attempt to annex Lebanon to ‘Israel' for good and to 
revive a new Arab Nakbah (Catastrophe). 
 
Facing this ‘Israeli' invasion the Lebanese were divided as is the case with all 
nations in the world in history. We Lebanese are no exception in this matter. 
Throughout history in every country which was invaded by an occupier, the 
people of that nation would be divided into several groups. This was the case in 
Lebanon in 1982 and so was the case in Palestine and still is relatively. This is 
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the case in Iraq. This is the case in past and future history. 
 
Facing the occupation requirement and on how to deal with it people split into 
numerous groups: a neutral group that stand on the sidelines in the beginning 
and waits, a second unconcerned group that is not concerned by what happens 
as long as it eats, drinks, and goes on outings on the weekend and isn't 
concerned in whose hands authority and sovereignty is nor what state the 
country is in, a third group of cheap collaborators and tools such as Anthony 
Lahd army who are cheap mercenaries and Lebanese at the same time, a fourth 
group that had intersecting interests with the ‘Israelis' and collaborates with 
them, a fifth previously defeated group that was looking forward to cooperate 
with the occupation on any level in the framework of cutting national losses and 
is usually composed of elites, a sixth group that, politically and through the 
media, rejects occupation but is not ready to pay the price or give blood, and a 
seventh group that believes that its humanitarian, national, religious and moral 
obligation is to take up arms and liberate the country regardless of the price; 
this is the group of the resistance that believes in resistance and resists in 
practice. 
 
This division is a natural historic social division and is not limited to Lebanon 
and is the result of losing national consensus on any issue. Some say that there 
was no consensus on the resistance in 1982 or that there is no national 
consensus on the resistance in Palestine or in Iraq, but there is also no national 
consensus on collaboration or carelessness. Therefore no decision bears 
national consensus, and each group makes up its mind and moves on forward. 
This is what happened in Lebanon. And I call upon any occupied nation as I 
have in the past that the resistance doesn't wait for consensus. It rather takes up 
arms and moves on to the duty of liberation, the liberation of land, people and 
captives...to regain dignity and glory with arms, blood, and heavy sacrifices. 
 
The resistance was a part of the Lebanese people and was not all the people of 
which are various parties and religious sects ... and there were martyrs among 
all Lebanese sects and parties both Islamic and patriotic. The resistance 
depended upon its willpower, jihad, operational actions, and the efforts of its 
youth. It was the obligation of the Arab and Islamic world to support it. Many 
sat back while thanked Syria and the Islamic republic in Iran came forward 
along with acting powers form the Arab and Islamic world. The first victory 
began in 1984-1985.  
 
The resistance pushed forward till the historic victory of 25 May 2000, an 
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evident victory for Lebanon, the resistance, Arabs, and the nation... an evident 
complete defeat of ‘Israel' and the "greater ‘Israel'" project that would extend 
from the Nile to the Euphrates and was broken down in southern Lebanon and 
the west Bekaa...and a humiliating exit for the Zionists without any prizes, 
gains or guarantees. The resistance's liberation strategy was successful. But the 
negotiation strategies, from Madrid to elsewhere, brought nothing to Lebanon, 
not a single inch of soil. The wait-and-see strategy only led the enemy to 
increased strength and the country to more desperation. Hence in the year 2000 
on days like this the liberation strategy depended by the resistance saw success.  
 
In Palestine after the catastrophe of 1948, the Palestinians were waiting in vain 
for their Arab brothers to form a unified Arab strategy or for the international 
community to act. They would have become lost and forgotten were it not for 
the armed Palestinian resistance from the first bullet and the first operation, and 
because of which the world and the occupiers of Palestine woke up to the fact 
that there is a Palestinian people, land, and cause... that there was someone 
pleading for his rights taking up arms and granting blood regardless of the 
price.  
 
Once more the Palestinian motto was launched noting that we will head to Al 
Quds (Jerusalem) by the millions. Even today, dear brothers and sisters, 
whatever Palestinian achievements made since the beginning of the resistance 
till this day is , in the first degree, because of the resistance, struggle and armed 
strife of the Palestinian people and all resistance factions....ending with a huge 
accomplishment and significant victory. In view of the changing world balance, 
blockaded Gaza which was cut from the world was capable of defeating the 
Zionist army and forcing it, for the second time after Lebanon, into a 
humiliating unconditional withdrawal from the Gaza sector with no strings 
attached, and without any gains. 
 
Yet again, the resistance's liberation strategy won meanwhile negotiations were 
attempting to regain the land inch by inch whilst it was required to surrender for 
every inch what could not be surrendered. What this signifies is that up till now, 
in Lebanon and in Palestine, experience has it that as Arabs, as a nation, and as 
Muslims, our sole way out of the catastrophe and all its ideological, 
psychological, military, security, political, and social implications....is through 
resistance in its method, cultures, willpower, and execution. 
 
Moving to Iraq, and in brief: In Iraq there exists an evident American 
occupation and American control of land and resources. The Americans in the 
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past few years have played the game of occupation and democracy. And today 
the objectives behind that democracy are surfacing. How? Promptly after the 
American invasion the Iraqi people, like all the nations I mentioned earlier, 
were divided into two strong groups, into believers in the political process, and 
into believers in resistance, namely armed resistance. It is absolutely natural for 
us in the resistance to side with the resistance movement in Iraq from an 
ideological, political, practical, experimental standing point. And despite that 
the pro-political operation group took their time and reached a difficult, 
intricate, separating exam which is the position on the agreements and accords 
that America wants to impose on Iraq and its peoples, and impose upon the 
government and parliament to consent to them.  
 
Here the true American objective behind the democracy game is uncovered. 
They came and opened the doors in front of all Islamic, patriotic, and national 
groups (to participate) knowing with whom they are friends and allies. So they 
opened the doors in front of everyone for a parliament to be elected and for it to 
elect a government, and therefore the whole world will refer to them as an 
elected government and parliament till the day comes when it (America) asks of 
this legalized government and legalized parliament to legalize the occupation, 
to sign an agreement granting the American sovereign control over Iraq making 
the security, political decision, oil, and Iraqi resources all in the hands of the 
Americans. Here the Americans are uncovered, and here the believers in the 
political process in Iraq, be they Shiite or Sunni Muslims, patriots or national, 
are faced with a difficult test. You (believers in the political process) say that 
you took part in the political process to decrease losses and as a means to deter 
the occupation. Today you are faced with a test. Will you hand over Iraq to the 
Americans for ever and ever? Or will you take the stance that is dictated by 
your religion, your Islam, your Arabism, your nationalism, your ethics, and 
your humanity? 
 
Today in the name of all those that have convened here and in the names of all 
free people in the Arab and Islamic worlds, I call upon the Iraqi people to with 
all its political and religious leaders to take the glorious historic position that 
prevents Iraq from falling forever in the hands of the occupier. As is the case in 
Lebanon and in Palestine, the various resistance factions in Iraq was capable of 
inflicting defeat after defeat on the American army. Here Iraq is also called 
upon to resort to the liberation strategy of resistance that was adopted in 
Lebanon and Palestine. This strategy is the only way to return the strong rich 
injured Iraq to its people and nation. 
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Dear brothers and sisters, before I conclude my research on the resistance and 
move on to the internal Lebanese situation, I would like to tell you that we also 
have presented a example of a strategy of defense as was the case in the 
liberation strategy. The July-august 2006 war is the example. How was it 
possible for a public resistance.....? How was it possible, as judge Winnograd 
put it, for several thousands to withhold for weeks in the face of the strongest 
army in the Middle East? Hence we are not discussing a defensive strategy 
studied in books and universities, rather, of a defense strategy that was 
implemented and inflicted defeat on the aggressor and usurper in the 
confessions of its entire society.  
 
This war in July changed many equations and weakened the possibilities of war 
in the region. Yes, dear brothers and sisters, your steadfastness in Lebanon, the 
blood of your martyrs, your nobleness and courage, your resistance which 
thwarted ‘Israel's' war and aggression on Lebanon...all weakened the 
possibilities of war in the region. The possibilities of an American war on Iran 
after the Lebanese sample was studied. The possibility of an American war on 
Syria is a very very far after the Lebanese war in Lebanon. As to an ‘Israeli' or 
American war on Lebanon or on a war by those who bet on the Americans and 
‘Israeli' tools...In Lebanon we are the most dignified people when we fought in 
July war and will fight and will fight in any future confrontation. 
 
In Palestine after the catastrophe of 1948, the Palestinians were waiting in vain 
for their Arab brothers to form a unified Arab strategy or for the international 
community to act. They would have become lost and forgotten were it not for 
the armed Palestinian resistance from the first bullet and the first operation, and 
because of which the world and the occupiers of Palestine woke up to the fact 
that there is a Palestinian people, land, and cause... that there was someone 
pleading for his rights taking up arms and granting blood regardless of the 
price. Once more the Palestinian motto was launched noting that we will head 
to Al Quds (Jerusalem) by the millions.  
 
Even today, dear brothers and sisters, whatever Palestinian achievements made 
since the beginning of the resistance till this day is , in the first degree, because 
of the resistance, struggle and armed strife of the Palestinian people and all 
resistance factions....ending with a huge accomplishment and significant 
victory. In view of the changing world balance, blockaded Gaza which was cut 
from the world was capable of defeating the Zionist army and forcing it, for the 
second time after Lebanon, into a humiliating unconditional withdrawal from 
the Gaza sector with no strings attached, and without any gains. 
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Yet again, the resistance's liberation strategy won meanwhile negotiations were 
attempting to regain the land inch by inch whilst it was required to surrender for 
every inch what could not be surrendered. What this signifies is that up till now, 
in Lebanon and in Palestine, experience has it that as Arabs, as a nation, and as 
Muslims, our sole way out of the catastrophe and all its ideological, 
psychological, military, security, political, and social implications....is through 
resistance in its method, cultures, willpower, and execution. 
 
Moving to Iraq, and in brief: In Iraq there exists an evident American 
occupation and American control of land and resources. The Americans in the 
past few years have played the game of occupation and democracy. And today 
the objectives behind that democracy are surfacing. How? Promptly after the 
American invasion the Iraqi people, like all the nations I mentioned earlier, 
were divided into two strong groups, into believers in the political process, and 
into believers in resistance, namely armed resistance. 
 
 It is absolutely natural for us in the resistance to side with the resistance 
movement in Iraq from an ideological, political, practical, experimental 
standing point. And despite that the pro-political operation group took their 
time and reached a difficult, intricate, separating exam which is the position on 
the agreements and accords that America wants to impose on Iraq and its 
peoples, and impose upon the government and parliament to consent to them.  
 
Here the true American objective behind the democracy game is uncovered. 
They came and opened the doors in front of all Islamic, patriotic, and national 
groups (to participate) knowing with whom they are friends and allies. So they 
opened the doors in front of everyone for a parliament to be elected and for it to 
elect a government, and therefore the whole world will refer to them as an 
elected government and parliament till the day comes when it (America) asks of 
this legalized government and legalized parliament to legalize the occupation, 
to sign an agreement granting the American sovereign control over Iraq making 
the security, political decision, oil, and Iraqi resources all in the hands of the 
Americans. Here the Americans are uncovered, and here the believers in the 
political process in Iraq, be they Shiite or Sunni Muslims, patriots or national, 
are faced with a difficult test.  
 
You (believers in the political process) say that you took part in the political 
process to decrease losses and as a means to deter the occupation. Today you 
are faced with a test. Will you hand over Iraq to the Americans for ever and 
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ever? Or will you take the stance that is dictated by your religion, your Islam, 
your Arabism, your nationalism, your ethics, and your humanity? 
 
Today in the name of all those that have convened here and in the names of all 
free people in the Arab and Islamic worlds, I call upon the Iraqi people to with 
all its political and religious leaders to take the glorious historic position that 
prevents Iraq from falling forever in the hands of the occupier. As is the case in 
Lebanon and in Palestine, the various resistance factions in Iraq was capable of 
inflicting defeat after defeat on the American army. Here Iraq is also called 
upon to resort to the liberation strategy of resistance that was adopted in 
Lebanon and Palestine. This strategy is the only way to return the strong rich 
injured Iraq to its people and nation. 
 
Dear brothers and sisters, before I conclude my research on the resistance and 
move on to the internal Lebanese situation, I would like to tell you that we also 
have presented a example of a strategy of defense as was the case in the 
liberation strategy. The July-august 2006 war is the example. How was it 
possible for a public resistance.....? How was it possible, as judge Winnograd 
put it, for several thousands to withhold for weeks in the face of the strongest 
army in the Middle East? Hence we are not discussing a defensive strategy 
studied in books and universities, rather, of a defense strategy that was 
implemented and inflicted defeat on the aggressor and usurper in the 
confessions of its entire society.  
 
This war in July changed many equations and weakened the possibilities of war 
in the region. Yes, dear brothers and sisters, your steadfastness in Lebanon, the 
blood of your martyrs, your nobleness and courage, your resistance which 
thwarted ‘Israel's' war and aggression on Lebanon...all weakened the 
possibilities of war in the region. The possibilities of an American war on Iran 
after the Lebanese sample was studied. The possibility of an American war on 
Syria is a very very far after the Lebanese war in Lebanon. As to an ‘Israeli' or 
American war on Lebanon or on a war by those who bet on the Americans and 
‘Israeli' tools...In Lebanon we are the most dignified people when we fought in 
June war and will fight and will fight in any future confrontation. 
 
Following the July war, we can see that the same defense strategy of the 
resistance is being employed in Gaza Strip. 'Israel' is battling in Gaza Strip a 
guerilla war, the way Gaza wishes it to be. 'Israel' will not invade Gaza because 
of its good behavior or because of its fear of an Arab public opinion or a certain 
Arab or international stance, knowing that it has carte blanche from the present 
135 
 
Pharaoh, George Bush. However, it is calculating each move in Following the 
July war, we can see that the same defense strategy of the resistance is being 
employed in Gaza Strip. 'Israel' is battling in Gaza Strip a guerilla war, the way 
Gaza wishes it to be. 'Israel' will not invade Gaza because of its good behavior 
or because of its fear of an Arab public opinion or a certain Arab or 
international stance, knowing that it has carte blanche from the present Pharaoh, 
George Bush. However, it is calculating each move in Gaza Strip, a city with 
proud nation and brave fighters from all the resistance brigades. 
 
This besieged, hungered, and victimized strip is rendering 'Israel' incapable and 
confused regarding options and methods. The defense strategy is succeeding in 
both Lebanon and Gaza despite the asymmetry of forces and the armament, 
economic and financial capacities as well as the lack of the international 
support. 
 
When the present pharaoh or George Bush, who will leave office God wiling, 
arrived to Palestine, and while ignoring the disaster of its nation and offering 
his total support to 'Israel', he wreaked his wrath upon the resistance 
movements in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq as well as the countries that side by 
and support the resistance. He also promised the 'Israelis' that 'Israel' will 
celebrate this sixtieth anniversary again after one hundred and twenty years. 
Bush is mistaken and will be disappointed. This very 'Israel' will cease to exist 
in the future. Bush also promised the world that the defeat will strike Hizbullah 
and the resistance movements. I promise Bush and Condoleezza Rice, who 
spoke about the loss of Hizbullah, that as long as Hizbullah stands by 
righteousness and depends on Allah and the noblest people like your selves, I 
tell them you are the defeated ones. 
 
On the eighth anniversary of the resistance and liberation, I ask the Arab 
nations and governments coupled with the Lebanese government to seriously 
mull the strategy of liberation and the strategy of defense in shade of the 
present symmetries in the region. In Lebanon, as always, there is continual 
utterance about designing a national defense strategy. 
 
However, I must also say that we need a strategy for the liberation of Shibaa 
Farms and Kafarshoub Hills, a defense strategy against aggression. We also 
require a plan to liberate the Shibaa Farms and Kafarshoub Hills as well as free 
the prisoners even though we say, "free your selves from the plan of freeing the 
prisoners" because freeing the prisoners is our promise and vow, freeing the 
prisoners is an achievement of the almighty through our hands-and shortly 
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Samir and his brothers will be amongst you in Lebanon. 
 
On May 25, 2000, the crowds gathered in Bint Jubeil, where I served and 
addressed them on their behalf. I had the honor to announce their victory, 
sacrifices, and feeling proud of the blood of their martyrs. I also gifted their 
victory to all Lebanon, all Palestine and the nation in its entirety. 
 
When I took the rostrum in Bint Jubeil, I said that we did our duty and it would 
be satisfactory for us to see God pleased with us because we fulfilled our duty. 
We sought no thanks, prizes or gifts from anyone. I also said that we sought no 
power and that the land that was liberated by the blood of the resisting martyrs 
in their entirety belonged to the Lebanese state and Lebanese authority. 
Therefore, it had to be fully responsible on the fields of security, justice, 
community and economy. We did not want to be responsible for security or 
administration. When we said it, didn't our words turn into deeds?  
 
They did. We did not try any traitor and we handed over all collaborators to the 
Lebanese justice. No military appearance of ours has ever surfaced along the 
borderline that was liberated through blood. Instead, we said to the state, 
proceed and be responsible. 
 
We asked the state to give attention to two issues: give developmental attention 
to the areas that lived the battles in the south and to the areas which struggled 
and offered martyrs in the deprived south, when I also mentioned Baalbeck by 
its name as well as Hirmil and Akkar. What did those, who sought the state's 
authority to be stretched, achieve after eight years? Who prevented you from 
going to the borderline and the deprived areas in order to fulfill your duty as a 
state? The Lebanese know it. Let our Arab brothers also know that there are 
many areas in Lebanon which know nothing of the Lebanese authority but the 
police and tax collectors, and they are deprived of development, services and 
care. 
 
I also said, when I was asked and answered, that my brothers and I did not seek 
any change to the political structure of the system and we did not demand any 
change to the Taif accord. We did not seek share of power or share of offices. 
We did not want anything at all. This is what happened. One must know that 
when they teach us about the French, Vietnamese, and Indian resistance, they 
tell us that the resistance disarmed after the liberation was achieved. I say to 
them that throughout history all the resistances that emerged victorious seized 
power or demanded power after their victory was achieved. On the contrary, we 
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never sought power in the first place. We said to them that this power belongs 
to you but do not monopolize it and be fair, give attention to the people, solve 
their social and economic problems, and maintain the dignities of the people. 
We never sought partnership of power after the victory of 2000. Who can say 
otherwise? 
 
Today, I repeat, speaking on Hizbullah in precise. We do not seek any power in 
Lebanon. We do not want to seize power or control Lebanon. We do not want 
to impose our ideology or agenda on the Lebanese nation because we believe 
that Lebanon is one of its kind, multiple and diversified. This country cannot 
rise but through the participation, cooperation, concord and unity of all. We 
always demanded these issues. Many tried, through their media, to twist this 
truth. They think that when they say that Hizbullah follows the supreme 
authority-the just authority, the jurisprudent authority, the wise authority, the 
brave authority, the honest authority, and the loyal authority- I reply and say to 
them that the supreme authority recognizes us as its party. Lebanon is a 
diversified country and you must preserve it. 
 
Gaza Strip, a city with proud nation and brave fighters from all the resistance 
brigades. 
This besieged, hungered, and victimized strip is rendering 'Israel' incapable and 
confused regarding options and methods. The defense strategy is succeeding in 
both Lebanon and Gaza despite the asymmetry of forces and the armament, 
economic and financial capacities as well as the lack of the international 
support. 
 
When the present pharaoh or George Bush, who will leave office God wiling, 
arrived to Palestine, and while ignoring the disaster of its nation and offering 
his total support to 'Israel', he wreaked his wrath upon the resistance 
movements in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq as well as the countries that side by 
and support the resistance. He also promised the 'Israelis' that 'Israel' will 
celebrate this sixtieth anniversary again after one hundred and twenty years. 
Bush is mistaken and will be disappointed. This very 'Israel' will cease to exist 
in the future. Bush also promised the world that the defeat will strike Hizbullah 
and the resistance movements. I promise Bush and Condoleezza Rice, who 
spoke about the loss of Hizbullah, that as long as Hizbullah stands by 
righteousness and depends on Allah and the noblest people like your selves, I 
tell them you are the defeated ones. 
 
On the eighth anniversary of the resistance and liberation, I ask the Arab 
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nations and governments coupled with the Lebanese government to seriously 
mull the strategy of liberation and the strategy of defense in shade of the 
present symmetries in the region. In Lebanon, as always, there is continual 
utterance about designing a national defense strategy. 
 
However, I must also say that we need a strategy for the liberation of Shibaa 
Farms and Kafarshoub Hills, a defense strategy against aggression. We also 
require a plan to liberate the Shibaa Farms and Kafarshoub Hills as well as free 
the prisoners even though we say, "free your selves from the plan of freeing the 
prisoners" because freeing the prisoners is our promise and vow, freeing the 
prisoners is an achievement of the almighty through our hands-and shortly 
Samir and his brothers will be amongst you in Lebanon. 
On May 25, 2000, the crowds gathered in Bint Jubeil, where I served and 
addressed them on their behalf. I had the honor to announce their victory, 
sacrifices, and feeling proud of the blood of their martyrs. I also gifted their 
victory to all Lebanon, all Palestine and the nation in its entirety. 
 
When I took the rostrum in Bint Jubeil, I said that we did our duty and it would 
be satisfactory for us to see God pleased with us because we fulfilled our duty. 
We sought no thanks, prizes or gifts from anyone. I also said that we sought no 
power and that the land that was liberated by the blood of the resisting martyrs 
in their entirety belonged to the Lebanese state and Lebanese authority. 
Therefore, it had to be fully responsible on the fields of security, justice, 
community and economy. We did not want to be responsible for security or 
administration. When we said it, didn't our words turn into deeds? They did. 
We did not try any traitor and we handed over all collaborators to the Lebanese 
justice. No military appearance of ours has ever surfaced along the borderline 
that was liberated through blood. Instead, we said to the state, proceed and be 
responsible. 
 
We asked the state to give attention to two issues: give developmental attention 
to the areas that lived the battles in the south and to the areas which struggled 
and offered martyrs in the deprived south, when I also mentioned Baalbeck by 
its name as well as Hirmil and Akkar. What did those, who sought the state's 
authority to be stretched, achieve after eight years? Who prevented you from 
going to the borderline and the deprived areas in order to fulfill your duty as a 
state? The Lebanese know it. Let our Arab brothers also know that there are 
many areas in Lebanon which know nothing of the Lebanese authority but the 
police and tax collectors, and they are deprived of development, services and 
care. 
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I also said, when I was asked and answered, that my brothers and I did not seek 
any change to the political structure of the system and we did not demand any 
change to the Taif accord. We did not seek share of power or share of offices. 
We did not want anything at all. This is what happened. One must know that 
when they teach us about the French, Vietnamese, and Indian resistance, they 
tell us that the resistance disarmed after the liberation was achieved. I say to 
them that throughout history all the resistances that emerged victorious seized 
power or demanded power after their victory was achieved. On the contrary, we 
never sought power in the first place. We said to them that this power belongs 
to you but do not monopolize it and be fair, give attention to the people, solve 
their social and economic problems, and maintain the dignities of the people. 
We never sought partnership of power after the victory of 2000. Who can say 
otherwise? 
 
Today, I repeat, speaking on Hizbullah in precise. We do not seek any power in 
Lebanon. We do not want to seize power or control Lebanon. We do not want 
to impose our ideology or agenda on the Lebanese nation because we believe 
that Lebanon is one of its kind, multiple and diversified. This country cannot 
rise but through the participation, cooperation, concord and unity of all. We 
always demanded these issues. Many tried, through their media, to twist this 
truth. They think that when they say that Hizbullah follows the supreme 
authority-the just authority, the jurisprudent authority, the wise authority, the 
brave authority, the honest authority, and the loyal authority- I reply and say to 
them that the supreme authority recognizes us as its party. Lebanon is a 
diversified country and you must preserve it. 
 
Much was said in recent events, that the this or that side wanted to control 
Lebanon... they spoke of a coup and a change of power to bring Lebanon under 
Syrian guardianship, just like what happened in the July 2006 war the U.S. 
adopted, and described as 'Lebanon witnessing the birth pangs of a new Middle 
East'. Back then they claimed, as they do today, that the resistance was fighting 
for the Iranian nuclear program and the International Tribunal. 
 
When the "government" revoked its two black decisions the opposition proved 
in Doha that it does not want to monopolize power and did not raise the ceiling 
of demands. We did not employ what happened recently in politics and we did 
not ask for political gains. The opposition kept to the political demands it had 
upheld prior to the recent events without changes.  
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Yes... after the events that took place in Lebanon, the cadres of the opposition 
have the right to ask for lifting the political demands ceiling, because changes 
had taken place. Yet, we did not alter an iota of our demands nor raise the 
ceiling, because we want to rescue Lebanon from what is more dangerous; from 
army-resistance inter-fighting, from sectarian sedition, from the hot summer 
promised by the tyrant 'Pharaoh, Haman' David Welch and his bosses. We did 
not at all employ what happened politically, nor did we demand for any 
political gains, despite what we incurred of unjust accusations, distortion and 
vicious abuse by many people. Yet, I will not delve into this topic today ..  
 
Is this experience not enough as an argument to settle the ongoing debate in 
Lebanon that accuses us of dreams of domination and hegemony?  
 
In the past in Bint Jbeil and again here today in the proud southern suburb, I 
renew my call for true partnership, where none is discounted or omitted, where 
no one is imposed over anyone else, to provide the Lebanese with the 
opportunity to build a true and fair state, governed by representatives who are 
elected faithfully in integrity, through sincere and solid alliances, to allow the 
Lebanese people the opportunity to work together away from outside 
interference..  
 
A few days ago, the Saudi Council of Ministers asked for constitutional 
amendments that ensured Lebanon's Arab identity. I personally agree, yes, I, 
who believes in 'Welayit-el-faqih' (the rule of religious jurisprudent), agree to 
perform constitutional amendments to ensure the Arab identity of Lebanon, to 
prevent anyone from intervening in Lebanon. It was better to them to talk about 
the western and American intervention in Lebanon. As for our friends, the 
world knows that they do not impose their decisions on us. We, in the 
opposition, whether here on the ground, in Doha or anywhere, are the decision-
makers.  
 
Regarding the recent events, I have already explained some aspects, and 
repercussions of the events during last Thursday's press conference, but today I 
am faced with two choices: either I explain, clarify and give detailed account of 
what happened in the period leading up to the two decisions being taken, 
through to taking them, their meaning, and the risks involved, and I know that 
this will lead to a resurgence of tensions on the Lebanese arena at the time I do 
not want to sour the joy of the Lebanese reconciliation and their joy of electing 
a new president to Lebanon, or postpone all this debate, thus leaving certain 
matters outstanding in the minds of some, vague for others and unfair to us. 
141 
 
 
I, for now, prefer to postpone this debate and suffer the unjust accusations 
against the resistance for the sake of reunification.  
 
Faced with the recent events some points need to be addressed. 
 
Both, them and us, are deeply wounded, therefore they and we are also faced 
with two options: either deepen the wounds by dwelling on them, or work on 
the bandaging and treatment of these wounds for the sake of Lebanon and the 
people of Lebanon; we support the latter.  
Such course needs words and deeds, for which we are ready.  
 
What is important is to draw lessons from what happened, and with such 
lessons I am not to be misinterpreted as speaking from the logic of a 'victor'. 
 
Hence, let us deal with opening the wounds at a later time when everyone 
concerned is calm and at more ease, when logic and reason can help mend the 
wounds, when we launch a new phase in Lebanon, the post-May 25, 2008 
phase, that is after the national, Arab and international merriment that was 
witnessed yesterday in our Lebanese Parliament.  
Dear brothers and sisters, faced with these developments I must put forward the 
following points:  
 
First: On your behalf, I wish to thank our fellow Arabs, the Arab Ministerial 
Committee, the Arab League Secretary-General, special thanks to the 
leadership and the people of the State of Qatar, and all the sister nations and 
friendly countries, particularly Syria and the Islamic Republic in Iran, as well as 
all Lebanon's friends, all who helped achieve this agreement.  
 
Second: On the question of disarmament, again today I stress the item 
contained in the Doha agreement not to use arms to achieve any political gains 
by any of the parties. We strongly support this sentence and we will discuss that 
at the dialogue table, but now hear me out: the resistance weapon is for 
confronting the enemy, to liberate the land and the prisoners and to defend 
Lebanon, and not to be used for any political gains, but as for the other 
weapons, what were they for? Who was accumulating them? For whom were 
they being prepared and trained on? 
 
And here is a question: the state's weapon means that of the national army and 
the security forces. It is to defend the homeland, protect the citizens and the 
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protection of their various rights, to protect the State and establish security. 
 
The resistance weapon should not be used to achieve gains internally, but also 
the state's weapon should not be used to settle accounts with any opposition 
political group. 
The weapon of the state should not be used either for the implementation of 
external projects that weaken Lebanon's ability in the face of "Israel", nor 
against the resistance and its weapon. 
 
Every weapon has to continue to serve the objectives for which it was 
employed, whether the weapon of the resistance or that of the state.  
 
Third: regarding the election law. There is no doubt that the law we reached 
thus far is better than previous laws, particularly the 'year 2000 law'. This law 
came at the cost of the opposition's partisan and confessional share of the 
allocated seats in Parliament, especially at the expense of Hizbullah and Amal 
movement, but we agreed to it because it ensures true representation that is 
approved by the other side.  
 
This law is derived from a settlement between parties who want to pluck 
Lebanon out of its  
crisis... I hope the time comes when the Lebanese are able to sit calmly to 
discuss a civilized and modern law that acts as a foundation for the 
establishment of the state. 
The true intentions of all those who say they want to build a state, are revealed 
when talking about the election law. The election law is the key to building the 
state, installing power, government, authority and the institutions. Anyone 
trying to fit an election law to their size, or to that of their leadership, their party 
or confession, proves they do not want to build a state. It is not enough to 
accuse others of not wanting to build a state, he who refuses to give the 
Lebanese a law that truly represents them, does not want a state but rather 
wants a farm. In any case, this is the possible settlement now.  
 
Fourth: Electing Gen. Michel Suleiman as President of the Republic renews 
hope among the Lebanese for a new era and a new beginning. The inauguration 
speech we heard yesterday reflects the harmonious spirit that His Excellency 
promised to act through in the coming stage, which is what Lebanon needs of 
harmony, partnership and cooperation, and away from monopolization.  
 
Fifth: A Government of National Unity through a genuine partnership between 
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the opposition and the loyalists, is not a victory for the opposition against the 
loyalists, but a victory for all of Lebanon and every Lebanese, a victory for co-
existence and the state, because this country can not be established, built, 
sustained and remain firm but through cooperation, agreement and 
collaboration. 
 
When I addressed your sit-in protest in both martyrs and Riyadh al-Solh 
squares and said: 'As I promise you victory always, I promise you victory 
again', I did not mean the victory of one group against another, nor a side 
against another, nor opposition against loyalists. As I believe, that victory in 
Lebanon cannot be achieved but through the government of National Unity. 
When agreement on forming a national unity government was reached in Doha, 
the victory was for Lebanon, just as May 25th, 2000 was not a victory for one 
category or political group, and again just as Lebanon was the victor in July 
2006, Lebanon is the victor in Doha today.  
 
We will contribute with all sincerity and seriousness in the formation of this 
government to start its work. I have previously promised the presence of 
spectrums of the opposition, not limited only to the opposition's representation 
through Hizbullah, Amal movment and the Reform and Change bloc, but to 
allow the opportunity for other forces of the opposition, even if from 
Hizbullah's share, because, unfortunately, the structure and composition of 
Lebanon is one of quotas and shares.  
 
We will work in earnest for the best possible representation of the opposition in 
the government of national unity. Also, I hope that the government is serious 
and works on addressing the many problems facing the Lebanese, rather than 
wasting a lot of the Lebanese people's time, or just kill time; a government that 
is serious about assuming responsibility.  
Sixth: Since we are talking about the future government and the next stage, I, in 
all sincerity, particularly invite the movement and those who love the martyr 
PM Rafik Hariri, to take advantage of this great man's considerable experience, 
to benefit from the horizons of his strategic thinking on Lebanon, whom with a 
great mind and a great heart was able to harmonise between the development 
and reconstruction project of the State and that of the Resistance.  
 
Some wanted to force the government and the resistance to take one of two 
choices: either a 'Hong Kong' type Lebanon or one like 'Hanoi', i.e. either a 
devastated country or a prosperous one, one that is subject to 'Israel's' whims.  
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The resistance with martyr PM Rafik Hariri's mind, was able to say 'we do not 
imitate anyone, neither Hong Kong nor Hanoi, nor follow any model'.  
 
We the Lebanese make the model. We can offer the world a country where 
development, economy, the state, companies, investments and productive 
sectors, can coexist alongside the resistance that does not exercise the task of 
the state, nor competes against its authority, but shares the burden of the 
responsibility in liberating the land and defending the homeland.  
 
This is the formula we and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri coexisted under and 
shared, and he who is faithful to the legacy of this great martyr has to carry on 
with this work. This is not an invitation to bilateral, trilateral or quad alliance, 
which has become a thing of the past. We now call for the participation of the 
broadest possible spectrum of people, to stay away from any monopolization of 
authority, in the state or in its institutions. 
 
I strongly hope and pray to God that the Lebanese may have a calm gentle 
summer. I invite all to cooperate as there are two dreams, one Lebanese and one 
American; the Lebanese dream speaks of a tranquil and calm summer, on the 
other hand the American dream speaks of a "hot summer". Hence, let us realize 
our dreams and not those of our enemies. I promise you along with all the 
Lebanese and all our loved ones in both the Arab and Islamic worlds, to make 
every effort to overcome all hatred, to put aside all the sensitivities and join 
hands in cooperation and build Lebanon.  
 
Thanks to the leaderships of the Islamic Sunnis in Lebanon, the Arab and 
Islamic worlds, to the religious, political and intellectual leaderships, because 
the courageous stands they took disrupted the American project which always 
tries to portray any political conflict anywhere as a sectarian conflict..  
 
Thanks to the nationalist Druze leaders of the sons of Ma'arouf (Bani-
Ma'arouf), from the resistance Mountain, for their courageous and nationalistic 
stands, whether clergy, elders, political leaders, media figures or forces and 
political parties because through their voices and courage, they prevented 
anyone in the world from portraying that what is happening here is a Shiite - 
Druze sedition.  
 
Thanks to all to the Nationalistic Christian leaders in Lebanon, who confirmed 
through their position that the conflict is political and far removed from 
sectarianism... and compassion and mercy for all the martyrs.  
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To mention the martyrs, 14 of us passed away as martyrs, whom we are proud 
of, and are honored by, through whom our heads are held high, and two martyrs 
from the Lebanese 'Saraya' (the Lebanese Brigades for Resisting Occupation), 
in addition to martyrs from Amal movement, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist 
Party and the Lebanese Democratic Party.  
 
These martyrs were from all confessions, Muslims and Christians, Sunnis, 
Shiites and Druze... therefore suspicions cannot remain over the non-sectarian 
nature of this conflict.  
We are proud of these martyrs, just as we regret and feel pain for all the victims 
from the other side who passed away during these events. The families of those 
martyred can find consolation in that their sons' blood brought Lebanon out of a 
long dark tunnel... If it was not for their blood and sacrifices, some foreign 
forces wanted to take Lebanon to a place where no opportunity exists for it to 
stand and rise.  
 
We owe it to those martyrs who placed Lebanon before a new summer and a 
new life.  
On your Resistance and Liberation Day, we give our beloved Beirut, the dear 
Mountain, the steadfast Bekaa, North and South Lebanon, to each village, party 
and sect in Lebanon, to every group and confession of Lebanon, and to you all 
our affection, gratitude, respect and open hand, always ready for cooperation in 
building a strong, dignified, just and a resilient Lebanon, capable of 
steadfastness, proud as its mountains, eternal as its cedars... 
 
Peace, mercy and God's blessings be upon you. 
 
 
